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Executive summary 
In order for multinational manufacturing companies to strengthen their position in a 
competitive global market, continuous improvement of the companies’ operations has 
received an increasing focus since the 1990s. In order to develop a lasting culture for 
continuous improvement, an increasing number of companies have developed ‘improvement 
programs’ tailored towards the company’s specific operations. This type of improvement 
programs have been denoted as company-specific production systems (XPS), and are inspired 
by principles from Lean Manufacturing and the Toyota Production System (TPS). In Norway, 
the multinational materials producer Elkem has been one of the pioneers within XPS with its 
Elkem Business System (EBS). Elkem’s  EBS center has since the early 2000s  implemented 
EBS in most subsidiaries within the company.  
There has been a heated debate in research over the transferability of TPS, as some argue that 
TPS is a universal set of management tools that can be transferred everywhere, while others 
deny the universal transferability of TPS, emphasizing the unique socio-economic context in 
which TPS exists. This study adopts the contingency perspective, believing TPS to be 
universally transferable but subject to organizational and external factors which influence the 
implementation at the recipient site.  
The contribution of this study is to increase the understanding of the conditions that influence 
implementation of XPS in the subsidiaries of a multinational company (MNC). In order to 
accomplish this, a comparative case study of two manufacturing units in Elkem is conducted, 
investigating one plant in Norway (Elkem Salten) and one plant in Iceland (Elkem Iceland). 
The two plants were chosen on the basis of their many similarities (production facilities, size, 
number of employees), which on a general basis should qualify the plants for an equal 
starting point when implementing XPS. However, while Elkem Salten appears to have 
experienced great success when implementing XPS, Elkem Iceland has experienced many 
challenges and relapses. Consequently, this case study seeks to examine why the 
implementation of EBS has varied to such a large extent between the two plants. In order to 
investigate this issue, the study first identifies i) factors influencing the local EBS 
implementation at each plant, ii) factors influencing the inter-unit EBS related sharing 
between the plants. 
As the research approach of this study is explanatory, and the investigated events are 
contemporary and possible to observe directly, a case study design was chosen to carry out 
the research. Drawing on the strengths of such a research design, the study employs multiple 
sources of evidence such as: focused and in-depth interviews, direct observation and several 
types of documentation. Further, in order to guide the selection of empirical data, the study 
uses theory from five streams of literature: absorptive capacity theory, change management, 
institutional theory, corporate socialization theory and agency theory. The choice of literature 
is based on a literature review conducted as a preliminary study during the autumn of 2011, 
within the field of ‘transfer of procedural knowledge within MNCs’. 
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The background for the comparative case study was a perception that Elkem Salten had 
achieved a higher level of success with its XPS implementation compared to Elkem Iceland. 
However, the findings of this study create a more nuanced impression of the current situation: 
Although Elkem Salten can be said to have had a more efficient XPS implementation, 
resulting in a more systemized approach to XPS, Elkem Iceland has in recent years shown 
significant improvement. Still, the plant lacks a sufficient systemization of the XPS 
implementation, resulting in a lower efficiency of the implementation process. Further, past 
events in the plant’s history have influenced the implementation of XPS, giving the plant a 
difficult start. Yet, the findings show that both plants have some common areas of 
improvement potential, such as increasing the motivation and involvement related to XPS 
among employees at the operating level.   
The study identifies 19 factors through the reviewed literature that are believed to have an 
influence on the implementation and inter-unit sharing of XPS within MNCs. These factors 
can be classified according to three levels of analysis: subsidiary level, corporate level and 
national level. The expected influence of the factors is formulated in 13 theoretical 
propositions, which are tested based on the empirical data. Four of the propositions find 
strong support and are thus expected to be generalizable to other MNCs. Further, a holistic 
perspective is used to evaluate all the factors, showing that they intertwine and influence each 
other across the three levels of analysis, and across the five theoretical perspectives. Although 
the discussion suggests a complex interaction of the identified factors, some particular factors 
are identified as major determinants for the different outcomes of the two plants.  
Of the identified factors related to implementation of XPS, the discussion shows that the 
organizational inertia at Iceland has had a major influence on the outset of the plant’s XPS 
implementation, and left a challenging basis for further implementation. Further, the plant at 
Salten has had a major advantage over the plant at Iceland due to a higher level of prior 
related knowledge and support from the plant manager, and the plant management’s higher 
level of knowledge acquisition. This advantage has resulted in a more systemized approach to 
the implementation process, and a higher level of cross-functional communication. 
 
Of the identified factors related to inter-unit sharing of XPS, the discussion reveals that the 
lack of standardization in XPS implementation has been an important underlying factor, 
causing the existence of other barriers to sharing. Most importantly, the lack of 
standardization has complicated the use of corporate socialization mechanisms. Further, the 
sharing between units in the case company has mainly been facilitated by an XPS knowledge 
center, acting as an intermediary. The empirical findings reveal that this arrangement has 
been a bottleneck in the XPS sharing process. 
These factors have commingled, and led to a limited sharing of XPS related knowledge in the 
case company. Therefore, many valuable experiences related to XPS implementation have 
not been shared between units, contributing to the high variation in the level of XPS 
implementation.  
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For managers of multinational companies, the findings imply that managing XPS in a 
multinational company is a complex undertaking. The findings show that providing 
subsidiaries with theoretical knowledge of XPS tools and methodology is not enough in itself. 
In order to achieve higher levels of implementation, local managers must possess a practical 
understanding of how to translate XPS related knowledge to the every-day situation of the 
plant.  Further, focus should be on systemizing the intra-unit, cross-functional communication 
as well as the inter-unit knowledge sharing. In addition, managers of the parent company 
must communicate the importance of XPS related knowledge sharing, and promote a 
common corporate identity to strengthen inter-unit ties within the MNC. 
This study provides two main contributions to the theory. First, the study’s findings indicate a 
strong link between the field of procedural knowledge transfer and the implementation and 
sharing of XPS in MNCs. Based on this link, a set of propositions for investigating XPS 
implementation and sharing in MNCs is provided for future research. Second, the study 
proposes a theoretical model which explains how the investigated theories interact to explain 
XPS implementation and sharing in multinational companies. 
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Sammendrag 
For multinasjonale selskaper som opererer i et marked med stadig økende global 
konkurranse, har kontinuerlig forbedring av prosessene blitt svært viktig for å opprettholde 
konkurransekraften. For å opprette en varig kultur for kontinuerlig forbedring, har et økende 
antall selskaper utviklet «forbedringssystemer» som er skreddersydde til selskapets 
virksomhet. Slike forbedringssystemer blir gjerne referert til som «bedriftsspesifikke 
produksjonssystem» (XPS), og bygger på prinsipper fra Lean og Toyotas produksjonssystem. 
I Norge er den multinasjonale metallprodusenten, Elkem, en pioner innenfor XPS med sitt 
Elkem Business System (EBS). Elkems eget EBS senter har siden tidlig på 2000 tallet 
implementert EBS i alle sine underenheter. 
Det har vært en opphetet debatt innenfor forskningsmiljøet angående overførbarheten til TPS. 
Noen forskere argumenterer for at TPS er et universelt sett av ledelsesverktøy som kan bli 
overført overalt, mens andre avviser den universelle overførbarheten til TPS og fremhever 
den unike sosialøkonomiske konteksten til TPS. Dette studiet bygger på det såkalte 
contingency perspective, som støtter den universelle overførbarheten til TPS, men også 
fremhever at organisatoriske og eksterne faktorer påvirker implementeringen hos hver enkelt 
bedrift.  
Hensikten med dette studiet er å øke forståelsen av hvilke faktorer som påvirker 
implementeringen av XPS i underenheter av multinasjonale selskaper. For å oppnå dette, 
utføres et sammenlignende case studie av to verk i det multinasjonale selskapet Elkem, der et 
verk i Norge (Elkem Salten) og et verk på Island (Elkem Island) utforskes. De to verkene ble 
valgt på bakgrunn av deres mange likheter (produksjonsfasiliteter, størrelse, antall ansatte), 
som på generelt grunnlag burde gitt dem et likt grunnlag for å implementere XPS. Likevel har 
Elkem Salten hatt stor suksess med å implementere XPS, mens Elkem Salten har hatt store 
utfordringer og tilbakefall. 
Dette case studiet ønsker å undersøke hvorfor implementeringen av XPS har variert i så stor 
grad mellom de to verkene. For å undersøke dette vil studiet først identifisere i) faktorer som 
påvirker den lokale XPS implementeringen på hvert verk, ii) faktorer som påvirker delingen 
av XPS erfaringer mellom verkene. 
Grunnen til at et case studie ble valgt som forskningsmetode er at implementering av XPS er 
noe som pågår i bedriften i dag, og som dermed kan observeres direkte. Dette studiet benytter 
seg av en av styrkene til case studiet som metode, nemlig å bruke flere beviskilder. Kilder 
som er blitt brukt er fokuserte intervjuer, direkte observasjon og ulike typer dokumentasjon. 
Videre, for å veilede utvelgelsen av empirisk data, bygger studiet på teori fra fem ulike 
teoretiske retninger: absorptive capacity theory, change management, institutional theory, 
corporate socialization theory og agency theory. Valget av teorier er basert på et 
forberedende litteraturstudie utført høsten 2011 som omhandlet overføring av praksiser innad 
i multinasjonale selskaper (Transfer of procedural knowledge within MNCs). 
Bakgrunnen for det sammenlignende case studiet var det faktum  at Elkem Salten hadde 
oppnådd en større grad av suksess med å implementerer XPS sammenlignet med Elkem 
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Island. Dette studiet viser likevel et mer nyansert bilde av den nåværende situasjonen: Selv 
om Elkem Salten har hatt en mer effektiv XPS implementering, noe som har resultert i en 
mer systematisert tilnærming til XPS, har Elkem Island vist store forbedringer de siste årene. 
Til tross for forbedringene mangler verket likevel en tilstrekkelig systematisering av XPS 
implementeringen, noe som resulterer i en mindre effektiv implementeringsprosess. Videre 
har hendelser i verkets historie påvirket implementeringen, da de har gitt verket en vanskelig 
start. Dette har igjen har ført til at verket har blitt liggende etter. Resultatene av dette studiet 
viser likevel at begge verkene har felles forbedringspotensialer, som å øke motivasjonen 
knyttet til XPS og å involvere de ansatte på operatørnivå. 
Dette studiet identifiserer 19 faktorer som har påvirket implementeringen og delingen av XPS 
erfaringer innenfor case selskapet. Disse faktorene kan bli klassifisert etter tre ulike 
analysenivå: datterselskapsnivå, selskapsnivå, og nasjonalt nivå. Den forventede 
påvirkningen til faktorene er formulert gjennom 13 teoretiske påstander, som blir testet basert 
på empiriske data. Fire av påstandene fikk sterk støtte, og er derfor forventet å være 
generaliserbare til andre multinasjonale selskaper. Videre er det benyttet et holistisk 
perspektiv for å undersøke faktorene, noe som viser at faktorene går inn i hverandre og 
påvirker hverandre på tvers av de tre analysenivåene, og på tvers av de fem teoriene. Selv om 
diskusjonen viser til et komplekst bilde av hvordan faktorene påvirker hverandre, har noen 
faktorer blitt identifisert og trukket frem som de de viktigste determinantene for den ulike 
graden av suksess med XPS implementering på de to verkene.  
Av de identifiserte faktorene som påvirker selve implementeringen, viser diskusjonen at 
organisatorisk treghet (organizational inertia) spilte en viktig rolle ved den første 
innføringen av EBS på Island, og at dette skapte et vanskelig grunnlag for den videre 
implementeringen. Videre har Elkem Salten hatt en stor fordel over Elkem Island på grunn av 
verkssjefens høye nivå av tidligere relevant kunnskap (prior related knowledge), sterk støtte 
og iver etter å erverve ny kunnskap. Dette har ført til en mer systematisk tilnærming til 
implementeringen, og en større grad av kommunikasjon på tvers av funksjoner (cross-
functional communication). 
Av de identifiserte faktorene som påvirker deling av XPS erfaring mellom enheter, påpeker 
diskusjonen at mangelen på standardisering av XPS implementering har vært en viktig 
underliggende faktor, som igjen har ført til at andre hindringer har oppstått. Det mest kritiske 
er at mangelen på standardisering har vanskeliggjort bruken av mekanismer for å bygge 
nettverk i selskapet (corporate socialization mechanisms).  Videre har delingen av erfaringer 
mellom datterselskapene skjedd gjennom et XPS senter, som har fungert som et mellomledd i 
prosessen. De empiriske resultatene indikerer at denne ordningen har vært en flaskehals i 
delingsprosessen. Alle de overnevnte faktorene har sammen ført til en begrenset deling av 
XPS erfaringer i case selskapet. Derfor har mange verdifulle erfaringer knyttet til XPS 
implementeringen ikke blitt delt mellom datterselskaper, noe som har vært med på å 
opprettholde den store variasjonen i implementeringssuksess.  
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Som et bidrag til teorien utvikles en teoretisk modell som viser hvordan de ulike teoriene 
påvirker hverandre, hvilket fenomen de beskriver (XPS implementering eller XPS deling) og 
på hvilket nivå de forklarer fenomenet. 
Resultatene av dette studiet impliserer at å lede XPS implementeringen i et multinasjonalt 
selskap er en kompleks oppgave. Funnene viser at å skaffe datterselskapene teoretisk 
kunnskap om  XPS verktøy og metodologi ikke er tilstrekkelig. For å oppnå et høyere nivå av 
implementering må lokale ledere ha en praktisk forståelse av hvordan de kan overføre XPS 
kunnskap til praktiske gjøremål i den daglige operasjonen. Videre bør det fokuseres på å 
systematisere kommunikasjonen mellom ulike funksjoner innad i datterselskapene, og også 
erfaringsutvekslingen mellom datterselskapene. For toppledelsen i selskapet er det 
avgjørende å kommunisere viktigheten av erfaringsutveksling knyttet til XPS, og å fremme 
en felles bedriftsidentitet som styrker båndene mellom datterselskapene. 
Dette studiet gir hovedsakelig to bidrag til teorien. For det første indikerer funnene at det er 
en sterk link mellom forskningsfeltet som omhandler overføring av prosessuell kunnskap 
mellom enheter og implementering of deling av XPS erfaringer i multinasjonale selskaper. 
Baser på denne linken, utvikler studiet et sett av påstander som omhandler implementering og 
deling av XPS i multinasjonale selskaper. Disse påstandene kan bli benyttet i fremtidig 
forskning. For det andre utvikler studiet en teoretisk modell som forklarer hvordan de 
undersøkte teoriene sammen forklarer XPS implementering og deling i multinasjonale 
selskaper. 
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1. Introduction 
When the Toyota Motor Company invented the Toyota Production System (TPS), they 
redesigned the mass production system. Based on the need to compete in a resource-constrained 
environment in post-war Japan, Toyota developed a hybrid production system that merged 
Ford’s mass production techniques with a small-batch production system. This became what is 
known as the Toyota Production System (Ohno 1988, Fujimoto 1999). Since then, TPS has 
continuously evolved (Holweg 2007), and became known in the West initially as just-in-time 
(JIT) production, and subsequently as lean production or lean thinking (Womack et al.1990).  
Inspired by the continual success of Toyota and its TPS, companies in the automobile industry 
have, since the mid-1990s, led the trend of developing improvement programs in the form of 
company-specific production systems (XPS) (Netland, 2012). In recent years, non-automotive 
manufacturing industries have joined the growing trend, giving evidence to a phenomenon that 
continues to spread globally across all types of manufacturing industries. XPS spans an array of 
different but related production concepts such as Total Quality Management, just-in-time 
production, Six Sigma, and lean production (Netland, 2012). 
However, there has been a heated debate in research over the transferability of TPS (Lee & Jo, 
2007). Some researchers (e.g. Adler & Cole, 1993; Womack & Jones, 1994) claim that TPS is a 
universal set of management norms that can be transferred anywhere, while others (Williams & 
Haslam, 1992; Williams et al., 1994) deny the universal transferability of TPS, emphasizing the 
unique socio-economic context in which Toyota exists. However, a third perspective, the 
contingency perspective, considers a more balanced approach: both the universality of TPS and 
the necessary pre-conditions and constraints related to its transferability. This academic group 
stresses that the successful implementation of TPS is dependent upon several organizational 
factors at recipient sites, like long-term management strategies, labor-management cooperation, 
employee and union involvement, open communication, and investments in training (Harber et 
al., 1990; White et al., 1999). They also point out that the processes and outcomes of TPS 
emulation are coordinated by external forces (i.e. market situations, internal division of labor, 
local institutional environment, social culture) (Liker et al., 1999; Mehta and Shah, 2004).  
In terms of the implementation of XPS, the experiences of Norwegian companies have been 
mixed. During a recent workshop on company-specific production systems and their role in 
future manufacturing 1 (Netland, 2011), this impression was further strengthened. Leading 
multinational manufacturing companies shared their experiences related to implementing XPS. 
Some stated that they have experienced success when implementing XPS in the organization, 
while others have experienced challenges when they for instance try to transfer XPS to globally 
dispersed subsidiaries. Consequently, the contingency perspective is adopted in this study, 
                                                            
1 Held at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology in May 2011 
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believing XPS systems to be universally transferable, but subject to organizational factors and 
external forces which influence the implementation of XPS at recipient sites. 
1.1 Research approach 
This study is conducted as a comparative case study of two subsidiaries within an MNC. The 
primary aim of the study is to investigate why the level of success related to the XPS 
implementation has varied between the investigated subsidiaries. This aim is consolidated in the 
study’s first research question: 
 
In order to approach this research question, a literature review was conducted during the autumn 
2011. The purpose of this review was to identify influencing factors of XPS implementation 
addressed by previous research. However, despite an extensive body of literature concerning the 
applicability of TPS and lean production, XPS as a separate phenomenon has received less 
attention within academic research (Netland, 2012). Thus, in order to identify factors with a 
potential for influencing the implementation of XPS, the field of ‘procedural knowledge transfer’ 
was reviewed. Indeed, several links can be drawn between the ‘implementation of XPS’ and 
‘transfer of procedural knowledge’. First, knowledge related to XPS can be categorized as 
procedural knowledge, often referred to in the literature as production know-how (Ferdows, 
2006) or, more broadly, as ‘organizational practices’ (Jensen & Szulanski, 2004). Second, many 
of the reviewed studies (Ambos & Ambos, 2009; Björkman et al., 2004; Gupta & Govindarajan, 
2000; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Minbaeva et al., 2003) viewed the transfer of procedural 
knowledge to be a process, in which the implementation at the receiving unit is the last stage. 
Through this literature review, a set of factors within the fields of absorptive capacity theory, 
institutional theory, corporate socialization theory and agency aheory were identified. Further, 
the theory of change management was added to tailor the theoretical background to the case 
being studied.  
In order to understand why the implementation of XPS has varied between the investigated 
subsidiaries, the study first addresses which factors have influenced the XPS implementation at 
each subsidiary: 
 
 
Further, in the reviewed literature, the sharing of practices between units was found to increase 
subsidiaries’ performance (Björkman et al., 2004). In this study, this finding is investigated in 
relation to XPS implementation, based on the assumption that the inter-unit sharing of 
experiences and ideas related to XPS will enhance the implementation process at the 
RQ1: Why has the implementation of XPS varied between the investigated MNC subsidiaries?
RQ1.1: What factors have influenced the XPS implementation in the investigated MNC 
subsidiaries? 
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subsidiaries. A limited inter-unit sharing, on the other hand, is assumed to cause a higher 
variation in how XPS is implemented and developed at different units. Consequently, the factors 
influencing XPS knowledge sharing between subsidiaries are addressed as a second sub question 
to help explore the variation in XPS implementation between the investigated subsidiaries. 
 
The proposed research questions will be approached through a case study of the multinational 
materials producer Elkem, a pioneer within XPS in Norway. Elkem has since its founding in 
1907 expanded from its Norwegian origins into a multinational company, with production 
facilities in Europe, North and South America, Africa and Asia, as well as an extensive network 
of sales offices and agents worldwide. At the end of the 1990s, Elkem Business System (EBS), 
Elkem’s global management system, was introduced in the company. In order to facilitate 
implementation of this system, a team of experts in fields such as TPS and Lean was established 
as an EBS center in year 2000. Since the start-up, representatives from the EBS center have 
transferred EBS to several subsidiaries, but with diverse results (Øyvind Sørli, 2012).  
The study will examine the case of two Elkem plants: Elkem Salten, located in the north of 
Norway, and Elkem’s Icelandic plant, Elkem Iceland. The two plants are in many ways very 
similar. The facilities are constructed similarly, with three furnaces, crushing facilities and with 
similar installations to utilize the micro silica dust created from the smelting process. Other 
similarities are the number of employees working at each plant as well as annual revenues.  
Further, both plants have been assisted by the EBS center when implementing EBS. However, 
while Elkem Salten appears to have had a successful EBS implementation, Elkem Iceland has 
experienced many challenges and relapses. Consequently, this study seeks to examine why the 
implementation of EBS has varied to such a large extent between the two plants, thereby 
exploring the main research question of the study.  
In addition to the two plants studied, Elkem’s EBS center is included as a third unit of analysis. 
This was seen as vital for gaining a full picture of the implementation process, as the 
implementation of EBS at both plants was initiated and facilitated by members of the EBS 
center. Additionally, the EBS center is responsible for a large part of the EBS knowledge sharing 
that is executed within Elkem today. 
1.2 Structure of the study 
This case study starts with a presentation of the theoretical background for the study in Chapter 
2. Here, the five theoretical perspectives used in this study are presented, with propositions stated 
in relation to each perspective. Chapter 3 gives a description of the methodology, describing the 
reasoning behind the chosen research design, the process of preparing the interviews and 
collecting the data. Then, the strategy for analyzing the data is explained, before a discussion of 
strengths and weaknesses of the research design conclude the methodology chapter. Next, a 
RQ1.2: What influences XPS knowledge sharing between the subsidiaries of the investigated 
MNC? 
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presentation of the case-company is given in Chapter 4, followed by a brief introduction to the 
units of analysis. Then, a presentation of empirical findings from each unit of analysis will be 
given in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 provides an in-depth discussion of the empirical findings using the 
proposed theoretical framework from Chapter 2. Here, the study’s propositions are addressed, 
discussing the empirical evidence. As a result, influencing factors of the implementation and 
sharing of XPS are identified. Further, the main research question is addressed, exploring how 
the identified factors commingle to provide a full explanation of the variation in XPS 
implementation between the investigated subsidiaries. Next, managerial implications are 
proposed in the form of six suggestions for managers of XPS, before theoretical implications 
conclude Chapter 6 by proposing a theoretical model explaining the relationship between the 
theoretical perspectives, and providing directions for future research. Finally, the study’s 
conclusion is given in Chapter 7. 
 
Structure of the study 
1. Introduction 
2. Theoretical background 
3. Methodology 
4. Case Presentation 
5. Empirical findings 
6. Discussion 
7. Conclusion 
Table 1: Structure of the study
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2. Theory 
This chapter presents literature that is related to the implementation and sharing of XPS 
related knowledge in multinational companies. First, the reasoning behind the selection of 
literature is explained. Four of the five theoretical perspectives chosen, are covered in a 
literature review on ‘Transfer of procedural knowledge in MNCs’ carried out by the authors 
in advance of the case study. The fifth theoretical perspective, change management, was 
added to complement the theoretical background for the case study. Second, a multilevel 
classification is proposed, providing an overview of classes of factors from the selected 
theories which may influence the implementation and the sharing of XPS. Finally, a 
description is given of the structure of the remaining chapter, before each theory is presented.  
Selection of literature 
When reviewing the literature on procedural knowledge transfer in MNCs, the absorptive 
capacity of the receiving unit was identified as one of the most cited determinants of 
knowledge transfer (e.g. Lee & Wu, 2010; Szulanski, 1996, Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000). 
Subsidiaries differ in their absorptive capacity, and this affects the level of internal 
knowledge transfer. Having identified a strong link between the transfer of procedural 
knowledge and implementation of XPS, absorptive capacity was an obvious choice of theory 
to review. 
The implementation of XPS in subsidiaries can be a dramatic change in the organization, as it 
is often followed by changes in the organizational structure, replacement of managers, or 
adjustments to new routines (The Economist, 2012) Also, an important ingredient in most 
company specific production systems is continuous improvement. This can be interpreted as 
small incremental changes that are conducted on an ongoing basis (De Wit & Meyer, 2005). 
Consequently, the organization’s tolerance for change is an important influencing factor for 
the success of XPS implementation. Therefore, the literature on change management was 
reviewed before collecting the data. 
The characteristics of a subsidiary’s host country have been found to have an influence on 
knowledge implementation (Kostova & Roth, 2002). Also, the relationship between the 
subsidiary and the headquarters is another important aspect of knowledge implementation 
identified through the literature review. Subsidiaries that identify with the parent company2 
will easier understand the importance and value of new practices, and therefore implement 
them more easily (Kostova & Roth, 2002). Institutional theory is thus chosen to describe the 
institutional context of the host country and the relational context that links a subsidiary to 
the parent company. 
Furthermore, many studies in the conducted literature review emphasized the existence of 
close interpersonal networks in the organization as being an important factor for knowledge 
sharing (e.g. Ciabuschi et al., 2011; Minbaeva, 2007; Tsai, 2001). The importance of such 
networks for knowledge sharing is explained by corporate socialization theory. Additionally, 
                                                            
2 During the entire study, Elkem is referred to as the ‘parent company’, even though the company was recently bought by 
China National Bluestar. 
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the motivation of the sender to share knowledge was emphasized in the reviewed literature 
(Cho & Li, 2007; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000; Szulanski, 1996). Agency theory is often 
used to explain the subsidiaries’ reluctance to share knowledge with other units in the MNC. 
As a result of the given argumentation, this case study is based on five theories: absorptive 
capacity theory, change management, institutional theory, corporate socialization theory and 
agency theory.  
A multilevel approach 
When studying a complex phenomenon such as a cross-
national transfer of practices between headquarters and a 
subsidiary, Kostova (1999) points to the necessity of using 
a multilevel approach. The theories selected to study the 
implementation and sharing of XPS related knowledge 
can be shown to cover three organizational levels of 
analysis: subsidiary level, corporate level and national 
level. At the subsidiary level, organizational factors within 
absorptive capacity theory and change management may 
help explain the outcome of local knowledge 
implementation. On the corporate level, relational factors 
within institutional theory, corporate socialization theory 
and agency theory can help explain interaction patterns 
within the corporation. More specifically, these relational 
factors can help explain how the interaction between 
subsidiaries, or between subsidiaries and headquarters, 
affect the implementation and sharing of knowledge. Finally, institutional theory can also be 
used to help explain how institutional factors of a subsidiary’s host country affect the 
implementation process. 
This multilevel approach will be used in later sections, in order to address the identified 
factors influencing the implementation and sharing of XPS-related knowledge in the case 
company.  
Structure of theory 
The five selected theories are presented in accordance with the structure of the research 
questions: First, the three theories of absorptive capacity, change management and 
institutional theory addressing factors related to the implementation of XPS will be presented. 
Second, corporate socialization theory and agency theory, addressing the sharing of XPS 
related knowledge are described. A proposition is developed in relation to each theory, 
functioning as a guide for the collection of empirical data, and the subsequent discussion of 
findings.   
 
 
National level
(Institutional factors)
Corporate level
(Relational factors)
Subsidiary level
(Organizational factors)
Figure 1: Three levels of analysis 
covered by the selected theory 
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RQ1.1: Implementation of XPS 1.1. Absorptive capacity 
1.2. Change management 
1.3. Institutional theory 
RQ 1.2: Sharing of XPS 
1.1. Corporate socialization theory 
1.2. Agency theory 
 
Table 2: The structure of the presented theory 
 
2.1 Absorptive capacity 
2.1.1 The concept 
Cohen & Levinthal (1990) define absorptive capacity as the ability of knowledge receivers to 
recognize the value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends. In 
their study, absorptive capacity is conceptualized as a function of the firm’s level of prior 
related knowledge: ‘Prior knowledge base refers to existing individual units of knowledge 
available within the organization’ (Kim, 2001, p.271). Thus, employees’ ability, their 
educational background, and acquired job-related skills may represent the ‘prior related 
knowledge’ which the organization needs to assimilate and use (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
However, in order to develop an effective absorptive capacity, intensity of effort is also 
critical. Intensity of effort represents the amount of energy expended by organizational 
members to acquire knowledge and to solve problems. Exposure of a firm to relevant external 
knowledge is insufficient unless an effort is made to internalize it. Thus, absorptive capacity 
has two elements: prior knowledge and intensity of effort (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
Further, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) assume that a firm’s absorptive capacity tends to 
develop cumulatively, and is path dependent in that prior knowledge facilitates the learning 
of new related knowledge.  
Although many studies agree on the core construct of absorptive capacity as consisting of 
both prior related knowledge and intensity of effort (or more simply referred to as ability and 
motivation), the conceptualization varies greatly and the measures are multiple (Zahra & 
George, 2002).  Zahra and George (2002) review representative studies on absorptive 
capacity, and propose a reconceptualization of the construct. They define absorptive capacity 
as a set of organizational routines and processes, by which firms acquire, assimilate, 
transform and exploit knowledge to produce a dynamic organizational capability. The 
acquisition and assimilation of external knowledge is referred to as potential absorptive 
capacity. The transformation and exploitation of knowledge reflects the firm’s capacity to 
leverage the knowledge that has been absorbed and is referred to as realized absorptive 
capacity. The conceptualization of absorptive capacity as employees’ ability and motivation 
is related to the concept of potential and realized absorptive capacity, since potential 
absorptive capacity is expected to have a high content of employees’ ability, while realized 
absorptive capacity is expected to have a high content of employees’ motivation (Minbaeva 
et al., 2003).  
  2. Theory 
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2.1.2 Factors affecting absorptive capacity 
Although existing literature has paid much attention to the definition and construct of 
absorptive capacity, little attention has been paid to how absorptive capacity is created and 
developed in the firm (Alvær & Westgaard, 2011). However, this statement holds a few 
exceptions. Daghfous (2004) categorize factors affecting absorptive capacity as internal or 
external. External factors include the external knowledge environment and a firm’s position 
in the knowledge networks. These factors go beyond the scope of this case study. However, 
several internal factors are also identified in the literature.  
According to Daghfous (2004), cross-functional communication creates opportunity for the 
internal transfer of knowledge within a unit. Better internal communication enhances social 
integration mechanisms, which lower the barriers to information-sharing and increase the 
efficiency of assimilation and transformation capabilities. All of this implies that an 
organizational structure allowing the maximum amount of communication between various 
departments, improves a firm’s absorptive capacity (Daghfous, 2004).  
Minbaeva et al. (2003) investigate whether specific human resource management (HRM) 
practices oriented towards employees’ ability and motivation increases the employees’ 
absorptive capacity. The results of this research show that the simultaneous effect of HRM 
practices such as staffing, training, promotion, compensation and appraisal, increases 
absorptive capacity, and thereby positively affects the degree of knowledge transfer. 
Performance appraisal and training helps to develop employees’ ability (Minbaeva et al., 
2003; Minbaeva, 2005), while internal promotion and performance-based compensation 
systems are both providers of motivation (Minbaeva et al., 2003; Minbaeva, 2005). 
Furthermore, Minbaeva’s (2005) study shows that the degree of knowledge transfer is 
stronger when HRM practices are applied as a system of mutually reinforcing practices.  
Further, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) state that acquiring, assimilating and exploiting the 
firm’s absorptive capacity is very much dependent on the individuals who stand at the 
interface of the firm and the external environment or at the interface between subunits of the 
firm. These individuals can assume the role as gatekeepers, reducing the communication gap 
and mismatch in ‘cognitive orientation’ between the producers and users of knowledge 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Daghfous, 2004).  
Finally, the theory of organizational inertia links the theoretical perspective of absorptive 
capacity with that of change management. This theory states that organizations tend to stick 
to their existing strategies and have a natural tendency to resist change (Daghfous, 2004). 
According to Davenport and Prusak (1998), organizational inertia becomes an impediment to 
a firm’s ability to adapt to changes in its environment, and thus negatively influences the 
firm’s absorptive capacity.  
2.1.3 Exploring the effect of factors within absorptive capacity theory on XPS 
implementation 
Although past research differs in the definition and construct of absorptive capacity, there 
exists a general consensus that absorptive capacity of the receiving unit is one of the most 
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significant determinants of internal knowledge transfer in MNCs (Alvær & Westgaard, 
2011). Subsidiaries differ in their absorptive capacity, and this affects the level of internal 
knowledge transfer (e.g. Szulanski, 1996, Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000). As discussed 
introductorily, strong links can be drawn between the transfer of procedural knowledge and 
implementation of XPS. Consequently, this study seeks to explore whether factors within 
absorptive capacity theory also can be found to have an influence on the XPS implementation 
within MNC subsidiaries. 
Proposition 1: Factors within absorptive capacity theory will have a significant influence on 
the XPS implementation in an MNC subsidiary. 
 
1a) 
 
A high level of prior related knowledge will have a positive influence on the XPS 
implementation 
1b) A high effort of knowledge acquisition will have a positive influence on the XPS 
implementation 
1c) A high level of cross-functional communication, a high use of HR practices, and a 
presence of gatekeepers will have a positive influence on the XPS implementation 
1d) Organizational inertia will have a negative influence on the XPS implementation 
 
 
2.2 Change Management 
Change management has been defined as ‘the process of continually renewing an 
organization’s direction, structure, and capabilities to serve the ever-changing needs of 
external and internal customers’ (Moran & Brightman, 2001, p.111). According to Burnes 
(2004) change is an ever-present feature of organizational life, both at an operational and 
strategic level. Despite the eclectism of views on organizational change, some common 
classifications recur. Two main approaches to change which are treated in the literature is 
corporate transformation either as revolutionary, dramatic change or as evolutionary, 
incremental change (De Wit & Meyer, 2005). Change as continuous improvement is the 
change process most often associated with company specific production systems (XPS), and 
corresponds to the evolutionary model of change (De Wit & Meyer, 2005). Here, 
organizations and their people continually monitor, sense and respond to the external and 
internal environment in small steps as an ongoing process (Luecke, 2003). 
A recurring theme in organizational change literature is the assumption –and warning to the 
practitioner- that most change programs or interventions are met with resistance (Agócs, 
1997). However, the type of resistance given can differ in nature. According to Agócs (1997), 
resistance to change can be described in terms of four sequential stages:  (1) The denial of the 
need for change, (2) refusal to accept responsibility for dealing with the change issue, (3) 
refusal to implement change that has been agreed to, and (4) repression by taking action to 
dismantle change that has been initiated. The denial of the need for change, identified as 
stage one, can either be in the form of attacks on the credibility of the change message, or on 
the messenger(s) and their credibility. Denial of the credibility of the messenger may be 
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expressed in personal attacks on change advocates either in public or private conversation, or 
through avoidance and marginalization (Agócs, 1997).  
2.2.1 Factors influencing the resistance to change 
One pre-existing factor which may influence the resistance to change is an organization’s 
prior change history. For example, cynical feelings may result from a loss of faith in change 
agents or a history of unsuccessful change attempts. Thus, the presence of cynical feelings 
has the potential to negatively influence change success (Walker et al., 2007). 
The support from top- and middle management is a much cited factor for successful change 
implementation (Kaye & Anderson, 1999; Bateman, 2005; Kotter, 2007; Walker et al., 2007). 
It is important to demonstrate that management is serious about the change and that this 
attempt is not just another “program of the month” (Walker et al., 2007). Kotter (2007) 
recommends assembling a group with shared commitment and enough power to lead the 
change effort, working as a team outside the normal hierarchy.  
Managerial mechanisms to implement and sustain change initiatives 
A large stream of literature within change management is concerned with managerial 
mechanisms for successful implementation and sustainment of change initiatives. One such 
mechanism is creating clear targets and a common understanding of direction (Upton, 1996). 
Even more important is the communication of the targets and direction, throughout the 
organization (Upton, 1996). This is supported by Kotter (2007): ‘Employees will not make 
sacrifices, even if they are unhappy with the status quo, unless they believe that useful change 
is possible. Without credible communication, and a lot of it, the hearts and minds of the 
troops are never captured’ (Kotter, 2007:p.6). Also, according to Walker et al. (2007) 
employees affected should clearly see the personal benefits of implementing change. For 
example, they may be able to perform their job better, pay might increase, or long-term job 
security may increase (Walker et al., 2007). 
Kotter (2007) points to the importance of planning for, and creating, short-term wins. Real 
transformation takes time, and a renewal effort risks losing momentum if there are no short-
term goals to meet and celebrate. This is supported by Schaffer and Thomson (1992), who 
argue that successful change programs begin with results.  They criticize activity-centered 
change programs, where employees are ritualistically sent off for training because it is “the 
right thing to do” although managers rarely make explicit how such activity is supposed to 
lead to specific results. Rather, Schaffer and Thomson (1992) argue that companies should 
introduce only those innovations in management methods and business processes that can 
help achieve specific goals. Further, the innovations introduced should be linked to short term 
goals. Empirical results will then quickly show the extent to which each approach yields 
results. 
Employee involvement, a fundamental ingredient of company-specific production systems 
(Womack et al., 1990), is also found to have a positive and significant effect on resistance to 
change (Beer & Nohria, 2001; Brown & Cregan, 2008). Sharing responsibility for decision 
making represents a fundamental shift in the nature of the employment relationship. 
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Managers are no longer seen as the sole custodians of authority, and employees are able to 
bring their workplace experiences to the decision-making table (Brown & Cregan, 2008). 
2.2.2 Exploring the effect of factors within change management on the level of XPS 
implementation 
As mentioned introductorily, the implementation of XPS can in itself constitute a large 
change to the organization. Further, with continuous improvement as a common element of 
XPS, small incremental changes become a part of employees’ daily agenda. As discussed in 
this section, change often brings with it a level of resistance among employees, which again 
can obstruct the implementation of the change initiative. Consequently, factors within change 
management are believed to hold a significant potential in influencing the XPS 
implementation process, as formulated in the study’s second proposition:   
Proposition 2: Factors within change management will have a significant influence on the 
XPS implementation in an MNC subsidiary 
 
2a) 
 
A prior change history of disruption with negative consequences will have a 
negative influence on the XPS implementation 
2b) A high level of top- and middle management support will have a positive influence 
on the XPS implementation 
2c) The use of managerial mechanisms to sustain change initiatives will have a positive 
influence on the XPS implementation. 
 
2.3 Institutional theory 
A central tenet of the institutional perspective is that organizations sharing the same 
environment will employ similar practices and thus become more ‘isomorphic’ with each 
other. Given that many elements of the institutional environment, such as culture and legal 
systems, are often specific to a nation, organizational practices can be expected to vary across 
units. Applying institutional theory to the case of MNCs highlights the unique institutional 
complexity that these organizations face. 
Empirical research (Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002) has used institutional theory to 
explain how MNC subsidiaries may react to a situation where the parent company is 
transferring, and actually imposing, organizational practices on its subsidiaries. According to 
these studies, the adoption response of a subsidiary is comprised of two components- the 
actual implementation of the practice and the internalized belief in the value of the practice. 
The implementation is expressed in the external and objective behaviors and the actions 
required by the practice. Internalization is that stage in which the employees at the recipient 
unit view the practice as valuable and become committed to the practice. The research of 
Kostova and Roth (2002) emphasizes that a foreign subsidiary is not an independent identity; 
hence, if a practice is mandated by the parent, the subsidiary is obliged to comply. At the 
same time, the subsidiary must adjust to the institutional pattern specific to the country where 
it’s situated. As a result, the subsidiary is confronted with two distinct set of pressures, 
referred to as a situation of institutional duality. 
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The pressure from the subsidiary’s environment can be conceptualized as the institutional 
profile of the host country, defined as a set of regulatory, cognitive, and normative 
institutions in a given country. The elements of the regulatory, cognitive, and normative 
dimensions, including laws and regulations, cognitive structures, and cultural norms, are 
issue-specific. This means that the institutional profile of a country can be favorable for 
certain types of issues (e.g. quality management), and unfavorable for others. The pressure 
from the parent company is influenced by the relational context that links the subsidiary to 
the parent. The relational context is defined through three characteristics- dependence, trust, 
and identity. Dependence of a subsidiary on headquarters is defined as the belief held by 
subsidiary managers that the subsidiary relies on the support of the parent organization for 
providing major resources. Trust is defined as a common belief within the subsidiary that the 
parent company has the subsidiary’s best interest in mind, is honest, and does not try to take 
advantage of the subsidiary. Identification is defined as the degree to which the subsidiary 
employees feel that they are part of the parent company, and partly define their self-identities 
from this organizational membership. It is assumed that a subsidiary that identifies with the 
parent company is likely to share the values and beliefs of the parent, embodied in the 
practice that is being transferred. Thus, the employees will better understand the meaning and 
value of the practice. Also, identification with the parent is believed to reduce the ‘not 
invented here’ syndrome; the practice will be viewed to a lesser extent as strange and coming 
from and outsider. The belief that a high level of both trust and identity with the parent 
company will have a positive influence on practice implementation is consistent with 
previous work on the transfer of practices across units (Szulanski, 1996; Tsai & Ghoshal, 
1998). Szulanski (1996) specifies that an arduous, or distant, relationship of the subsidiary 
with the headquarters might create difficulties in the transfer of practices.  
To understand a subsidiary’s response under conditions of institutional duality, the study of 
Kostova and Roth (2002) investigates the joint effects of institutional and relational factors 
on the pattern of adoption. One particular pattern of adoption is ceremonial adoption, a 
situation where the subsidiary employees have adopted a practice for legitimacy reasons, 
without believing in its real value for the organization (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The study 
suggests that ceremonial adoption is likely to occur if the practice is viewed simply as a fad, 
arising from an institutional setting that is distinct from the local setting of the subsidiary, or 
if the institutional profile of the host country is not favorable for the specific practice. The 
likelihood of ceremonial adoption may increase even further if the relational context is 
characterized by a subsidiary’s having high dependence on its parent, but low trust and 
identification with it.  
2.3.1 Exploring the effect of factors within institutional theory on XPS implementation 
The institutional theory suggests that MNC subsidiaries are confronted with two distinct set 
of pressures, formed by the institutional context that links a subsidiary to its environment and 
the relational context that links the subsidiary with the parent company. Based on the given 
theoretical background of institutional theory, the study’s third proposition is developed: 
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Proposition 3: Factors within institutional theory will have a significant influence on the XPS 
implementation in an MNC subsidiary. 
 
3a) 
 
The combination of an unfavorable institutional profile and a relational context, 
characterized by a high level of dependency and a low level of trust and identity 
with the parent company, will have a negative influence on the XPS implementation 
 
2.4 Corporate Socialization 
The aim of corporate socialization is to establish a shared set of values, objectives, and 
beliefs across MNC units, and to provide them with a sense of shared mission and a unitary 
corporate culture (Björkman, 2004). The underlying rationale is that the more different units 
share long-term visions and goals, the more likely they are to exchange knowledge. Research 
has found knowledge flows in MNCs to be positively related to the use of corporate 
socialization mechanisms (Björkman et al., 2004; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000) and the 
existence of close interpersonal networks in the organization (Tsai, 2001). 
While the relational context that links the subsidiary to the parent company is important for 
the implementation of organizational practices (Section 2.3), the relationship between 
subsidiaries is important for inter-unit transfer of practices. Organizational units differ in 
their internal knowledge, practices and capabilities. Therefore, the sharing of practices 
between units may be advantageous for the organization (Björkman, 2004). However, the 
inter-unit transfer of knowledge is not straight forward. In his study, Szulanski (1996) finds 
that the success of knowledge transfer depends to some extent on the ease of communication 
and on the ‘intimacy’ of the overall relationship between the source unit and the recipient 
unit. In order for organizational units to obtain new knowledge through interacting with one 
another, inter-unit links and networks are essential. Networks of inter-unit links allow 
organizational units to access new knowledge from each other, and units may increase their 
cost efficiency through dissemination of ‘best practices’ within organizations. (Tsai, 2001)  
A crucial design problem for MNC top management is how to choose organizational 
mechanisms that enhance knowledge flows (Foss & Pedersen, 2002). Corporate socialization 
mechanisms refer to those organizational mechanisms that facilitate the development of 
interpersonal ties in the MNC, which in turn can be expected to enhance the communication 
between units, including transfer of knowledge (Björkman et al., 2004). In their study, 
Björkman et al. (2004) investigate three different socialization mechanisms: inter-unit trips 
and visits, international committees, and training involving participants from multiple units. 
The results indicate that the more subsidiary managers interact with managers from other 
MNC units through visits, during joint training programs, and in cross-unit committees, the 
more the knowledge transferred to other parts of the organization.   
In addition to lateral socialization mechanisms, the use of IT in knowledge transfer between 
units has been the topic for much research (Bolsani & Scarso, 1996; Brynjolfsson & 
Saunders, 2010; Ciabuschi et al., 2011). Bolsani and Scarso (1996) describe IT systems as 
tools with high potential in knowledge management, especially in terms of efficiency and 
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scope of knowledge access, although limited in terms of richness compared with more direct 
types of mechanisms. Given an initial investment in an IT structure, knowledge transfer can 
occur faster and cheaper compared to more expensive and time consuming alternatives, such 
as extensive traveling.  In his study, Ciabuschi et al. (2011) finds that the use of intranet has a 
positive impact on the success of knowledge transfer between units in an MNC. However, he 
states that caution is to be recommended toward relying too much on IT based systems for 
knowledge transfer. As suggested by Brynjolfsson and Saunders (2010), the best results are 
likely to occur when IT usage is combined with lateral mechanisms.  
2.4.1 Exploring the effect of factors within corporate socialization on XPS related 
sharing 
Corporate socialization theory suggests that the use of corporate socialization mechanisms 
will create a network of interpersonal links in the MNC, which again will enhance the 
knowledge sharing between units. Also, the use of IT is assumed to increase the efficiency of 
knowledge sharing. Based on the above discussion, a fourth proposition is developed: 
Proposition 4: Factors within corporate socialization theory will have a significant influence 
on the XPS sharing between MNC subsidiaries.  
 
4a) 
 
The existence of inter-unit links will have a positive influence on the XPS sharing 
between MNC subsidiaries. 
4b) The use of corporate socialization mechanisms will have a positive influence on the 
XPS sharing between MNC subsidiaries. 
4c)      The use of IT will have a positive influence on the XPS sharing between MNC 
subsidiaries. 
 
2.5 Agency Theory 
Agency theory is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in agency 
relationships. The first problem is the agency problem that arises when the desires or goals of 
the principal and agent conflict, and it is difficult or expensive for the principal to verify what 
the agent is actually doing. The second is the problem of risk sharing that arises when the 
principal and agent have different attitudes towards risk (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Agency theory 
has found increasing use in MNC research, as the relationship between headquarters and a 
subsidiary can be viewed as a principal-agent relationship. It is in the interest of the 
headquarters (the principal) that a subsidiary (the agent) contributes to the competence 
development of other MNC subsidiaries. However, as discussed under, subsidiaries may 
perceive it to be against their own interest to engage in knowledge transfers to other MNC 
units. (Björkman et al., 2004) 
Research has indicated that motivational factors at the sending unit might be important 
barriers to knowledge transfer. For instance, a subsidiary may be reluctant to transfer 
knowledge to other units for fear of losing a position of superiority, or because it is 
insufficiently compensated for the costs and efforts involved in the transfer process 
(Björkman et al., 2004). By diffusing knowledge to other MNC units, proprietary technology 
might also leak out to other units (Szulanski, 1996). Also, effort to transfer knowledge may 
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interfere with the subsidiary’s ability to attend to aspects of its own operations that subsidiary 
manager’s view as more important for the unit’s own performance (Szulanski et al., 2003). 
Given a situation of information asymmetry between the MNC top management and the 
subsidiary, it might be in the subsidiary’s self-interest not to transfer knowledge to other 
units, even though it would increase the MNC’s overall performance (Björkman et al., 2004). 
Agency theorists generally agree that a combination of incentive based and behavioral control 
mechanisms should be employed, in order for MNCs to control and coordinate their 
subsidiaries. (Björkman, 2004). The research of Björkman et al. (2004) found that the higher 
the perceived importance attached to knowledge transfer by headquarters when evaluating 
the performance of the subsidiary, the more the knowledge transferred from the subsidiary to 
other units. One incentive based mechanism explored by several researchers (Björkman et al., 
2004; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000) is to let the president bonus be MNC network based 
rather than subsidiary focused, as this would increase the subsidiary managers’ incentive to 
share. 
2.5.1 Exploring the effect of factors within agency theory on XPS related sharing 
The above discussion revealed that the relationship between the headquarters and the 
subsidiaries can be viewed as a principal-agent relationship. Consequently, factors within 
agency theory hold a significant potential in influencing the XPS sharing between 
subsidiaries, as formulated in the study’s fifth proposition:   
Proposition 5: Factors within agency theory will have a significant influence on the XPS 
sharing between MNC subsidiaries.  
 
5a) 
 
A low motivation of the sending unit to share knowledge will have a negative 
influence on the XPS sharing between MNC subsidiaries.  
5b) A high perceived importance attached to knowledge sharing by headquarters will 
have a positive influence on the XPS sharing between MNC subsidiaries.  
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3. Methodology 
This chapter describes the methodology used to answer the research questions. The next 
section explains the reasoning behind the chosen research design, while Section 3.2 and 3.3 
describe the process of preparing the interviews and collecting the data.  Section 3.4 explains 
the strategy for analyzing the data, while the last section discusses the strengths and 
weaknesses of the methodology. 
3.1 Designing the case study 
In the most elementary sense, the design is the logical sequence that connects the empirical 
data to a study’s initial research questions, and finally, to its conclusions (Yin, 2009).  
3.1.1 Choice of research method 
The background for the study was to investigate why the implementation of EBS had been 
more successful in some subsidiaries in Elkem than in others. Therefore, the general question 
of inquiry concerned why the implementation of XPS is more successful in some subsidiaries 
of MNCs than others. This type of “why” question is explanatory and therefore suited for a 
case study design (Yin, 2009). Also, the implementation of EBS in the investigated plants is a 
contemporary event. This means that central actors in the implementation process were 
available for interviews, and that the units of analysis could be observed directly. In addition, 
the factors influencing the level of success with EBS implementation could not be directly 
manipulated. The degree of focus on contemporary as supposed to historical events and the 
limited control over behavioral events, favor the case study as an appropriate research method 
(Yin, 2009). 
3.1.2 Theory development 
The theory development of this case study was an iterative process. In order to explain the 
different level of XPS implementation in the investigated plants, it was decided to investigate 
what factors influence the XPS implementation in MNC subsidiaries (RQ1.1). However, 
when visiting the plants, it became clear that the exchange of EBS related knowledge 
between the subsidiaries in Elkem is very limited. This was believed to be an important 
contributing factor to the variation in the level of EBS implementation between Elkem 
subsidiaries, and thus also between the two investigated plants. Therefore, an additional sub 
research question was added exploring what factors influence the sharing of XPS related 
knowledge between MNC subsidiaries (RQ1.2). 
In order to answer the two sub research questions (RQ1.1, RQ1.2), five theoretical 
perspectives were explored. The choice of these particular theories was partly based on a 
previously conducted literature review (Alvær & Westgaard, 2011) on “Transfer of 
Procedural Knowledge Within MNCs”, which proved four of these theories to have a high 
explanatory power of the former investigated, and related, topic. An additional theory, change 
management, was added based on the belief that change management is important when 
implementing new practices or business systems in subsidiaries. 
Based on the theories, five main propositions were developed. The propositions were 
essential when collecting the data; by having formulated a set of propositions, it became clear 
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what factors to look for. Also, the propositions were used to generalize the results. This mode 
of generalization is called analytical generalization, in which a previously developed theory 
is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study (Yin, 
2009). If both cases were shown to support the same theoretical proposition, replication could 
be claimed. 
3.1.3 The choice of cases 
Based on the initial research question and suggestions from Øyvind Sørli, a key informant at 
the EBS center,  this study has chosen two units of analysis or “cases”; the silicon producing 
plants ”Elkem Iceland” and “Elkem Salten”. This is therefore a multiple-case study, or a 
comparative study.  
The reason for choosing the two particular plants is due to their different levels of success 
with implementing EBS. While Elkem Salten has had success with implementing EBS, 
Elkem Iceland is still struggling with the implementation. Based on this knowledge, one 
would expect many of the critical success factors of implementation to be present at Elkem 
Salten, while the barriers to be more evident at Elkem Iceland. This is thus a “two-tail” 
design (Yin, 2009) in which cases from both extremes have been deliberately chosen.  
This study investigates each case, or each plant, as a whole, and does not give further 
attention to any sub-unit within each case. The case study can therefore be said to be a 
holistic study.  
3.1.4 Definition of specific measures 
In order to ensure construct validity, it is important to identify the correct operational 
measures for the concept being studied. As a basis for investigating whether specific factors 
has had an influence on the implementation, the level of EBS implementation at each plant 
was addressed. 
To measure the level of EBS implementation, the given score on the audits held by the EBS 
center was used. This is how the company itself measures the degree of EBS implementation, 
and the measures are developed by people having in-depth experience with EBS. Because the 
direct results on the audits are the plants’ property and considered confidential material, only 
the average score on the audits could be used to measure the level of implementation. 
When it comes to transfer of knowledge between subsidiaries, several measures have been 
used in the literature. Some researchers measure knowledge transfer success in terms of the 
amount of knowledge being transferred, or the flow of knowledge (Foss & Pedersen, 2002; 
Kogut & Zander, 1993; Minbaeva, 2007). Other studies (Björkman et al., 2004; Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 2000; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Minbaeva et al., 2003) measure knowledge 
transfer success as to the extent knowledge is implemented and used at the receiving unit. In 
this study, both measures are used to investigate knowledge transfer between subsidiaries.  
3.2 Preparation 
A case study protocol was made in order to guide the investigators in carrying out the data 
collection (See Appendix B). A protocol is a major way of increasing the reliability of the 
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case study, as it contains the procedures and general rules to be followed in the data 
collecting process (Yin, 2009). 
An important part of the case study protocol is the case study questions. In this study, a 
distinction was made between Level 1 questions and Level 2 questions. Level 1 questions 
were the questions directly asked to the interviewees. Level 2 questions, on the other hand, 
were the questions of inquiry. For example, one topic of investigation was the relational 
context that links a subsidiary to the parent company. A question of inquiry was: “To what 
extent does the plant identify with the parent company?” (Level 2 question). This question 
was converted into two Level 1 questions: (1) “Do you think of your plant as being part of a 
corporate family?” (2) “Is there a common “Elkem culture” across the different plants?” 
3.3 Collection of data 
This case study draws on three sources of evidence, namely focused interviews, archival 
records, and direct observation. No single source has a complete advantage over all the 
others; in fact, the various sources are highly complementary (Yin, 2009). By using several 
sources of evidence, this study was able to address a broader range of historical and 
behavioral issues. It was also possible to develop converging lines of inquiry, a process where 
the data is triangulated (Yin, 2009).This means that the different sources of evidence were 
used to confirm the same fact. The next sub sections describe how the different sources have 
been used to collect data. 
3.3.1 Interviews 
In-depth interviews 
An in-depth interview was conducted with the leader of the EBS center, Øyvind Sørli, who 
has acted as a key informant during the case study process. With in-depth interviews, one can 
ask key respondents about the facts of a matter as well as their opinion about events. The 
interview may also take place over an extended period of time (Yin, 2009). Through several 
meetings at “Teknobyen” in Trondheim, Øyvind Sørli has given his insights into different 
matters, and also guided the investigators in which people to interview.  
Focused interviews 
Focused interviews were conducted at both plants, and also with employees at the EBS 
center. The interviews remained open-ended and assumed a conversational manner, but 
followed a set of questions derived from the case study protocol. This is referred to as 
focused interviews (Yin, 2009). A total of eight focused interviews were conducted at each 
plant, with employees from different levels in the organization. Both at Elkem Iceland and 
Elkem Salten the following roles were interviewed: the plant manager, the production 
manager, the HR manager, the local EBS coach, two team leaders, and two operators. An 
interview guide was used to perform the interviews, a part of the case study protocol in 
Appendix A. The same interview guide was used at the two plants, but varying slightly 
between the different roles. By using the same interview structure in both plants, the results 
could be used for data triangulation. Also the fact that all levels in the organization were 
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interviewed, from the top management level to the operating level, contributed to data 
triangulation.   
Four of the five employees at the EBS center were also targeted for focused interviews. A 
slightly different interview guide was used to conduct the interviews, but focusing on the 
same topics as the interview guide for the plants. The interviews with the EBS center are 
therefore another source of data triangulation. 
The interviews varied in length, the longest lasting for approximately one and a half hour and 
the shortest for about 20 minutes. All the conducted interviews were recorded on tape, and 
later transcribed. This resulted in over 250 pages of transcribed interviews. The interviews at 
Elkem Iceland were held in English, while the interviews with Elkem Salten and the EBS 
center were held in Norwegian. The reason for this was to avoid that the language became a 
barrier. The interviews held at Elkem Salten and the EBS center were transcribed in 
Norwegian, and only the parts being used as direct quotations were translated at a later point 
in time.  
After the interviews were transcribed, they were e-mailed to the interviewees for approval. 
All 20 interviews were approved, with only small corrections from some of the interviewees.  
 
Figure 2: Collection of data 
3.3.2 Archival records  
In order to address the plants’ EBS activities and performance, archival records were 
collected from both the plants and the EBS center. From the plants, numbers concerning the 
EBS activity (i.e. training activities, conducted improvement projects, received coaching) 
were accessed through the local databases and handed over, together with .ppt files 
describing different projects. Also, the results from a recent employee survey at Elkem 
Iceland were given access to. The plants’ results on the EBS audits were admitted from the 
EBS center.  
3.3.3 Direct observation 
Observational evidence is useful in providing additional information about the topic being 
studied, as it adds new dimensions for understanding either the context or the phenomenon 
being studied (Yin, 2009). 
Elkem Iceland
8 focused interviews 
conducted
Elkem Salten
8 focused interviews 
conducted
EBC center
1 in-depth and 5 
focused interviews 
conducted
Empirical data
250 pages of transcribed 
interviews
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The case study protocol did not specify any certain types of behaviors to look for in the field. 
However, it was scheduled a guided tour at both plants, and also attendance at a morning 
meeting. During the tours, pictures were taken of observed matters of interest, and 
conversations were made with employees. The tour at Elkem Iceland was guided by the 
divisional EBS coach, while the tour at Elkem Salten was guided by the local EBS coach. 
While the tours were very similar in terms of what production facilities were shown, the two 
EBS coaches had a different focus. The divisional EBS coach visiting Elkem Iceland was 
eager to point out weaknesses and improvement potentials. The local EBS coach at Salten, on 
the other hand, was enthusiastic about showing the latest achievements related to EBS work.  
3.4 Analyzing the data 
In order to code and categorize the data, a qualitative data analysis software was used, called 
NVivo. The transcribed interviews were first imported into NVivo as Word files. Thereafter, 
a folder was made for each unit of investigation: “Elkem Iceland”, “Elkem Salten” and “The 
EBS Center”. Under each folder, a node was made for each topic of investigation. The topics 
of investigation were the same for each of the plants. When reading through the transcribed 
interviews, interesting parts could be marked and placed under the relevant nodes. 
The analytical technique was to use a cross-case synthesis; even though the cases had been 
conducted as a predesigned part of the same study, the two individual cases were first treated 
as separate studies. For each node, revealed factors were, if possible, related to one of the 
investigated propositions. For example, the empirical evidence pointed to top management 
support as being an important influencing factor, as hypothesized in one of the propositions. 
Therefore, all empirical data regarding top management support were collected in one sub 
node. After all the evident factors were placed under their respective propositions, a 
comparison could be made between the two cases.  
The strategy for analyzing the data was to replicate the findings across the two cases. For a 
theoretical proposition to be supported, findings from both plants needed to confirm the 
proposed relationship. Thus, if a given factor (or factors) was shown to have had the expected 
influence on the EBS implementation at both plants, one would expect the finding to be 
generalizable and the respective proposition to hold. 
3.5 Strengths and weaknesses of the methodology 
Four tests have been commonly used to establish the quality of any empirical social research; 
(1) construct validity, (2) internal validity, (3) external validity, and (4) reliability. The first 
part of this section will discuss the quality of the method, based on these four measures. The 
second part will address weaknesses of the used method. 
3.5.1 Quality of the method 
External validity 
For a case study to have external validity, it must have defined a domain to which the study’s 
findings can be generalized. One way of accomplishing external validity, is to rely on 
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analytical generalization. The aim of analytical generalization is to generalize the results to 
some broader theory. (Yin, 2009) 
The cases of this study are subsidiaries of the same multinational company, Elkem. The 
question is whether the findings from this study are applicable to other MNCs. The 
investigated factors at the two plants were not single and random experiences, but broader 
theoretical issues, such as the use of corporate socialization mechanisms. The investigated 
factors were based on the theoretical propositions, which again directly stemmed from an 
extensive review of the literature on knowledge transfer in MNCs.  
The generalization is not automatic, however. The proposed theories, or propositions, were 
therefore tested by replicating the findings in a second case. Once such a direct replication 
has been made, the results might be accepted as providing strong support for the theory (Yin, 
2009). The fact that the investigated factors built on existing theory, and that replication was 
made between the two cases, means that the results can be generalized to other MNCs.  
Reliability 
To ensure reliability, the investigators have to demonstrate that the procedures of the study 
can be repeated, with the same results. One prerequisite for allowing another investigator to 
repeat the same study is the need to document the procedures (Yin, 2009).  
In this case study, two tactics to ensure reliability have been applied; the use of a case study 
protocol and the development of a case study database. The protocol contains the procedures 
for data collection, the name of the interviewees, and the case study questions. This would 
allow a different researcher to follow the same data collection procedure. Also a database was 
developed, where the data was codified and categorized based on the theoretical propositions. 
In principle, other investigators could review the evidence directly in this database. 
In this manner, the case study maintains a chain on evidence; it is possible for an external 
observer to follow the derivation of evidence from the initial research questions in the case 
study protocol to ultimate case study conclusions.   
  
Figure 3: The chain of evidence from initial research questions to case study conclusions 
Construct validity 
One way to assure construct validity is to identify the correct operational measures for the 
concepts being studied. In order to say something about the level of XPS implementation, an 
appropriate measure needed to be identified. This study used the same measure of 
implementation level as the case company itself. As they are assumed to have in-depth 
knowledge about XPS systems, it is believed that this measure is valid. Also, the measures of 
knowledge transfer used in this case study are well known in the existing literature. 
Case study protocol
Data base 
(250 pages of 
transcribed 
interviews)
Theoretical 
propositions Conclusions
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In this study, multiple sources of evidence were used to investigate the topics being studied. 
The most important advantage presented by using multiple sources of evidence is the 
development of converging lines of inquiry, a process of triangulation and corroboration. By 
using data triangulation, the facts of the case study have been supported by more than a single 
source of evidence. The potential problems of construct validity can be addressed because the 
multiple sources of evidence provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon.  
Internal validity 
Internal validity is a big concern of explanatory case studies when an investigator is trying to 
explain how and why event x led to event y. If the investigator incorrectly concludes that 
there is a causal relationship between x and y without knowing that some third factor –z- may 
actually have caused y, the research design has failed to address the threat to internal validity.  
This case study assumed that given factors within absorptive capacity theory, change 
management and institutional theory would have a significant influence on XPS 
implementation in MNC subsidiaries. Also, given factors within corporate socialization 
theory and agency theory were assumed to have a significant influence on the XPS 
knowledge sharing between MNC subsidiaries. The risk of a lack of internal validity is 
considered low in this case study. First, the propositions are formulated with caution. While 
they suggest that some factors have a positive or negative influence on the XPS 
implementation, they do not indicate that some factor alone led to the success, or lack of 
success, with the implementation. Also, they do not state that some factors are more 
influential than others. Second, by basing the propositions on several theories, a broad scope 
of potential influencing factors are investigated.  
 
Research quality test Employed research tactic 
External validity • The propositions were based on existing theory (analytical 
generalization) 
• Findings from one case were replicated in a second case 
(direct replication) 
Reliability • Used a case study protocol 
• Created a case study database in NVivo 
• Established a chain of evidence 
Construct validity • Used correct operational measures 
• Used multiple sources of evidence, and triangulated the data 
Internal validity • Basing the study on several theories 
Table 3: Quality of the method 
3.5.2 Weaknesses of the method 
Subjectivity 
This study is exposed to the subjectivity of the researchers during the interpretation of the 
empirical findings. In order to reduce the degree of subjectivity, several measures are taken. 
After each interview, the transcribed interviews were sent to the interviewees for approval, 
assuring that their statements have been correctly interpreted. Further, a meeting was 
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arranged with the key informant at the EBS center after the collection of data, to discuss the 
interpretation of the findings. The intention was to ensure that the researchers’ interpretations 
were in line with those of the members of the social context. This practice is called member 
validation, and is supposed to increase the credibility of qualitative studies (Bryman & Bell, 
2007).   
Also, the empirical findings were separated from the analysis of the data. This case study has 
a rich collection of empirical data; a big part of it being direct quotations from the 
interviewees. In this way, an external reader can make up her or his own opinion based on the 
findings.  
Interviewees bias 
During the data collection process, the local EBS coaches at each plant were responsible for 
selecting employees to interview. While some of the interview targets were set, such as the 
plant manager, others were not determined in advance. This was true both for the team 
leaders and the operators. In this way, the local EBS coaches could in theory have selected 
the team leaders and operators that were most enthusiastic about EBS.  
Also, at Elkem Salten, it was the local EBS coach who was responsible for guiding us at the 
plant, and therefore decided what areas of the plant to show us. It is possible that the local 
EBS coach is more biased than the divisional EBS coach who guided us at Elkem Iceland.  
The fact that the EBS coaches to some degree were in control of the information available to 
the researchers could be considered a potential weakness of the study. 
Language barriers 
Because the researchers are not familiar with the Icelandic language, the interviews at Elkem 
Iceland were all held in English. Although many of the interviewees spoke English quite 
fluently, others had some difficulties with expressing themselves adequately. Therefore, 
language barriers have influenced the research to some extent, and this can be seen as a 
weakness of the study.  
The selected parts of the interviews from Elkem Salten that were presented in the empirical 
findings had to be translated from Norwegian. Therefore, some of the nuances in the 
language may have been lost in translation. 
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4.2 Elkem Business System 
Elkem Business System (EBS) is derived from Alcoa’s Alcoa Business System (ABS), which 
again is founded on the principles and philosophy of Toyota Production System (TPS). Thus, 
TPS is also the cornerstone for EBS.  
Through its joint venture with Alcoa in the aluminum production, Elkem was introduced to 
Alcoa’s ABS in the late 1990s. It was decided in 2000 that Elkem should develop its own 
business system Elkem Business System (EBS), but based mainly on the principles, 
methodology and tools from ABS. Both ABS and EBS were introduced in the companies 
partially as a reaction against short-term thinking, and some unfortunate experiences from 
several corporate cost cutting initiatives, based on extensive use of different external 
consulting groups.  
The guiding principles of EBS are anchored in 
Elkem’s Core Values of respect, continuous 
improvement, precision, and involvement, with a 
primary objective of improving customer satisfaction. 
The four fundamental guiding principles are: Make to 
Use, Empowered People, Elimination of Waste and 
Processes in Control. Make to Use is about 
connecting people in the organization as customers 
and suppliers in the value chain, making 
organizational output meet customer needs. 
Empowering people involves respect for individuals, 
developing people and recognizing that individuals 
drive the continuous improvement of the organization.  
Identification and elimination of waste is seen as an 
important principle for developing and improving process flow, while processes in control 
are about stability and capability to meet customer and business requirements. 
4.2.1 The EBS center 
The EBS center was established in year 2000 to support development of EBS as a global 
management system in Elkem. The center, located in Trondheim and Kristiansand, consists 
of five coaches and is organized as a unit within the Elkem headquarters’ Human Resources 
department. The purpose of the center is to accelerate a continuous improvement process by 
developing the employees’ motivation and ability to solve problems. The EBS center’s main 
tasks are: Divisional- and plant support by coaching in problem solving and facilitate 
improvement projects, education and training in designated EBS forums, annual EBS audits 
for monitoring progress and initiating new improvement areas, and system development and 
continuous improvement of EBS as the company’s management concept.  
4.2.2 EBS implementation 
The EBS implementation process starts with a visit to a designated plant from two or more of 
the coaches from the EBS center. The first visit lasts a week, where the plant is introduced to 
EBS according to a specific deployment sequence. The first priority of the coaches is to 
Processes
in
Control
Figure 5: The four guiding principles of 
EBS 
  4. Case Presentation 
 
 
26 
 
ensure sponsorship. The main sponsor of each plant is the plant manager and the top 
management team, which is coached in EBS philosophy, methodology and tools, as well as 
the strategic importance of implementing EBS. In order to ensure continuation of EBS 
training and further implementation after the initial week, the plant’s HR help chain is 
developed. The HR department’s role in EBS is to ensure development of employees through 
process improvement, implementation of a team-based organization, and to support and 
stimulate an internal improvement culture. Next, team roles are defined, standards for work 
practices are developed, and EBS tools 4  are introduced to the organization. Table 3 
summarizes the most important roles within a plant concerning the EBS implementation: 
 
Role Responsibilities: 
Sponsor The sponsor must express the strategic importance of implementing EBS in the 
organization, and should therefore acquire comprehensive knowledge about EBS 
philosophy and methodology in order to understand the necessary changes it takes to 
implement the system. He/she must be willing to put personal prestige behind the 
implementation of necessary changes, and is responsible for allocating the necessary 
resources for implementation and development of EBS at the plant. 
HR help 
chain 
In addition to more traditional HR-responsibilities such as recruiting, defining the internal 
and external HR policy and developing incentive systems and practical measures to 
support and encourage employees to education and development, HR is also responsible 
for development and operation of continuous training programs, implementation of a team-
based organization, and facilitation and support of establishment and operation of 
continuous improvement teams. 
Team 
leader 
The team leader is also known as the “shop floor coach”. The purpose of this coach is to 
involve and challenge all employees in improvement activities and facilitate “learning by 
doing”. More specifically, he/she shall lead the development of standard practice in the 
process section, involve, coach and help operators in problem solving, as well as initiate 
and facilitate continuous improvement 
Table 4: Important roles related to the implementation of EBS 
 
After the initial introduction, the plants are left responsible for the further implementation of 
EBS with support and visits from the divisional EBS coaches. Regular audits to assess the 
plant’s EBS performance are conducted through collaboration between the plant and the 
divisional EBS coaches. Further education and training is conducted through three types of 
EBS forums: EBS University, EBS Academy and EBS Team leader school. Table 4 presents 
a description of the three forums.
                                                            
4 See Appendix F for an overview of the EBS tools 
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 Content 
EBS University Was first started in 2001 to educate employees on EBS at all levels and functions 
within Elkem. The University is held by the coaches from the EBS center and 
gives an introduction to basic philosophy and principles, tools and methodology. 
Today, the University is held in 3 different languages (Norwegian, English and 
Chinese), and has from 2001-2011 had 819 participants. The EBS training material 
is translated to 12 different languages. One University-week lasts for 5 days and 
has a maximum of 35 students. Case presentations from Elkem plants are given, 
where the objective is to share experience and ideas between plants. Direct 
observation and practical training is also conducted at the hosting plant. 
EBS Academy EBS Academy is an initiative to increase EBS training locally at the plants, 
involving all employees. The academy runs over the course of 2-3 days, held either 
by the plant itself or with assistance from the EBS center, depending on the 
capacity of the plant. The academy consists of five modules of which some content 
is customized to fit with the level of EBS implementation at the particular plant. 
EBS Team 
leader school 
The target group is personnel who daily lead and coach improvement teams. The 
focus areas at this school are facilitation and coaching skills of teams, and how to 
apply EBS methodology and tools in a team based problem solving process. The 
team leader school has so far only been held in Elkem Solar and Elkem Salten. 
 
Table 5: The three types of EBS forums directed at education and training
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4.3 Elkem Iceland 
Elkem Iceland (former Icelandic Alloys Ltd.) was established April 28, 1975 by the Icelandic 
government in a joint venture with the American company Union Carbide. The plant is 
located in Grundartangi, Iceland, about 45 kilometers northwest of the capital city of 
Reykjavik. In 1976 Union Carbide withdrew from the joint venture, and Elkem acquired the 
company’s owner share. The government then started a cooperation with Elkem, who gained 
full ownership of the plant in 2003. The same year the production capacity was expanded 
through a third furnace, which was built by Elkem. The decision was made to use a new 
break-through technology on this furnace, which had not been tested in such a large scale 
before. The following years were marked by fluctuating company results, and several cost-
cutting initiatives were carried out in order to maintain operations. Among these was a 
decision to outsource all maintenance operations at Elkem Iceland. In 2006 a large strategic 
decision was made that Elkem Iceland should go from being a commodity producer with 
ferrosilicon (FeSi75) as their main product, to becoming a specialty producer of magnesium-
ferrosilicon products. A new alloying plant and crushing/ sizing plant were built to 
accommodate this type of production. In 2008, the financial crisis hit Iceland and the plant 
management was replaced. Due to challenges such as the economic climate and frequent 
changes to the plant’s organization, being a specialty producer proved to be demanding. In 
2011, a decision was made to go from producing magnesium-ferrosilicon back to specialty 
refined production of ferrosilicon (Fe75) to the steel industry, in addition to a few other 
specialized foundry products.  
 
Figure 6: The location of Elkem Iceland 
Today, the plant is organized under Elkem‘s foundry division. Elkem Iceland has 200 
employees of which 30 holds staff functions and the remaining 170 are operators at the plant. 
Revenues in 2011 were estimated to 1200 MNOK. 
The main products of the plant are ferrosilicon and microsilica, of which annual production is 
about 120.000 MT of 75% ferrosilicon and 24.000 MT of micro silica. Approximately 30.000 
MT of the FeSi75 is used to produce 50.000 MT MgFeSi (FSM) products. The total use of 
FeSi in the world is approximately 3.5 millions MT per year, of which Elkem Iceland‘s 
production caters to around 3% of world use. The production is round-the-clock with a five-
shift system operating the three furnaces of  the plant.
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5. Empirical findings 
5.1 Implementation of EBS at Elkem Iceland 
5.1.1 The history of EBS implementation 
The implementation of EBS in Elkem started in year 2000. However, the understanding as to 
why EBS was to be implemented differed within Elkem’s corporate management. According 
to Arve Ulriksen, who was working at Elkem Iceland at the time, this resulted in a difficult 
start at Elkem Iceland. 
“The chief executive in Elkem at the time, I’m sorry to say that he didn’t see his own 
important part in this. He used it without hesitance to start change processes in order to cut 
costs, but with the wrong motive, if I may say so. He-, when you look at people as an 
expense...that’s when you have lost in my opinion. People are a valuable resource, and we 
have to have people to succeed with changes. (…) At Iceland, I remember, I think three or 
four managers resigned in protest. Nobody wanted them to go, they were the best, 
naturally, the best people we had at Iceland” [Arve Ulriksen, Plant Manager Salten] 
Nevertheless, the implementation of EBS at Elkem Iceland was initiated. However, the 
motivation of local management rendered the implementation process as slow and the plant 
unconvinced as to the EBS philosophy. 
“Well, if I look at the history of trying to implement EBS in Iceland, at the plant here, I 
see a lot of mistakes or, well, mistakes may be a too strong word, but something hindering 
the process. For example it was started without total commitment from the top 
management at the plant. And that really showed off, because you didn’t really see 
anything happen.” [Einar Thorsteinsson, Plant Manager] 
 “(…) I would say that the philosophy behind EBS wasn’t really there at that time, well we 
didn’t implement it. We were more like looking at the EBS tools and using them.” [Sigrun 
Palsdottir, HR Manager] 
During the following years, the plant experienced a series of large strategic changes. The first 
change came when Elkem gained full ownership of the plant in 2003, and a third furnace was 
built. This gave unanticipated and challenging consequences. 
“Strategic choices were made for the plant, which when looking back one maybe would 
have thought about once or twice before doing again. The first choice was about the 
expansions that were done. It is such a large furnace, and the Icelanders themselves, along 
with Engineering, wanted a very complex new breakthrough technology on that big 
furnace. And it all went straight down the drain, to put it mildly. And that marked the 
organization in quite a strong way. They had some very large challenges.” [Øyvind Sørli, 
Leader of EBS center] 
Shortly after installing the third furnace, the strategic decision to go from producing 
commodities to specialty products of magnesium ferrosilicon made another impact on the 
plant. 
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” (…) it was an entirely new process, that wasn’t tested in Elkem even. Also, it requires a 
lot of knowledge about the process and about the market in an organization that chooses a 
differentiation strategy. And then these things were all done at the same time. And then 
just before this, they had outsourced everything that had to do with maintenance almost, 
including the managers. They bought it from the outside. And the plant just started to fall 
apart, because the fixed costs became more important to get reduced than to get stability. 
They thought they could do both at the same time.” [Øyvind Sørli, Leader of EBS center] 
As a consequence, the strain of being a specialty producer eventually started to show, as 
Wayne Faaland and many others in the organization observed: 
“They wanted to be a flexible plant that could produce every product. And again it gave 
the plant good numbers, because it’s a high valued product that they’re selling. But we 
saw some quality issues, we saw some safety issues. And the efficiency was very low. So 
again, it showed that we overloaded this plant too much. They weren’t mature enough to 
take over.” [Wayne Faaland, EBS center] 
After the plant became fully-owned by Elkem, EBS was given more focus. However, as a 
result of the plant’s difficult situation, the implementation process suffered as a consequence. 
” (…) it is difficult to run EBS as an improvement process and 
organizational development if you are doing firefighting all the time, 
right? Because it wasn’t enough peace in the organization or enough 
resources for them to concentrate on it” [Øyvind Sørli, Leader of EBS 
center] 
The following period was marked by frequent changes to the plant management. The plant 
managers employed were sourced from the Elkem system, and of Norwegian nationality. 
Language and culture barriers, organizational restructuring and disorganized implementation 
of EBS activities made the long-term view of the EBS philosophy difficult to carry through. 
“So, you can imagine the operational challenge in strong volume growth, a differentiation 
strategy, new technology that doesn’t work, and added to that, changing the plant manager 
every other year. With Norwegians coming in that aren’t capable of communicating across 
the organization, right (…) so there wasn’t any basis for running a systematic 
improvement process, if you can call EBS that.” [[Øyvind Sørli, Leader of EBS center] 
This is supported by the fellow EBS center colleague, Wayne Faaland, who observed how the 
EBS activity of removing middle management and implementing a team-based organization 
was carried out. 
“Here in Iceland the people who worked with EBS before me came in and said that, “If 
you want to get EBS implemented, you have to take away the shift foremen”. And then a 
year later I was called in to help save the organization (…) the problem here in Iceland 
was when the shift leaders were taken away, everyone wanted to decide what they were to 
be doing. So, again, they rotated three times per shift, so the guy that was on the stoking 
floor, he was only there for two hours. Then he went down to tap, and then he went down 
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to refine. And again, if everyone is doing all these changes and they don’t have any 
ownership, this is what almost ruined the plant, you know.” [Wayne Faaland, EBS center]  
Another experience made by the divisional EBS coaches at this time, was the reluctance of 
the plant management to accept assistance or to facilitate visits from the EBS center. 
“Wayne experienced this many times. It is in many ways something like ‘yes, ok, we will 
receive that gang from Norway that come here and talk about EBS and those things. And 
yes, we will gather some people’. But they didn’t seem to find the time, and we made an 
arrangement to meet 15 people, and only 4 came. And that told us a lot about the thinking 
and prioritizing.” [Øyvind Sørli, Leader of EBS center] 
A fresh start 
In 2008, the current plant manager at the plant, Einar Thordursson, was employed. The 
difference with this plant manager was his Icelandic nationality and thereby ability to speak 
the language and understand the culture (Øyvind Sørli, 2012). Changes towards the plant’s 
EBS implementation were soon carried out. 
“Einar was crystal clear and said to the corporation that ‘Here, I am the one in charge. And 
it is me who asks for help, and I am the sponsor. But I am also going to get all the help 
that I ask for’. And that is what he got.” [Øyvind Sørli, Leader of EBS center] 
Thordursson observed early on how the plant reacted towards EBS and its content, after 
previous years of implementation by different plant managers, and decided to approach EBS 
differently. 
“When I came I felt that we were pressing EBS on people, forcing it, and using the word 
EBS in every sentence, and I stopped that. I changed the tactics. Because people were 
saying, ‘This is EBS, what the hell is that?’ ‘Elkem bullshit’ is one of the phrases you get 
if you do it wrong. So, we stopped using the word EBS in every sentence, but sometimes 
when we’re working with something, I sometimes stop up and say ‘Hey guys, did you 
realize this is the core of EBS we’re using now?’” [Einar Thorsteinsson, Plant Manager] 
The ownership towards EBS taken by Thordursson, as well as the change in implementation 
tactics, resonated down the organization, and affected the way many employees at the plant 
perceived EBS. 
“So I would say after 2008, from 2009 we really started to integrate it more. Not seeing it 
as just some tools you were using but integrating the philosophy and principles of EBS 
into the everyday work.” [Sigrun Palsdottir, HR Manager] 
 “It was a break through when the plant management in Iceland took 
this over by themselves and started to do things how they liked to do it. 
And stopped doing what someone else was telling them.” [Thordur 
Magnusson, Production Manager] 
After many years of changes and disruptions, the last few years have been spent building a 
new fundament for the organization.  According to Sigrun Palsdottir, the focus has been on 
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getting the process under control and going back to the basic operations the plant started out 
with. This is also something Thorsteinsson reflects on: 
“If we look back at the last three years, when I started it was supposed to be the most 
sophisticated, specialty producer in Elkem. After quite a struggle, we went back to the 
basics. We are going back to commodity production of ferro-silicon, which is quite a 
dramatic strategic change.” [Einar Thorsteinsson, Plant Manager] 
The EBS activity is mentioned by Thorsteinsson as something that is gradually improving. 
“We’ve been doing a steady progress building up the EBS understanding in the plant. So 
it’s always going better and better, up and up, and so, I haven’t seen any set-backs.” [Einar 
Thorsteinsson, Plant Manager] 
In 2010, the plant also got its own, local EBS coach which is responsible for overseeing the 
local EBS implementation. In 2011 the first EBS school was held at Elkem Iceland by Unnur 
Sigrunsdottir, the local EBS coach. According to her, the plan is to hold an EBS school for 
the employees two times a year as a regular event. However, according to Wayne Faaland, 
the plant’s divisional EBS coach, the history of the plant still proves to be a challenge. 
 “But again, sometimes they, this is my worry, that they always want something new. And 
again, the progress for the plant here, (…) things have been going very quickly for them. 
And they haven’t been, they haven’t got time to really reflect on ‘what we’re doing well, 
and what we’re not doing so well’. And I think that is one of the reasons why FSM is 
being moved back to Bjølvefossen. They’re not performing well enough. And again, it’s 
our fault, and I say ‘our fault’ meaning that some decisions were made to do it here 
because it was supposed to be cheaper.” [Wayne Faaland, EBS center] 
5.1.2 Roles and responsibilities related to EBS 
The Role of Top Management 
The current plant manager’s early introduction to EBS through the EBS University is 
something he believes has been important for his early commitment to the philosophy. 
Furthermore, before becoming plant manager, Thorsteinsson had already been introduced to 
many of the TPS and Lean-based elements used in EBS through his university education.  
“(…) when I was introduced to EBS, when I started, I was really lucky. I started in Elkem 
in April 2008, and I was hired from outside Elkem as a plant manager, which is not the 
usual way Elkem has done things. And I was lucky, because only a few weeks after I 
started I got the opportunity to go to Elkem University. So that was really a good thing.” 
[Einar Thorsteinsson, Plant Manager] 
 “When I started looking at this EBS, whatever that was, I said ‘this makes sense, I know 
almost all the techniques, all the methodology as such, but not as a package.’” [Einar 
Thorsteinsson, Plant Manager] 
However, Thorsteinsson is quick to point out that for him, EBS is far more than a number of 
tools put into system. 
  5. Empirical findings 
 
 
34 
 
“Again, I feel that EBS is more a philosophy, than a..anything else. It’s a philosophy with 
a tool kit.” [Einar Thorsteinsson, Plant Manager] 
What employees at the plant point out as the most important quality of Thorsteinsson, is the 
fact that he takes ownership towards EBS, and shows a commitment to the implementation of 
EBS at the plant.  
“I think it’s…the saying was, that this was much harder in Iceland because of cultural 
differences, like you were mentioning, but that’s not really the point. The point is if the 
plant management takes ownership and adapts things and do what they feel is important, 
that’s the key to success, and not letting someone else come in and tell you what to do. But 
you should yourself take the initiative, and use the others to help reaching that goal.” 
[Thordur Magnusson, Production Manager] 
The role of the EBS coach 
 The local EBS coach at Iceland was employed in 2010. Since then, she has focused on 
increasing EBS-related communication within the plant, as well as coaching of the 
employees. 
“The biggest part is communicating with the operators and team leaders, everything 
regarding EBS, and helping them with the daily coaching part. It’s the biggest part.” 
[Unnur Sigurjónsdóttir, Local EBS coach] 
When asked about the work of the local EBS coach, the general attitude towards the work 
that is carried out is positive.  
 “(…) Unnur, who we have as our EBS coach, she has done a very good job.” [Sigrun 
Palsdottir, HR Manager] 
“She is very visible and most often pops down with her presentations and things like that. 
She is the head of EBS here and I think she is respected for her job and her work.” [David 
Buason, operator] 
The EBS coach has also been responsible for starting up the local EBS school in Icelandic, 
and the response of those who have so far attended is very positive. 
“(…) they don’t just read through all the tools, you actually have projects and you use 
them in a group, a five-person group. And they have it for people in different divisions, 
it’s not usually people you work with, so you learn to work with them and solve projects 
using the EBS tools. So it’s really effective to see actually, you feel the tools work, you 
know, instead of just reading about it. Yes, you don’t really learn EBS unless you use it.” 
[Hannes Ingolfsson, Team leader] 
Involvement of people is mentioned by Sigurjónsdóttir as the most important advantages of 
EBS, although she admits this is something the plant could get better at. 
“I would say, by integrating people into projects, and involving them in all kinds of 
projects, and asking them to, you know, give us their opinion. I think that’s the biggest 
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thing that we can use, and probably don’t use enough.” [Unnur Sigurjónsdóttir, Local EBS 
coach] 
In fact, having to engage the workers is not something the EBS coach has to worry about. 
“They’re really, many of our workers are really open to giving me their point of view with 
what they think I should be doing and how to be doing things and, most of the time they 
have really good points, so they’re not afraid of telling me what they think, that’s really 
good.” [Unnur Sigurjónsdóttir, Local EBS coach] 
Although the communication between the employees and the EBS coach is good, there does 
not seem to be many regular EBS meetings to secure an official line of communication from 
the operating level and upwards to the top management. 
“No, no formal meetings, no. Only in small groups when we are talking about something, 
improvements or, but no formal meetings with management, no.” [Unnur Sigurjónsdóttir, 
Local EBS coach] 
The role of HR 
At Elkem Iceland, the Human Resources department consists of only one person, the HR 
manager. This limits the capacity of the HR manager to assist the EBS coach in coaching and 
training of the employees. Therefore, the responsibility for the training employees receive in 
EBS on a daily basis is assigned to the individual departments at the plant. 
The EBS coach recognizes the limited capacity of the HR manager, but expresses on a 
general basis the wish for more interaction between those responsible for HR and EBS, as 
well as other related departments.  
”(…) how I see EBS is that it comes into HR, quality and EHS, so this proves we should 
of course contact each other more or you know, help each other out more than we do 
today, definitely.” [Unnur Sigurjónsdóttir, Local EBS coach] 
The role of the team leader 
When interviewing the team leaders, it is clear that the vision of the plant manager to make 
EBS more about the philosophy concerning EBS rather than using specific tools has spread 
downwards into the organization. 
“I really look into the people, the culture, and that means how I empower people. (…) 
How is my group? How do I get my people to constantly be active in thinking ‘Hey, how 
can I get better, how can I continuously improve, how can I, there’s a waste, how can I do 
that?’ That’s my main focus. Then, I feel in the long run I will gradually come to the tools. 
But, I feel often that EBS has been about the A3 or this, I don’t know, the actual tools. But 
the EBS is a culture. It’s the way we think, the way we work, that’s the most important 
thing. You have to have that in place, then I think we can go and start using the tools, and 
that’s what I’ve been trying to do.” [Jon Atli Kjartansson, Team Leader] 
Further, the team leaders express a clear wish to make any more EBS training they are to 
receive as practical as possible. 
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“(…) Not like formal training. No, that will not give me anything, another course in the 
literature. But maybe like, assistance on some actual projects or problems that I have. Not 
sitting about, reading about it and listening, that does not bring me anything.” [Jon Atli 
Kjartansson, Team Leader]  
At Elkem Iceland, the information received is unclear as to how the improvement projects are 
organized, and who leads these projects. However, the impression given is that many small-
scaled improvement projects are performed, of which the ones performing the improvements 
make A3s to structure their work. Those participating in the project don’t necessarily report 
on the project status regularly in a designated forum. Rather, they are assisted by their shift 
team leader who, in the case of these projects, doubles as an improvement team leader. 
However, the use of formal tools such as A3s is not always viewed by the operators as 
worthwhile.  
“The A3 has a bad reputation, it’s like, ‘Oh, write an A3 about it’, that means ‘the kiss of 
death’, or that means that nothing will happen. So I’m trying to ‘Ok guys, we have a 
project’. (…) I try to do it without calling it A3 in the beginning, and then gradually 
getting into it. But, yes, I’m using the A3 but that’s not my main focus. But still, it’s good 
to think in a systematic way and everything, but to get my people to work, and to think 
about it, I have to motivate them. They can get a little skeptic about those formal tools.” 
[Jon Atli Kjartansson, Team Leader] 
When talking about the involvement of the workers at the plant, the divisional EBS coach 
misses a more structured, hands-on approach to problem solving out on the shifts. One 
example where this could be improved is at the morning meetings where the shifts meet up to 
get an update about the production status from their team leader. 
 “I’d like to get a little more engagement at the morning meetings, instead of just the boss 
telling them what happen and then they go through the numbers they write down on the 
board. (…) To me, I define it sometimes as waste.(..) But my issue with morning meetings 
should be that there is more of a discussion. The numbers are up there, there’s no sense in 
reading them. But I rather have more discussions on improvements that aren’t there. I 
think this is where we could get a lot more information out to the teams and not just 
reporting their last production numbers.” [Wayne Faaland, EBS center] 
5.1.3 Visualizing and communicating goals and results  
Visualizing and communicating goals and results related to EBS, is perceived by many of the 
employees at Elkem Iceland as one of the plant’s biggest improvement potentials. The results 
of the employee survey recently conducted at the plant (see Appendix C for further details) 
clearly indicated the need for more information among operators.  
 “Well. Eh, communication is one of the big, big, big issues in a plant like this. 
Communicating strategy, results, what’s going on, improvements work, how do you do 
that? We recently did a survey with all the employees regarding how they feel about work. 
And, well, surprise, surprise, what was at the top? “I want to know more”. The need for 
information.” [Einar Thorsteinsson, Plant Manager] 
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When it comes to communicating goals, this is done indirectly by showing results which are 
based on the Rolling Top Five. However, the plant manager believes that the overall 
awareness of the plant’s goals are low, especially at the operating level. 
 “In the cantina you see a very big flat-screen. There we have on rolling weekly basis 
some operating results, which are in fact based on the Rolling Top Five. So it’s both direct 
and indirect communication. But unfortunately we, I am quite sure, when I go out in the 
plant and see one of my operators and start discussing, I can very easily find that he hasn’t 
a clue of what we are doing. But, so, this is really an on-going process.” [Einar 
Thorsteinsson, Plant Manager]  
Many of the employees mentioned that both goals and results related to the production are 
sufficiently communicated. The results of EBS work, on the other hand, are not that visible.  
“I think we are not efficient enough in doing that. So, we communicate 
production, and production goals and things like that, but we are not very 
good at communicating the results of different programs. So that is 
definitely an improvement potential.“ [Thordur Magnusson, Production 
Manager] 
When it comes to quantifying the results of EBS work in monetary values, it appears that this 
has not been a strong objective. The plants manager is actually a bit uncertain about the value 
of this practice. 
 “On top level, yes, everything is quantified in monetary values. But  in the daily work, we 
do it sometimes, sometimes we don’t. And that’s one of the things I personally, in the 
EBS, I think is overrated. That everybody always thinks about costs and money. At 
management level, definitely, it’s a very big driving force. But for the operators always to 
relate to monetary values, I’m not so certain about it. I think there are other things that can 
motivate even more.“ [Einar Thorsteinsson, Plant Manager] 
5.1.4 Overall motivation at the plant 
It appears that the motivation for EBS at Elkem Iceland has previously been low. Some 
employees explain this by the lack of results in the early stages of the implementation.  
 “I think it is the older people that failed at the first time, and again, they usually use the 
same example that, ‘Why should it work now when it didn’t work before?’ And again, I 
know some of these guys have been through different kinds of improvement work, both 
with external consultants and others. So, I think it’s just a negative way of being.” [Wayne 
Faaland, EBS center] 
The divisional EBS coach, Wayne Faaland, also blames the EBS center and the parent 
company for not being patient enough:  
“We, sometimes we hunt for results, and have people not understand what they’re doing. 
You’ll get results, but you see after a while that the results are getting less, because a mega 
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glitch shows again that they don’t know what they’re doing, they’re just doing something 
that somebody is telling them to do.” [Wayne Faaland, EBS center] 
In addition to the set-backs in results, some of the interviewees explain the low motivation by 
a general resistance to change. 
“I think they actually, they’re just do the work the way they’ve been told pretty much. And 
I remember the first time they were putting the safety rules much stricter, and I remember 
how people were frustrated. They hate change, but before they know it, they have just 
become a part of it. (…) And another change comes and they’re frustrated about that, and 
they are just ‘god damn it’, you know, and before they know it they are a part of it, and 
they can’t remember how frustrated they were before.” [Hannes Ingolfsson, Team leader] 
“Some people are against changes, just because it’s a change I think. One 
thing I think the Icelandic organization do is that they focus on the people 
that want to do this, and they leave the people that don’t want it, they just 
leave them alone.” [Wayne Faaland, EBS center] 
Both the local and the divisional EBS coach indicated that it is sometimes easier to motivate 
new employees for EBS. They also contribute to increase the overall motivation at the plant. 
As Sigurjónsdóttir explains: 
“They’re more open to new things and way of working. It’s just like clay, you take a piece 
of clay and you need to form it. And off course it’s different with the older ones, it takes 
longer time.” [Unnur Sigurjónsdóttir, Local EBS coach] 
Furthermore, it seems that the motivation for EBS is highest at the plant management level, 
and then becomes more varied further down in the organization. 
 “I think, my feeling is that on top level, we have been working top-down, and on top 
level, if I look at the plant manager, I am totally convinced about this philosophy as such. I 
really see the benefits. I think the next level, the management group, has really adopted. 
And to take the next level, the middle management, the team leaders etc., they are getting 
better and better. But there, I think, you start to see differences between departments. Shift 
leaders, they understand, I think, partly. At that level I think the 5S is the tool that most 
people know about. And they don’t know about the 5 S, I think they know especially 
about one S, which is sweeping.” [Einar Thorsteinsson, Plant Manager] 
5.2 The basis for sharing of EBS-related knowledge at Iceland 
5.2.1 Relational distance 
Cultural differences between the plant and parent company 
Elkem Iceland is a wholly owned subsidiary of Elkem, and is dependent on the parent 
company for essential resources. This is pointed out by the plant manager at Elkem Iceland.  
“So we are in a way very dependent because we are a production unit only, financed by 
the mother company.” [Einar Thorsteinsson, Plant Manager] 
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Even though Elkem is a multinational company, many employees at Elkem Iceland feel that 
Elkem is more of a Norwegian company.   
“We as Elkem, we say we are an international company. And in a way 
we can very easily describe us as an international company, we are 
owned by the Chinese, we have operations all over the world. But I 
feel very strongly that in our hearts we are not an international 
company.” [Einar Thorsteinsson, Plant Manager] 
The plant manager at Elkem Iceland further points out that all the central functions are 
located in Norway, and that there is often a lack of understanding of other cultures.  
“I feel that very often we get a response from headquarters that say “Well, you’re the same 
as us, aren’t you?” Or it’s assumed. But in Iceland we have different laws, the cultural 
issues I’m not so sure about, but different laws, different regulations, different ways of 
behaving because of that. And sometimes people forget that.” [Einar Thorsteinsson, Plant 
manager] 
In addition to different laws and regulations, the history of the country has influenced the 
behavior of the Icelandic workers. Øyvind Sørli draws a parallel between Iceland, Norway 
and Sweden to explain the differences. 
”When we work with these things (EBS) on Iceland they say, ’Yes, we will do this and 
this’, but they don’t do it. There is no discipline towards decisions, and to a great extent a 
lack of precision culture. And that has to be related to the history, to the fact that it is a 
young industrialized community. They are fishermen and farmers and so on. If you look at 
Sweden, which is the other extreme, they have many hundred years of industrial 
experience. (…) In Norway we are somewhere in the middle. We keep discussing things 
after the decision has been made. But still, we put more precision behind the work. ” 
The divisional EBS coach, Wayne Faaland, indicates that the norms in Iceland are also 
different from those in Norway. 
” (…) the industry is new for Iceland, this type of industry. Even though they have been 
doing this for 27 years, it’s new. And a lot of people that started working here are farmers 
and fishermen and they have a different way of working. But the changes that have been 
here, not just for the company here, but I see changes going on throughout the country too. 
When I came here six or seven years ago for example, there weren’t any garbage cans in 
the, not in the plant, but outside. And people were just throwing garbage outside and I 
even asked them, the organization here, ‘Why don’t you put of a garbage can, why would 
you want people littering your country?’ So things like this, they change a lot. But like I 
said, they’re very proud of the work they do. Even though sometimes it’s wrong, I think 
they're very proud to try to solve their own problems. And again, it’s an ‘island culture’ I 
think.” [Wayne Faaland, EBS center] 
The employees at Elkem Iceland point out that cultural differences between Icelanders and 
Norwegians are indeed evident.  
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“Of course you have to be careful not to say that we’re so special here in Iceland, we need 
special rules and special laws, but still there is a cultural difference. (…) There’s more of a 
rebel in Icelandic workers. They’re more rebels, like stubborn, want to do the things 
themselves. Like ‘hey, don’t tell me to do this’. Norwegians are more structured, more 
formal. But we have a lot of, more, creative people, but sometimes they’re a bit outside of 
the box. We are getting more formal and more structured, but I feel we have to be careful 
not to make everything really squared, everyone fits this frame, and so on.” [Jon Atli 
Kjartansson, Team Leader] 
However, the understanding of cultural diversity seems to have increased after a new 
divisional manager was employed. Also, the implementation of EBS in Elkem is believed to 
make Elkem more of an international company. 
“But, on the other hand, I can say that in our division, now we have a boss, French-
Canadian, we have the Icelandic plant, we have a Chinese plant, and two Norwegian 
plants. And it has changed dramatically by not having a Norwegian divisional boss, in a 
positive way, for me. I’m not saying it’s bad to be a Norwegian, but it is a better 
understanding of the diversity. And I feel that we in the foundry division now are getting 
more and more, let’s say, international, instead of Norwegian.” [Einar Thorsteinsson, Plant 
Manager] 
“And I think from our discussion, on top of my mind is that for me EBS is the key to 
making us an international company, not only a Norwegian company. This is the glue that 
should hold it all together.” [Einar Thorsteinsson, Plant Manager] 
Language barriers 
Several of the interviewees stated that the language barrier is the biggest cultural issue. One 
problem related to language occurs when the divisional EBS coaches are trying to work 
directly with teams in the organization.  
“But one of the biggest, well if you are comparing the plant here to the Norwegian plants, 
one of the biggest factors is just the language. Because, if we want to run some courses or 
some training for our operators, the language is always a barrier. You know, compared to 
the Norwegian plants where they can get the people from the EBS-center to have some 
training or anything in their own language, even though a lot of people speak English here 
at the plant, it’s not quite the same. And, well, that is a big part, and maybe the biggest 
obstacle.” [Sigrun Palsdottir, HR Manager] 
“The greatest hindrance is more the language. Because, Icelanders do normally not 
communicate in Norwegian. And it’s very often, although many can communicate in 
English, it very often leads people to be a bit passive in their work. So it’s been quite 
difficult to get Norwegian coaches to work directly with teams in Iceland, it’s been 
difficult to have active teams with Norwegian coaches. And that’s mostly related to 
language.“ [Thordur Magnusson, Production Manager] 
Also, the local EBS coach points out that the language barrier is one of the reasons why there 
has not been a team leader school in Iceland, yet.  
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“We have been planning to have that, but we haven’t been able to start that yet because 
we’re planning to have it in Icelandic. And, we can have it in English, but that won’t give 
us as much. So we want to have it in Icelandic to be able to use everything and get full 
understanding from the operators.”  [Unnur Sigurjónsdóttir, Local EBS coach] 
The perceived importance of holding courses in Icelandic is supported by her colleague:  
It’s bad when you have to select people to participate not from their interest or capacity of 
EBS work, but from their knowledge of language. So it’s very good to have this for 
example in Icelandic, then everyone can participate.” [Thordur Magnusson, Production 
Manager] 
The fact that English can be difficult to use in coaching and education activities seems not to 
be the only problem. According to the production manager, many important documents are 
only distributed in Norwegian. Also, even though the formal company language is English, 
several meetings are Norwegian biased. 
“Elkem is a multinational company and I think definitely Elkem has shown that in 
procedures, stating that the common language is English. And the meeting language is, the 
formal Elkem language is English. Still there are lots of documents, which are distributed 
only in Norwegian, and a lot of meetings which are very Norwegian biased. It’s maybe 
that someone is speaking English, but it’s still, its’ often difficult for us to send operators. 
And they feel, if the discussion goes in Norwegian, they feel pretty isolated.” [Thordur 
Magnusson, Production Manager] 
Relationship towards the EBS center 
The Icelandic plant has been clear on the fact that they want to be in charge of implementing 
EBS, without too much involvement from the EBS center (Sørli, 2012). Even though they 
were dependent on help in the beginning, they now work more independently. 
“I can see a difference in that, before we used to have Wayne coming here or someone 
else from the EBS center to help us on the tasks. But today we’re doing it mostly by 
ourselves and getting help from him just over the phone or if there is something special.”  
[Unnur Sigurjónsdóttir, Local EBS coach] 
Even if they want to be in charge of the EBS implementation themselves, the plant manager 
points out the value of having someone from the EBS center to come and help them with 
bigger projects. He especially emphasizes the importance of having a divisional EBS coach 
who has an in-depth knowledge about the plant and its production.  
“And we want some outsiders to come and help us with it, fresh eyes, guide us through it, 
and Wayne is doing an excellent job there. And for us he is very valuable, because he 
knows the methodology and also all the tools, and he knows us very well (…) Getting 
someone from the EBS center come and help, and the help will be going through all the 
methodologies once again, showing 150 slides, that’s not help. We know all about that, 
we’ve seen that all of us that are handling the situation. We need somebody with more in-
depth understanding of how to adapt the tools to the current situation.” [Einar 
Thorsteinsson, Plant Manager] 
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It also seems like the plant has become familiar with the visits and inspections of the 
divisional EBS coach, Wayne Faaland. In fact, the operators appreciate these inspections, and 
do not appear to be threatened by them. 
 “He comes here and does an inspection and leaves a list to follow and to improve. I think 
that’s good. My aim is to, if I know he is coming, that I don’t have to jump off my chair, 
because I want to keep it in the standards just all the time. But I hear people talking about 
when they are coming and inspecting, and they’re not anymore talking about it in a 
frightened way.” [David Buason, Operator] 
Elkem Iceland, an island in the middle of the ocean? 
The feeling of being part of a corporate culture seems to be low at Elkem Iceland. Many of 
the employees say that they feel a bit isolated, or as the HR manager expresses it. 
“I think sometimes we’re just an island in the middle of the ocean. (…)” [Unnur 
Sigurjónsdóttir, Local EBS coach] 
The production manager also indicates that the corporate feeling is maybe stronger at the 
Norwegian plants.  
“I feel that for example in the Norwegian plants, there is much more a 
common Elkem culture. I think it’s less so here.” [Thordur Magnusson, 
Production Manager] 
The reason for not feeling as part of a ‘corporate family’ is said to be just as much due to the 
history of the plant as due to cultural differences.  
“If we look 10 years back there was a lot of mismanagement of Elkem Iceland, both in 
Iceland and also from Norway. So I think differences are maybe as much in the history of 
the company as in cultural difference between Iceland and Norway. “[Thordur 
Magnusson, Production Manager] 
“I would say before, it was kind of a stand-alone plant. We saw it more as cooperation 
with the Elkem plants. And Elkem was, it became the sole owner of the plant, I think it 
was in 2003. And there were other owners before. And, a lot of that culture, you can still 
find it here at the plant. But, just the thing like changing the name, and saying, like we are 
doing now everyday: that we are Elkem. With that it comes much easier to think we are 
part of that family. And I see a lot of difference there, in general, here at the plant. Even 
though, you could say that the name itself was just symbolic, but as a whole we have come 
a long way from where we were here in Iceland. (…)” [Sigrun Palsdottir, HR Manager] 
Also other employees at Elkem Iceland agree that the plant has come a long way, and is now 
feeling more as a part of Elkem. However, many operators are still identifying only with 
Elkem Iceland. Some of the interviewees think this is because of the lack of knowledge of 
other Elkem units and the company as a whole. In fact, the results of an employee survey at 
the plant indicate that the operators would like to have more information about Elkem as a 
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“It was a survey, an employee survey, which showed that, what I read from that survey 
was that people are not very aware of Elkem as a whole. They are very aware of this 
company, but not very aware of Elkem as a whole, of what Elkem stands for, and what 
Elkem for example is producing.” [Thordur Magnusson, Production Manager] 
“I think we just have to say that operators in Iceland look at themselves as employees of 
Elkem Iceland, and not Elkem anyways, that’s for sure. And more awareness of what 
other units are doing and what Elkem is for example producing would definitely be 
helpful.” [Thordur Magnusson, Production Manager]  
5.2.2 Sharing of EBS knowledge with other plants 
Many of the employees at Elkem Iceland have visited other plants for various reasons. Even 
if sharing of EBS experiences was not the purpose of the visits, it has given them new ideas 
and insight into EBS implementation. 
 “I always learn a lot when I visit other plants. And yes, I always get new ideas and, and 
yes, see both good things and bad things. And when I see something we can learn, then I 
become very happy that this is something good we can implement. And then I see 
something which is worse than how we are doing, and then I get very satisfied that we are 
doing this quite well.  So it’s a win-win situation.”[Thordur Magnusson, Production 
Manager]  
According to the plant manager, different forums have also been used to indirectly discuss 
EBS. 
“When we have the safety forums, which we have once or twice a year between the silicon 
division and foundry division, I feel that sometimes there we are discussing how we use 
the EBS tools, indirectly. And that’s very valuable. (…) And off course I look at the EBS, 
how they are performing, and compare it to what we are doing.” [Einar Thorsteinsson, 
Plant Manager] 
However, many of the interviewees pointed out that it should have been more knowledge 
sharing on EBS between the different plants, and that it would be a shame if good ideas were 
not distributed. 
“I think this is something that we should use more in Elkem (…) to share competence 
between the plants. [Unnur Sigurjónsdóttir, Local EBS coach] 
 “I want to be able to go out and see other plants, see how they are doing it, because it’s 
really a shame if there are good ideas out there, especially in the same corporation, it’s sad 
if it is not shared.” [Hannes Ingolfsson, Team leader] 
However, the employees at Elkem Iceland mentioned several reasons why the knowledge 
sharing on EBS between the plants is so limited. One reason that was mentioned, is that it’s 
difficult to share experiences if you are not proud enough of what you are doing 
“I think it’s not that they don’t like to. (…) One thing is, you know, feeling that something 
is good. But if you are not proud enough of what you are doing, you don’t want to share it 
with everybody. “[Sigrun Palsdottir, HR Manager] 
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Other reasons mentioned as to why the sharing of EBS is limited, are related to the lack of 
interpersonal networks. It was pointed out that it is difficult to share experiences with other 
plants if you don’t know anyone there personally, and if the different roles are not connected 
between the plants.  
“I don’t know, maybe it’s more or less how we can connect people in the same situation as 
me, and ask them ‘how do you, how are you doing things, how are you implementing 
EBS, how are you doing improvement work?’ And that has been like a competition all the 
time between the plants. (…) Maybe not a competition, but still, they are isolated, they 
don’t talk to each other that much. Just if I personally know someone there, then that’s 
easier, but otherwise it’s like, isolated.” [Jon Atli Kjartansson, Team Leader] 
“I think what we would gain most of is that if we connect the positions and if there were more EBS 
coaches in foundry, it would be good to meet them and share their experiences and what they’re 
doing and what I’m doing, and to help each other out in that way”. [Unnur Sigurjónsdóttir, Local 
EBS coach]  
However, it was pointed out that courses such as the EBS University is a good way of 
creating inter-unit networks in Elkem. 
“I always find that the meetings like this they help for creating a network. And it’s always a benefit 
when later on having some meetings or having some kind of relation with people in later ends, it 
makes everything easier if you know them from before and, so. There has been, I think it’s very 
useful for networking, meetings like this and courses.” [Thordur Magnusson, Production Manager] 
Even if most of the interviewees were very positive about sharing EBS knowledge with other 
plants, some skepticism was also to be found. This was related to the simple act of just 
copying ideas from other plants. Also, creating forums or meetings with the solely purpose of 
discussing EBS in general, was not very useful in the plant managers opinion. 
 “Because, again, EBS is not like so many, it’s a philosophy, a culture. To sit down and 
discuss culture, it’s very nice, I would probably enjoy it quite a lot. But would I benefit 
from it, apart from meeting the guys discussing something else? I don’t think so. And 
because it’s not that specific, discussing different tools, specific tools, maybe if we have 
some kind of a problem, some kind of improvement potential. But not to discuss EBS in 
general, I don’t believe in that.“ [Einar Thorsteinsson, Plant Manager] 
5.3 Implementation of EBS at Elkem Salten 
5.3.1 The history of EBS implementation 
The implementation of EBS at Elkem Salten started in 2003, when the first employees were 
sent to attend EBS University. At the beginning, the implementation was slow, and the 
employees of Salten linked EBS to 5S, which was interpreted as cleaning.  
“(…) it was said that it was going to be implemented at all plants. And it was given a try 
here as well, but those who were in charge of carrying it through didn’t really understand 
what it was about. The first couple of years it was mostly used as 5S. What it lead to here 
at Salten, EBS, was that somebody put up sheets which said who was responsible for that 
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area, and that person was supposed to clean and mop the floors.” [Terje Aanesen, HR 
executive] 
In 2008, two new employments were made, which would both prove to affect the 
implementation of EBS at the plant; Oddgeir Samset, a divisional EBS coach from the EBS 
center was employed as a production manager, and Arve Ulriksen was employed as the new 
plant manager.  
Oddgeir Samset was repositioned from the EBS center and employed as a production 
manager at Salten, in order for Samset to gain production experience. However, with 
extensive knowledge of process engineering as well as EBS, the employment proved to be 
valuable for the EBS implementation process in the production department. 
“(…) and what was really smart of us was to send up one of the most experienced, like 
Oddgeir, as a production manager. He is a technical expert, but also one of the best in 
Elkem on EBS. And with that starting point you’re bound to have a flying start.” [Øyvind 
Sørli, Leader of EBS center] 
“I think…We had Oddgeir here as a production manager in, I don’t know if it was three 
years, two and a half to three years. Up in the furnace house, I just think we got it really 
under our skin. Because he was you know, very much like that. So maybe we’ve had a 
head start, at least that’s what I feel we have had (…) He was a mentor on this, without 
doubt.” [Trond Steensen, team leader] 
Although the organization at Salten remained stable, and the production process remained 
unchanged, the following period was marked by an international financial crisis and a 
fluctuating demand for materials. 
“(…) Over the course of the two and a half years that I was a production manager there, we 
went from using the capacity of two furnaces, to three furnaces, to two furnaces, to one 
furnace, to two furnaces. So, five changes with temporary lay-offs and then re-hiring. Those 
types of things take a lot of time. And it eats up the time of the organization too.” [Oddgeir 
Samset, EBS center] 
The same year, the new plant manager, Arve Ulriksen was employed. Ulriksen had 
experience as a manager from Elkem Bremanger, and was quick to start following up on the 
EBS implementation across the plant.   
“(…)the plant was lucky enough to get hold of a plant manager that came from Bremanger, 
I’m talking about Arve Ulriksen. He had practiced EBS and seen the results in Bremanger 
when he was head of the Sil-department. And at Salten, he went straight inn with an iron fist 
to get EBS in place.” [Øyvind Sørli, Leader of EBS center] 
Ulriksen became quickly involved in obtaining resources, both financially and from the EBS 
center, to develop the EBS implementation at the plant. 
”(…) he was very much the one to ask for assistance from the EBS center all the time. He 
viewed it as free labor, I think, as he didn’t have to pay for us anyway. And that allowed us to 
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take a more systematic and structured approach to the implementation at Salten” [Øyvind 
Sørli, Leader of EBS center] 
This systematic approach led to the development of the team leader school in 2010, as one of 
two plants in Elkem which has carried this through. A local EBS coach was appointed in 
2008, to manage the EBS implementation and day-to-day work of the plant. Also, the plant 
was given money in 2011 to restructure its HR department and build its own improvement 
room at the plant (see Appendix C). Rune Skau, Salten’s local EBS coach, is quick to draw 
attention to the value of the commitment the plant manager has shown. 
“(…) Arve has also seen the value of all the help we have gotten, and formalized it in a way. 
Because clearly, this has cost a lot of money what we have done, but it is an expense we have 
been willing to pay. And that is something I think we have gained from” [Rune Skau, EBS 
coach Salten] 
Magne Løkaas is one of the divisional EBS coaches that has watched Salten’s EBS 
development closely through frequent visits to the plant the last couple of years. He observes 
that Ulriksen is not the only plant manager that has had a commitment to EBS 
implementation at this plant. 
“What has been extraordinary at Salten, is that they have had, they’ve been very lucky with 
their plant managers, at least a couple of them, as they have been easy to work with. There has 
been very clear decision-making processes, in that “it should be like this and this”, in such a 
way that it has been easy for an EBS coach like me to come up there, as the course has been 
set and there is no discussion” [Magne Løkaas, EBS center] 
Øyvind Sørli points to the stable production process as another influencing factor on the 
implementation of EBS. 
“At Salten they haven’t really had any big challenges in implementing new technology or new 
processes, and new products and things like that. They have stayed where they are in this time 
period. Right now they are converting, but that is part of the their next phase and not 
comparable in any sense” [Øyvind Sørli, Leader of EBS center] 
However, although the plant has had a continuous EBS implementation, Salten’s EBS coach 
admits that the plant still has work to do   
“(…) and we have been developing from where we started, and that is, well, ten years ago 
now. And when you talk about ten years, ten years is a pretty long time, and you would think 
that in the course of ten years everything about it would be accepted and that it now was a 
regular way of working. But it isn’t, because it takes longer time. At least that’s what I have 
discovered, that it takes longer than you would think” [Rune Skau, EBS coach Salten] 
5.3.2 Roles and responsibilities related to EBS 
The role of top management 
According to the local EBS coach, the top management at Salten has always been clear about 
the importance of EBS at the plant, even if the employees not always find the commitment. 
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” (…) and well, this is a new way of working and we are an organization that have been used 
to working differently. And when you introduce new things, there is always someone that will 
be like ‘no, I don’t want to do this’. (…) so we have been, on the sponsor side, extremely 
lucky. Those who have, like Arve, those who have sat behind the steering wheel have flagged 
this for a very long time.” [Rune Skau, EBS coach Salten] 
The local EBS coach points to this as a necessity for the EBS work he has carried out at the 
plant  
”What has been much of the reason for our success I think, or, it’s difficult to say if it’s been a 
success, but what has been good here is that those who have sat on top have realized that there 
isn’t any point in me going out here and working with EBS if there isn’t any support from top 
management. So, in my opinion, I think the success factor of this plant has been that the 
management, or top management, has realized that this is the way we’re going to do things” 
[Rune Skau, EBS coach Salten] 
The plant manager himself mentions communication across the different organizational levels 
as key, and points to the location of the administration offices as an example of this.  
” (…) I’m sitting right in the middle here. Actually, we built a large, new administration 
building on the outside of the fence. And that is maybe one of the most stupid things that have 
been done here. Creating distance like that, that’s, well, you would have to be back in the 50s 
to come up with such an idea. But this arrangement also demands that you take time off to 
listen to those people who actually come by the office for a chat.”  [Arve Ulriksen, plant 
manager] 
The divisional EBS coaches point to the plant management’s push to be involved in the EBS 
agenda as a great strength. 
”We ran a team leader school when I was up there. (…) and afterwards we had to run, well, 
the whole plant management decided they wanted to have the school too.  Then we had to do a 
second round with the plant management. So now the whole plant management has gone 
through the same team leader education as the others, and that is in itself a large strength. So 
Salten has a very good basis for continuing work there” [Oddgeir Samset. EBS center] 
However, the interviews reveal that the top management still has improvement potential in 
their EBS work. The different departments are shown to have large variations in the level of 
EBS implementation.  
“It is really important that the managers are coordinated and understand EBS well enough, and 
that they manage to run the different departments in the same way so that it is possible to 
identify the work at one department with the other. Today, I’m sorry to say that there are still 
some large differences across the plant.” [Terje Aanesen, HR Manager, Salten] 
The role of the EBS coach  
The everyday work of the local EBS coach at Salten includes facilitating improvement work, 
holding training sessions and performing regular EBS audits at the different departments. 
Regular meetings are held with the improvement teams as well as weekly meetings with the 
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top management. Spare time is often used out and about at the plant, talking to people (Skau, 
2012). 
When the EBS coach first started his work at the plant, he began with implementing 5S, and 
later widened the coaching to include improvement projects and facilitating the team leader 
school. Recently, the plant has performed several Kaizen projects, which has been done as a 
collaboration between the EBS coach and the selected departments (Skau, 2012).  
However, the attitude towards the work the EBS coach carries out at the plant varies. The HR 
manager points out that most people recognize the overall value in the work the EBS coach 
does. 
“I see that the active role he has, that he is out and about a lot, talking to people, that makes 
the knowledge he has more sought after. I’ve seen that many people consult him, asks him for 
advice. He’s become really good at involving people around here” [Terje Aanesen, HR 
Manager, Salten] 
However, the regular audits that are performed at the various departments are met with a 
defensive attitude by many of the operators. During these audits, pictures are taken and each 
department is scored as to the status of their EBS work. Some of these defensive attitudes 
were displayed by some of the operators when asked about the work of the EBS coach. 
Nevertheless, those operators who showed a negative attitude towards the work of EBS 
coach, explained that the coach himself was a nice guy and well-liked by most people, and 
that they viewed most of the defensive attitudes among operators as mostly harmless. 
”He is a really nice guy, so we don’t put much into it” [Stig Sivertsen, operator] 
”It is mostly done on a friendly basis. But it is as I said, not everyone is open to this kind of 
work. So I guess that from some it can be more genuine than from others, the criticism that he 
gets. But most people just joke around with it. And that’s the way I think it will always be 
when there are 200 people that work here. Some have been here from the beginning and have 
their routine, and won’t accept changes. And then he comes inn who has been here for ten 
years, and there are people here who have been here for forty years and say ‘that’s not how it 
works’.” [Hans Erik Vollan, operator] 
However, the fact that the plant has started to see results of the work the EBS coach is 
leading, was pointed out as an effective antidote to any negative attitudes. Especially, the 
result of the recent Kaizen projects is something many workers at the plant have noticed. 
”That’s when it’s so good that we have successful EBS projects like the room that they 
showed you earlier. It goes without saying, if you had been here four years ago and seen 
what the workshop looked like. We had to use a whole day to tidy up before a visit. But 
now it is done in half an hour, to get it back to the standard it’s supposed to be in. It’s a big 
difference, and is something that without doubt affects the attitudes of people” [Roar 
Åsbakk, team leader] 
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Further, when asked about what the plant could improve on in order to succeed with EBS, 
overcoming the negative attitudes towards the EBS coach was mentioned as an important 
step. 
”It’s when every single person feels that we have to do something about this thing or that 
thing, which is bigger than just tidying the workbench. And that although the EBS coach 
comes around with his camera in hand, it isn’t seen as something negative” [Roar Åsbakk, 
team leader] 
The role of HR  
The Human Resources department at Salten consisted of two employees until 2011, when the 
HR project was initiated. This project was funded by the headquarters, and led to the creation 
of an improvement room at the plant to facilitate improvement work, as well as a 
restructuring of the HR department (see Appendix C). The department was expanded with a 
new position for today’s HR manager, and was organized as a team where all positions at the 
plant that concerned training and development of people were included. Today, the team 
includes people such as the HR manager, the EBS coach, the EHS manager and the Quality 
manager (Aanesen, 2012). Regular team-meetings are held in the EBS room every week. This 
way of linking EBS to HR is a thought-through decision, according to the coaches from the 
EBS center  
”It’s the only plant that has a thought-through HR team organized as it 
should be (…) it was done like this mostly to clarify that EBS is maybe 
more related to HR than to production” [Magne Løkaas, EBS center] 
In the HR manager’s perspective, the new HR team is something that has strengthened the 
organization at Salten. 
“(…) it is a great strength, a great strength. In a way…you become more powerful in 
decision-making processes too. I mean, of all those that can make decisions here, it’s 
almost just the plant manager who isn’t part of the HR team. And now, quite often, 
decisions that have to be made are handed over to the HR team” [Terje Aanesen, HR 
Manager, Salten] 
But although the HR department is expanded from two people to six, the visibility and 
communication has, according to one of the team leaders in production, yet to catch up. 
”Of course I know well the job that Rune does, but the HR department covers quite a lot 
now actually, and it is somewhat invisible compared to what I feel it should be. Especially 
the development of (…) well, the development of the link between the different 
departments, the way they should fit together in a toothed wheel.” [Roar Åsbakk, team 
leader] 
When asked about the inter-departmental communication, the same team leader expressed a 
wish that the HR team would establish a better forum for this type of communication. 
  5. Empirical findings 
 
 
50 
 
”Right now it’s generally very dependent on who works at the different departments. 
Some have more links, through their area of responsibility, to others (…) before, we used 
to have these meetings where we gathered to work together, and take control of the 
direction we were heading. In a way steering the same boat. There’s too little of that now, 
in my opinion. Across the departments, I mean.” [Roar Åsbakk, Team Leader] 
When asking about the educational background of the interviewees, it turned out that many of 
the local managers have ‘climbed the internal ladder’ at the plant, starting as operators. This 
was further confirmed by the HR manager, confirming a high focus on the internal 
development of employees. 
“Yes, it can be said that if you look at the employees of  Salten, they usually come from, 
well, most have started out as operators (..) most have taken supplementary education and 
some sort of school after they started working here. You know Lars Johnny, the 
Production manager, he started out at the furnaces, and has followed the same route as I 
have.” [Terje Aanesen, HR Manager, Salten] 
The role of the team leader 
According to the EBS philosophy, the ideal organizational structure is modeled on Toyota’s 
team-based structure, where there is a team leader for every 5-6 people throughout the 
organization. This team leader’s purpose is to continuously make the team members improve 
the process they are working in. When EBS was first implemented, one of the first tasks that 
were carried out was to remove the shift managers and implement a team-based structure 
(Løkaas, 2012). 
”(…) so what we did, you can say that it was very good for increasing the dynamics in the 
organization, and we managed to get people responsible in an entirely different way than 
what we used to do. They were motivated by this, and we defined the role and 
responsibilities of every single one, so we really made people responsible.” [Magne 
Løkaas, EBS center] 
At Salten today, the workers at the plant refer to two types of team leaders: those managing 
the shifts and those leading improvement projects. In other words, the old organizational 
structure with shift managers still seems to linger. The ideal of small, Toyota-inspired teams 
is something the HR manager doubts will ever be fully implemented  
” (…) no, not in the way it is optimally supposed to be, with small teams of six or seven 
people. We have, the team leaders at the smeltery, they have what, 35 men they are 
responsible for. And of course, they don’t all work here at the same time. The shifts, they 
work afternoons and nights while the team leaders work during daytime. So, you will 
never get that kind of team leader.” [Terje Aanesen, HR manager] 
When the team leaders of the plant are mentioned by members of the EBS center, the focus 
appears to be on the team leaders of the improvement teams. The shift-based teams are 
referred to as having little to do with the EBS philosophy.  
  5. Empirical findings 
 
 
51 
 
”A team leader for me is someone that has a much smaller and tight 
knit group, like a coach on a team, if you can use that analogy. But 
they call them team leaders and I guess they can go ahead and call 
them that if they want to, but to me they aren’t team leaders.” [Magne 
Løkaas, EBS center] 
The improvement work carried out on the shifts is believed to be done unaware as to the fact 
that it is EBS-related.  
”Well, I think they mostly just focus on their usual routine. I don’t think EBS is, if you 
think in terms of improvement, continuous improvement, I don’t think it is systemized. I 
guess they do work that can count as improvements, but I don’t think that EBS is a topic 
out on the shifts.” [Magne Løkaas, EBS center] 
The team leaders spoken to admit that most EBS work is done in relation to the improvement 
projects, and that the operators that aren’t part of this work have little knowledge about EBS, 
apart from the 5S. Further, practical barriers such as the shift-based work schedule make it 
difficult to carry out any regular EBS activities. 
”Well, to get hold of the operators who work shifts on a rotation basis –they work days 
and nights. If you want to get hold of a person that has been on a nightshift, well, you have 
to fetch them out of what they’re doing, if it’s a meeting, maybe just a two-three hour 
meeting, then we have to replace these people that we fetch from production. So it’s like a 
game of solitaire, finding the right way to solve this. You can’t just go and fetch Per and 
Pål and make them come to a meeting, because they have their work that they are required 
to do. You can’t just pause the production and wait until everyone gets back from the 
meeting.” [Trond Steensen, Team leader] 
Yet, there are significant individual differences between the different departments, which the 
local EBS coach thinks have a lot to do with the different department managers’ and team 
leaders’ own motivation 
”Yes well, there has been, one can’t hide from the fact that some departments have gotten 
a lot further in their development than others. And that is without doubt connected to the 
managers. It’s not my job to go around talking to each and every one, that’s up to the head 
of department and other leaders’ job. And some, I guess it’s the same as for the operators, 
some are more motivated than others” [Rune Skau, EBS coach] 
5.3.3 Visualizing and communicating goals and results  
At the recently established improvement room, all the improvement projects, or A3s, are 
hung up on the walls.  Also, the results of the completed improvement projects are quantified 
in monetary value and displayed (see Appendix C).  
This ‘improvement room’, however, is mostly used for management meetings. Also, when 
improvement projects are completed, the team leader for the project, maybe accompanied by another 
team member, comes here to present the results. This means that this room is not very much used by 
operators not participating in improvement teams. 
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“Those who come to this room to report, they already know what improvements have been 
created. And those who join the improvement projects know. But then you have hundred 
other employees who don’t participate in these groups. And if we can’t visualize the 
improvements to them, I think we have failed. So this we have to accomplish, one way or 
another” [Rune Skau, EBS coach] 
In order to reach out to more employees, a digital screen is set up in order to show the 
quantified results of the improvement projects. This screen was previously placed in the 
cantina, but has now been moved to the entry, just outside the changing rooms, as many of 
the operators pass through here many times a day. In an interview with one of the operators 
however, he confessed that he had never stopped to look at this screen. According to him, it 
was better when the screen was placed in the cantina, as it was almost impossible not to look 
at it during the break. 
Elkem Salten is also planning to use the new intranet site of Elkem to communicate EBS. 
They are currently developing an internal site for the plant, where EBS will have a great 
focus. According to the HR manager, one objective is to recognize the employees who 
participate in improvement projects:  
“I want to recognize the people who work with improvements to a greater extent than 
what has been done previously. And with an internal EBS site on the intranet, this can be 
achieved. I want people to know who participate in these groups, because today not 
everybody knows. And I want them to be acknowledged for the job they are doing.” [Terje 
Aanesen, HR manager] 
However, the HR manager admits that communicating EBS to employees through the use of 
IT may be problematic: 
“We see that when it comes to the IT culture here at the plant, it is very 
varying, especially on the competence side. Some don’t even open 
their e-mail. Maybe they don’t even know that they have an e-mail. So 
that is a big challenge.” [Terje Aanesen, HR manager] 
In addition to communicating EBS through screens and the intranet, many of the interviewees 
believed that the shift meetings could be a natural forum for this objective.  
“Shift work is off course difficult, since the only meeting the shift leader has with his shift 
is one meeting every fifth week. (…) And many other important matters have to be 
discussed there. EBS is given too little attention. But we have a plan on how to reach out, 
and we have started to think how we can get better at this point. We want to structure the 
shift meetings and give them a clear and visible content, where EBS, especially the 
improvements, has an active part in each meeting.” [Rune Skau, EBS coach] 
When it comes to communicating long term goals for the plant, Elkem Salted has lately 
focused on what they call the common thread.  
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“We have started to focus on the common thread, that everything is connected,  from the 
creation of a new idea, through the prioritizing of team leaders in the different 
departments, to the Rolling Top Five of the plant, which again are rooted in the strategic 
directions of the division. In this way, it should be a clear and visible direction in the way 
we work.” [Terje Aanesen, HR manager] 
5.3.4 Overall motivation at the plant  
It is obvious that Elkem Salten has had a positive development over the last years, and much 
of this may be attributed to the EBS implementation.  
“We see that EBS has had an effect on peoples’ perception of their work place. And that is 
maybe the most important thing. If people call it EBS or not doesn’t matter to me; it is 
only a three latter acronym. But the perception of the work place is changing, and people 
come to me and say ‘Look at all we have achieved. So incredibly many things have 
happened’.  And this has been in periods where Elkem has struggled. There has been two 
such periods this year as a consequence of the second wave of the financial crisis. We had 
to shut down furnaces and dismiss people, and there haven’t been any reactions. Because 
people know that we think long term, and that we think pass this period. And it creates 
stability in the organization. And this is because of our way of working, that we think long 
term. So personally I think I get a lot back from the operators in terms of trust. And EBS is 
the reason for this.” [Arve Ulriksen, Plant Manager] 
The plant manager’s conviction of EBS can be reflected in his priorities, and he has sent a 
clear signal to the organization that this is something they will be focusing on. 
“Arve is crystal clear on this, and it has to come from him and downwards. If it is forsaken 
on the top, it will fail down the system as well. But on this he is very clear, and I think that 
is very good.” [Lars-Jonny Lundeng, Production Manager] 
In spite of the highly motivated plant manager, the plant is still struggling with the attitude of 
some employees.  
“We have a long way to go when it comes to attitude. We have a lot of people that are not 
able to follow the standards. Too many don’t use their eyes to see improvement potential 
in their daily work.” [Arve Ulriksen, Plant Manager] 
According to the HR manager, the understanding of EBS at the operating level is low. Also 
the operator, Stig Sivertsen, admits that many operators don’t really know what EBS is. 
“We are still struggling with achieving an adequate understanding of 
EBS at the operating level. They take a too small part in the ongoing 
EBS processes, actually.” [Terje Aanesen, HR manager] 
“Everything which is new takes time. It takes time before you get, at least those who have 
been here for 30, 40 years; it’s not done over the night to get them on board. At the same 
time they have to know what it is. You hear the word EBS, but you don’t have a clue what 
it is. And that is a problem.” [Stig Sivertsen, Operator] 
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In order to evaluate the operators understanding of EBS, it was asked about their 
interpretation of the concept. It seems like the 5S, and especially cleaning, is what many 
operators associate with EBS: 
“EBS is, roughly speaking, this 5S thing, which we are handling on a daily basis.  And it is 
trying to live by those rules, the 5S, to keep it tidy, clean, and systematic. It is not always 
easy, but we’re trying. And sometimes we make a mess, but then we have to take the time 
to clean it up afterwards, but most of all trying to make it a daily routine.” [Hans Erik 
Vollan, Operator] 
The same operator was asked whether EBS had led to more involvement of people, but he 
was not so sure about that matter.  
“No, I don’t know what to say. As I said, 95 % of my perception of 
EBS is the 5S. That is how far we have come.” [Hans Erik Vollan, 
Operator] 
Another operator was asked what he thought of when he heard the word EBS, and he gave 
the following answer. 
“Cleaning. Cleaning.” [Stig Sivertsen, Operator] 
Another employee indicates that the low understanding of EBS is not the only problem. Time 
constraints and a fast changing focus might also cause problems. Further, he explains that if 
they were given enough time, to really make the new procedures into routines, it would make 
things easier. 
 “You get this new case, then you don’t get it, it’s not turned into a routine, before you get 
a new case which has to be done. Then you forget about the case you were working on. 
Like the cleaning (the Kaizen project in the work shop), it turned into a, it was the only 
thing we were supposed to focus on for several months. And then it stuck.” [Stig 
Sivertsen, Operator] 
When the interviewees were asked about the overall motivation for EBS at the plant, the 
answers indicated that the motivation is very varied; from highly motivated employees to 
direct opponents. However it seems like the motivation has increased and that many 
employees have accepted that EBS is there to stay. 
 “No, it’s varying, that is nothing to hide. But most of them have eventually accepted that 
EBS is a working method we will continue with. Then you have someone who resists all 
they can, and what I’ve learned from these past three years is that I can’t spend my energy 
on them. Because they will eventually be eaten up by the others, or sitting on the side line. 
But when I started I spent too much energy on therm. But I’ve found out that that is a 
waste of time.” [Rune Skau, EBS coach] 
The operator, Hans Erik Vollan, concludes that what is important is to get what he calls “the 
grey mass”, or the undistinguished mass, on board.    
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“Yes, it is maybe 5 % on the top and 5 % on the bottom, and then you have the gray mass 
in between. Maybe a bit bigger part of those who are interested in participating, really 
interested, than those who are totally rejecting. But you can say that it’s a narrow layer at 
the top and bottom, and then it’s the big grey mass. And to embrace that big mass, that is 
what’s interesting. (…) Because what is important, is to get the big mass on board.” [Hans 
Erik Vollan, Operator] 
Elkem Salten has tried different things to increase the overall motivation, among others to 
quantify the results of improvement projects in monetary values. The local EBS coach 
believes that seeing what big saving such projects can lead to, is highly motivating for the 
participants. Also the plant manager believes in the motivational effect of seeing results, but 
is afraid of a too high cost focus. 
“The motivation can be better, and we don’t achieve this until we visualize things in a 
better way than we do today. But, I kind of feel that those who participate in the 
improvement projects are motivated. When they see the results; that a group can, with the 
job they do, save for instance 1.5 million or 3 million. Then you see that people become 
motivated and think their work is fun. Also, we have given them a carrot; those who 
participate in improvement work get extra paid. And, it is not rewarding, it is not the big 
amount, but at least it’s something.” [Rune Skau, EBS coach] 
“(…) I haven’t focused too much on it. I am scared to death that we will have this one-
sided focus on costs, because it is synonymous with jumping straight off a cliff when it 
comes to environment, health, and safety.” [Arve Ulriksen, Plant Manager] 
5.4 The basis for sharing of EBS-related knowledge at Salten 
5.4.1 Relationship with EBS center and headquarters  
Elkem Salten has been one of the pioneers in Elkem when it comes to EBS implementation 
(Øyvind Sørli, 2012). The plant manager emphasizes the importance of pressure from top 
management in Elkem when it comes to EBS. 
“We are dependent on a pressure from corporate top management, that they give a clear 
signal that this is something we should work with. And yes, they do, at least more clearly 
now than in previous years.”  [Arve Ulriksen, Plant Manager] 
Oddgeir Samset, one of the divisional EBS coaches from the EBS center, worked for a period 
of time as production manager at Elkem Salten (see Section 5.3.1). Also, Magne Løkaas has 
visited the plant frequently the last period. According to many of the employees, Elkem 
Salten has a close relationship with the EBS center, and especially with Oddgeir and Magne.  
“We have been lucky with the people who work there (at the EBS center). One of them, 
Oddgeir, has worked here as a production manager, and he knows us very well. And he is 
used as a mentor for the new production manager and others. And I think we get the 
answers in no time if we have questions. The same holds for Magne, who has been here 
twice a month for a period of time. (…) It’s extremely important that those people know 
the plants, at least that’s my opinion.” [Rune Skau, EBS coach] 
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 “I think we have had the opportunity to use the EBS center a lot 
compared to other plants. At this plant they have not only been a 
control function, but also a support function.” [Rune Skau, EBS coach] 
On the question if the plant had received more help because of its location in Norway, not too 
far from the EBS center, the plant manager refused. 
“No, it is not because of that. I don’t believe in that. Because there are a lot of plants that 
request this help, but the plants that show that they want it the most, get it.” [Arve 
Ulriksen, Plant Manager]  
It seems like the education and training activities from the EBS center has been well received 
at Elkem Salten. As long as the training can be related to practical issues in the production, it 
is perceived as very valuable. 
“When you get a PowerPoint presentation, it often becomes a little overkill. And the 
whole blackboard sometimes ends up completely covered. But if they (the EBS center) 
relate it to real problems that people can relate to in their daily work, it is a totally 
different matter. And one person that has achieved this is Oddgeir. I took over the role as 
production manager after him, and he is very well educated and structured. The same 
holds for Øyvind Sørli. He is extremely experienced and has a spicy way of presenting. 
And you feel like you have gotten an adrenalin kick when you leave the presentation, you 
think ‘this is good, I want to get started’. If the operators feel the same way, I am not so 
sure about.”   [Lars-Jonny Lundeng, Production manager] 
5.4.2 Sharing of EBS knowledge with other plants  
Several of the employees at Elkem Salten indicated that the sharing between plants has been 
limited in the past. They explain this by the history of the company and the relationship 
between units. 
”The transfer of ideas between units has been insufficient in Elkem from times to times. 
And I think it is because of the fact that the company was an engineering company, which 
in itself was not very including.” [Arve Ulriksen, Plant manager] 
”I have experienced that they put plants up against each other. And it is obvious that we 
should learn from each other, or I know that, that we learn from each other. But we do not 
want a situation where if we do something clever here, we have to keep it to ourselves. It 
was maybe more like this before. (…) But then we know that there are fluctuations in the 
market, and like I said, maybe the plants are put up against each other, and in times of 
recession maybe one plant has to shut down. And off course, everyone hopes that their 
plant will survive.” [Trond Steensen, Team leader] 
However, today it seems like the plants have opened more up. Also, according to the plant 
manager, Elkem Salten has been one of the pioneers when it comes to opening up to others. 
“When it comes to sharing, it was more of a boundary before between the plants. But this 
boundary has been almost erased. So it is much more openness between the plants now 
than ever before.” [Lars-Jonny Lundeng, Production Manager] 
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“Somebody has to start. Somebody must dare to open up. So I have 
opened up the whole plant, and invited people to show up any time, 
come to visit. Then we will share what we have done. And this is in 
line with the basic principles of EBS, to share ideas and experiences, in 
order to strengthen the competence building.” [Arve Ulriksen, Plant 
manager] 
The plant manager also states that the plant has gained goodwill from the headquarters 
because of its willingness to open up the plant to others, and to share what they have done 
related to EBS. 
“We have gained a lot of goodwill because of what we have done with EBS. (…) People 
come here, and every time they come to visit they see new improvements. And it’s 
consciously done. And it is spreading. And my goal has also been that every time there are 
some training activities initiated by Elkem,(…) I’ve asked, or I’ve been eager to arrange it 
here. It’s not only marketing, but a nice way to share what you are doing. 
It is not only the plant manager that has a positive attitude towards sharing. Also other 
employees at Elkem Salten stated that sharing EBS experiences would be very valuable. 
“I think it would have been nice to meet people and discuss. I think that would have been 
a good idea. Off course, we have Oddgeir and Magne who are here from time to time to 
help us, and we can discuss matters with them. But without doubt, gathering people from 
different plants to discuss would not be a bad idea.” [Trond Steensen, Team leader] 
” (…) we see that in many cases we struggle with the same problems. And maybe 
someone else has found a solution, and why on earth should we keep struggling if we can 
just copy it?” [Trond Steensen, Team Leader] 
Some interviewees indicated that one way of sharing ideas is just to rotate employees 
between plants. In this way, the employees get new ideas to bring back home. Also, to 
receive visits from employees from other plants may help to solve the plant’s own problems, 
as it often helps to see problems with fresh eyes. 
” (…) I’ve always claimed that visiting other plants to copy things, and to study in detail 
how they do things, is reasonable. It is always something you can find to bring back. The 
one who doesn’t find anything to bring back, has not been inside the gate. That is my 
claim.” [Lars-Jonny Lundeng, Production Manager] 
“(…) it turns out that when you have been in the same job for 20, 30, maybe 40 years, you 
can’t see the forest for the trees. But it happens that someone comes from outside the 
plant, and during the first day he sees the solution to a problem that has existed for twenty 
years. We have experienced that very often” [Hans Erik Vollan, Mechanics] 
When it comes to more long term cooperation between plants, this has been limited. As the 
HR manager emphasizes. 
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“We don’t have any active cooperation; this is something we are not good at in Elkem.  
We keep sitting on separate rocks.” [Terje Aanesen, HR Manager] 
However, Elkem Salten started a cooperation with Elkem Solar, called the HR project. The 
aim of the project was, among others, to get a better documentation of training and education, 
and a more continuous improvement pace. Even though the project has been a success at each 
plant, the cooperation ended after only one visit from Salten at Solar. According to the HR 
manager, this can be explained by the fact that the two plants were in very different stages, as 
Elkem Solar was still in the ramp-up process. But he also stated that time is a big constraint 
when it comes to such cooperation. 
“It becomes evident, when we look at the HR project we started with Solar, that to allocate 
time, and that they have time available to receive you, that they are available for you there 
and then when you arrive. That is not always easy.” [Terje Aanesen, HR Manager] 
Even if the cooperation ended after a short period of time, the local EBS coach at Salten was 
able to copy some good ideas from Solar. He also expects that Elkem copies these ideas to all 
plants. 
“(…) parts of the working method we use in our improvement work are ideas I have 
gotten from Solar, actually. The way they have used their rooms to visualize and review 
things. And then we have given it a distinctive character and built a system around it that 
fits us.” [Rune Skau, EBS coach] 
“I have high hopes, or I would expect that those who sit with the power 
here in Elkem can copy this to the other plants. And I don’t know if 
they have done that, but they absolutely should.” [Rune Skau, EBS 
coach] 
One thing that the local EBS coach at Salten is missing is a forum where people involved in 
improvement work could meet. He explains that, except from the EBS center, he has no one 
from outside the plant to discuss EBS related matters with. 
“I wish that we could have a forum in Elkem where the people involved in improvement 
work could meet once or twice a year to exchange experiences. (…) I feel the need for an 
environment where the improvement people from the different plants meet. We don’t have 
enough knowledge about each other.” Rune Skau, EBS coach] 
In the interview with the HR manager, it was asked whether a yearly meeting with people 
involved in improvement work from different plants would be valuable. The HR manager 
stated that such a meeting would only be beneficial if it had a clear content and intention. 
“If we were able to make it into something concrete, that the meeting had an agenda, an 
intention. And that some learning objectives or points of improvement were developed. 
And if we don’t achieve that, there is no point in continuing. But if we see some 
improvement as a result of such meetings, new ideas and thoughts and so on, it would 
absolutely justify it.” [Terje Aanesen, HR Manager] 
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5.5 The role of the EBS center in facilitation of inter-unit knowledge sharing 
The sharing of EBS related knowledge between the plants is not very formalized. According 
to Magne Løkaas, there are several meeting forums within the special fields of production. 
However, there is no specific forum with the sole purpose of sharing EBS experiences.  
“It is not put into system yet, but much of it happens through the contact between the 
plants, and the forums for the special fields, which occur all the time. What are formalized 
are the management meetings, division- and plant manager meetings, and meetings for 
process engineers and so on. And then we have some EBS focused gatherings, but this is 
not a forum with the main purpose of exchanging EBS experiences. (…) So you can say 
that this is something we could have done much better, and I think we can. But it is a bit 
difficult to formalize such a process. ‘Let’s meet, let’s share experiences, what 
experiences shall we share today?’ It becomes a bit forced.” [Magne Løkaas, EBS center] 
Also the leader of the EBS center, Øyvind Sørli, points out that the sharing of EBS related 
knowledge between plants is not formalized yet.  
“No, it’s not formalized properly. So it becomes very dependent on the one who is the 
responsible EBS coach for a specific area.” [Øyvind Sørli, Leader of EBS center] 
It is not given that all the plants have an EBS coach, however. Both the silicon and foundry 
division have plants where the EBS responsibility is given to other employees. 
“At Salten they have a local EBS coach, Rune Skau. We have an EBS coach at 
Thamshavn, we have it on Iceland, but if we look at Bremanger it is the HR manager who 
is given that role. And in other places there isn’t necessarily an EBS coach at all. If you 
look at Tana for example, one of the team leaders has that role. So it varies between the 
plants, but the cooperation between the EBS coaches could absolutely have been better.” 
[Oddgeir Samset, EBS center] 
“(…) the problem with foundry is that we have only two full-time coaches; so three of the 
other plants don’t have coaches. There is either the HR manager or the quality manager, 
they have a shared role. And some of them even have three roles, and I don’t want to 
bother them with this. But I do bother the plant manager, saying that, ‘I would like an EBS 
coach at all the plants’.” [Wayne Faaland, EBS center] 
One problem related to knowledge sharing appears to be that the plants are differently 
organized. According to employees at the EBS center, some plants have developed in their 
own direction. 
“We have some plants which, we call them ‘Sinatra plants’. I don’t 
know if you have heard the song ‘My way’? We call them Sinatra 
plants if they go their own ways.” [Magne Løkaas, Divisional EBS 
coach] 
Magne Løkaas at the EBS center indicates that this “Sinatra culture” is one of the reasons 
why the sharing of EBS knowledge between plants is limited. 
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“It is because we have allowed a Sinatra culture, which on some areas, have accelerated. 
And I am really against that. It should have been more standardized. And about six seven 
weeks ago, we had a global management meeting at Gardermoen where all the plant 
managers and some others were gathered. And there EBS was an issue. The case discussed 
was the experiences from Salten and Solar. (…) And a question came up, from the 
corporate manager actually, related to exactly what you are saying; ‘should we standardize 
HR for instance?’” [Magne Løkaas, Divisional EBS coach] 
The leader of the EBS center, Øyvind Sørli, points out that many of the new ideas at the 
plants are transferred to other plants through the EBS center itself. When asked who was 
behind transferring new ideas to other plants, such as the ‘improvement room’, which was 
transferred from Salten to Chicoutimi, the answer was the following.  
”We are the ones who do that, we who are coaches. It’s us who travel from place to place 
after all.” [Øyvind Sørli, Leader of EBS center] 
It appears that the sharing activity between plants is reduced during times of recession.  The 
leader of the EBS center states that the communication between the plants is very varying and 
dependent on the situation in the market.   
“I think it is very varying. And it is also a bit time dependent. Because when you have 
situations such as the financial crisis where the plants were partly shut down and people 
were dismissed and so on, it is obvious that there is no room for meeting arenas then. So 
then we really saw a decrease in the activity level, you know, also within our field. 
“[Øyvind Sørli, Leader of EBS center] 
The EBS center is trying to facilitate a more direct sharing of EBS knowledge between the 
plants. The divisional EBS coach, Wayne Faaland, has started to have monthly meetings for 
sharing EHS experiences within the foundry division. This has according to him been very 
successful, and he is planning to start this for EBS as well.  
 “This is what I try to get through with the EHS monthly meetings. That all the EHS 
managers bring their experiences and what they are working on within a monthly topics. 
And again, we started this up in January and it was surprising to hear the feedback from 
the safety managers saying that ‘That was a good idea’ and ‘We haven’t thought about 
that’. And then again, it’s not that difficult. It’s just that sometimes you get too hung up in 
what you’re doing and you can’t open your eyes for new ideas. So just bringing in five 
new ideas for fall protection or 5S and stuff like that, we learn a lot from that. And I know 
that people already asked the safety managers to send them more information and they 
said that they’ll implement some of these things.” [Wayne Faaland, Divisional EBS coach] 
For a period, the divisional EBS coaches brought local EBS coaches with them when they 
performed EBS audits at other plants. The intention was that the local EBS coaches could 
bring new ideas with them back home, and also build relations to the people responsible for 
EBS at the visited plant. 
 “When we do assessments, our philosophy and policy is to bring an EBS coach from 
another plant that is with us. And then you have established a relation and they get first-
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hand information, you know? And we did this a few times. But then comes times of 
recession and cost cuttings, and it is dropped. That is the problem. But is should have been 
in place.” [Øyvind Sørli, Leader of EBS center] 
The employees at the EBS center have started to use the intranet as a channel for sharing EBS 
knowledge. So far, it is more of a knowledge base where relevant literature and information 
on EBS is uploaded. The plan is to make this into a forum where the EBS coaches can 
exchange knowledge and experiences. 
”What we have done so far is to give a description of EBS on the intranet. We have uploaded 
literature, relevant literature, and we have uploaded information about training and other current 
topics. In the long run I hope that we can establish some kind of forum, which can lead to a better 
cooperation between the local coaches at the plants.” [Oddgeir Samset, EBS center] 
”What is an improvement point here, and which I am supposed to find a way to develop, is 
a formalized virtual meeting forum, online, a meeting place online, for all the EBS 
coaches. So that they can use it and say; ‘If I have a problem of some sort, can I find the 
solution at some other plant?’ But this is only for the EBS coaches.” [Øyvind Sørli, Leader 
of EBS center] 
However, the employees at the EBS center have their doubts about this online forum. 
Oddgeir Samset indicates that for the forum to be useful, is has to be designed for a both-way 
communication. 
“It has to be more than just an intranet I think, for us to make it work. So we need an arena 
where people can exchange information and work together to become even better.” 
[Oddgeir Samset, EBS center] 
Also, if a database with all the relevant information on EBS should be available for the EBS 
coaches, the leader of the EBS center is concerned about unintentional transfer of confidential 
material. 
“I think this database should be more available to the EBS coaches. But there is also of 
course a downside. And that is the risk when something is available online, then it is just 
for others to download it, right? And then they can quit and start somewhere else.”  
[Øyvind Sørli, Leader of EBS center] 
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6. Discussion  
The discussion of empirical findings is structured in accordance with the study’s research 
questions. First, factors influencing the implementation of XPS in the case company will be 
discussed, followed by a discussion of factors influencing the inter-unit sharing of XPS. In 
each section, the propositions stated in Chapter 2 will be addressed, thereby determining 
which of the factors stated by theory that have influenced the implementation or sharing of 
XPS. Further, a discussion of which factors that have caused the variation in XPS 
implementation between the investigated subsidiaries is given, thus addressing the main 
research question of the study. Next, managerial implications of this case study are proposed, 
before theoretical implications are discussed. 
6.1 Factors influencing the implementation of XPS 
6.1.1 Absorptive Capacity 
Prior related knowledge in the organization 
When Iceland and Salten received new plant managers in 2008, a new source of prior related 
knowledge was added to each organization. According to Zahra and George (2002) a higher 
degree of knowledge increases a unit’s ability to realize the potential of new practices. Both 
plant managers were well-acquainted with theoretical knowledge of Lean-based tools and 
concepts through their university education. This is stated by both plant managers as helpful 
to recognize the value of EBS. Furthermore, Salten’s new plant manager had a great 
advantage of having direct knowledge of how to make EBS work in practice through his 
former position at Elkem Bremanger. Several of the members of the EBS center point to this 
experience as playing an important part in the plant manager’s proactive attitude towards the 
EBS implementation, and the following increase in Salten’s EBS-related activity.  According 
to these findings, the plant manager’s prior related knowledge of similar practices at Elkem 
Bremanger seems to have made it easier to realize the potential of EBS practices within the 
organization at Salten –supporting with the prediction of Zahra and George (2002). 
Consequently, evidence from both plants gives support to Proposition 1a: A high level of 
prior related knowledge will have a positive influence on the XPS implementation.  
Effort of knowledge acquisition 
The organization’s effort to acquire knowledge is identified as an important dimension of 
absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). At Salten, the proactive attitude of the 
current plant manager has resulted in frequent visits from the EBS center (see Appendix C). 
Also, the HR project carried out in 2010 is an example of the plant’s effort of knowledge 
acquisition, as this was not only initiated by members of the EBS center, but also came about 
as a result of the plant’s own effort. At Iceland, the current plant management values the 
work of the EBS center, but is much less proactive in seeking it. The plant manager clearly 
states that the plant itself is capable of handling its EBS work, and apart from the regular 
visits performed by the divisional EBS coach, the plant is reluctant to call upon the EBS 
center for help. This has led to a much lower frequency in visits from the EBS center the past 
few years, which is the plants’ main source of EBS-related knowledge. Consequently, Salten 
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has achieved a higher score on the EBS audits the past few years, while Iceland has obtained 
a comparably lower score on these audits (see Appendix D). The findings thus strongly 
indicate that the effort of knowledge acquisition has an influence on XPS implementation. 
However, due to the lack of support from both plants, Proposition 1b: A high effort of 
knowledge acquisition will have a positive influence on the XPS implementation cannot be 
supported. 
The use of cross-functional communication, HR practices, and gatekeepers 
Cross-functional communication is important for the ability to assimilate and transform new 
knowledge and practices (Daghfous, 2004). Empirical findings point to the communication 
structure between the different levels at Salten as being more systemized than the 
corresponding communication at Iceland. As a result of the HR project conducted at Salten in 
2010, the establishment of a HR team now ensures cross-functional communication between 
those managerial positions that are closely related to EBS. Further, the separate designated 
EBS team supports the work of the local EBS coach, as well as providing insights and 
feedback from the operating levels. Also, regular meetings held inside the plant’s 
Improvement Room help communicate the improvement work carried out.  However, 
evidence points to the inter-departmental communication between operational departments at 
Salten as having a large improvement potential. This lack of inter-departmental 
communication increases the differences in level of EBS implementation between the 
different operational departments at the plant.  
At Iceland, the plant lacks regular and formalized forums where the EBS work can be 
communicated. As a consequence, the status of the EBS work committed across the plant is 
poorly communicated, making it harder to assimilate and exploit the knowledge within the 
plant. Overall, the lack of both cross-functional, managerial communication and the lack of 
inter-departmental communication on the operating level appear to have slowed down the 
EBS implementation process at Iceland, supporting the importance of communication cited in 
the theory.  
The empirical findings suggest that there are significant differences in use of HR practices of 
the two investigated plants. In terms of training, the empirical data obtained through 
documentation shows that more employees from Iceland have participated at formal EBS 
training events than from Salten. However, according to the EBS center, by adding the level 
of undocumented training to the equation, Salten is the plant which has received the most 
training in total. In terms of internal promotion, the organization at Salten has had a strong 
focus on developing the ability of the plant’s employees, filling positions from within the 
organization. This is in line with what Cohen & Levinthal (1990) refer to as prior investment 
in individual absorptive capacities, and thereby helps to develop the absorptive capacity of 
the organization. At Iceland however, the practice has mostly been to source potential 
candidates for managerial positions from outside the plant. At Salten, compensation is given 
to those who participate in the improvement teams. However, this compensation is not 
performance-based, but rather based on the number of hours put in, given as a raise in the 
hourly pay. Those interviewed who had participated in improvement projects, pointed to this 
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compensation as an extra source of motivation. Minbaeva et al. (2003) propose that internal 
promotion and compensation increases absorptive capacity, and thereby the amount of 
knowledge transferred into a unit, by increasing motivation. The empirical findings of this 
study point to the same conclusion. The use of training is proposed by Minbaeva et al. (2003) 
to increase the level of ability to absorb new knowledge in the organization. In this sense, the 
empirical data obtained may point to a stronger development of EBS related ability at Salten. 
In 2008, the appointment of one of the divisional EBS coaches as production manager at 
Salten added to the character and distribution of expertise available in Salten’s organization. 
During the years of his employment, the divisional EBS coach acted as what Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990) refer to as a gatekeeper towards the production units; monitoring the 
environment and translating information into a form understandable to the group in question. 
According to the study, a gatekeeping role can help a unit to better exploit the knowledge 
acquired. Indeed, Salten’s employment of a gatekeeper is pointed out by several employees 
as having had a strong positive effect on exploiting acquired knowledge during the 
implementation process, supporting the predictions of Cohen and Levinthal (1990). At 
Iceland, the lack of such a gatekeeper role towards the lower levels of the organization is 
something the employees point out as a barrier to the implementation process. In fact, 
empirical evidence suggests that one of the main challenges the operators experience within 
EBS, is a difficulty in translating PowerPoint-presentations and simulation activities 
performed during EBS training, into practical everyday activities.  
The discussion above reveals that the evidence concerning use of cross-functional 
communication, HR practices and gatekeepers is weak. At Salten, the level of cross-
functional communication has led to an increased systemization of the EBS implementation 
at the plant. Further, evidence suggests that the low communication between operational 
departments has had a negative influence on the EBS implementation. At Iceland, the low 
cross-functional communication on both a managerial and operational level appears to have 
hindered the implementation process. At Salten, the high use of HR practices can point to 
increased ability and motivation related to EBS, while evidence suggests that using a 
gatekeeper has helped to internalize EBS at the plant. However, the study lacks empirical 
evidence concerning the effect that the use of HR practices and gatekeepers has on the EBS 
implementation at Iceland. Consequently, the empirical evidence is not sufficient to confirm 
Proposition 1c: A high level of cross-functional communication, a high use of HR practices, 
and a presence of gatekeepers will have a positive influence on the XPS implementation. 
Organizational Inertia  
Empirical evidence suggests that during the first stages of the implementation process, there 
were large differences in organizational inertia at the two plants. Organizational inertia, or 
resistance to change, is identified by Daghfous (2004) as a common obstacle to the use of 
transferred knowledge, consequently affecting a unit’s absorptive capacity. While EBS was 
seemingly implemented at Iceland, those working at the plant at the time describe the 
implementation as what is best identified as a case of ceremonial adoption (see Section 2.3). 
The plant management resisted any participation in the implementation, viewing EBS as 
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something concerning the production workers. The workers themselves used the tools, but 
didn’t understand why they were using them. Consequently, visits from the EBS center were 
met with a defensive attitude. This led to a low number of attendants of the training 
opportunities these visits presented. This organizational inertia or resistance to change is 
mentioned by the EBS center as a major barrier at the time of the initial implementation 
process at Iceland, giving support to the findings of Daghfous (2004). Also at Salten, 
evidence suggests there was some initial resistance towards change among the employees that 
hindered the initial implementation process. Thus, findings from both plants support 
Proposition 1d of this study: Organizational inertia will have a negative influence on the XPS 
implementation. 
Absorptive capacity: cumulative and path-dependent 
A central assumption of Cohen and Levinthal (1990) is that the absorptive capacity of an 
organizational unit is both cumulative and path-dependent. The identified factors within 
absorptive capacity theory all seem to have, over the course of time, contributed to the 
accumulation of a higher level of absorptive capacity at Salten than at Iceland. Evidence 
suggests that prior knowledge and experience has helped to develop and assimilate new 
knowledge, thereby supporting the findings of Cohen and Levinthal (1990).  
6.1.2 Change Management 
Prior change history 
One pre-existing factor which may influence the resistance to change is an organization’s 
prior change history (Walker et al., 2007). Indeed, evidence suggests that this has been a 
major influencing factor on the resistance towards EBS at Iceland. The empirical evidence 
accounts of a turbulent implementation process, also after the initial years of top management 
resistance. Large changes to the plant’s overall strategy created a difficult basis for 
implementing EBS. Today, an argument given by those operators skeptical towards EBS, is 
that there is no reason why implementing EBS should work now, when it proved 
unsuccessful in early years. The reasoning ‘Why should it work now when it didn’t work 
before?’ is an argument the divisional EBS coach has received from some of the plant’s 
employees. At Salten, the evidence suggests that changes experienced by the plant has been 
small compared to those of Iceland, which appears to have made its prior change history less 
influential. Accordingly, the study lacks empirical evidence from this plant regarding the 
influence of a disruptive change history. As a result, Proposition 2a: A prior change history of 
disruption with negative consequences will have a negative influence on the XPS 
implementation lacks sufficient evidence from both plants to be supported.  
Support from top management 
Several authors highlight the support from top management as an influencing factor for 
successful change implementation (Kaye & Anderson, 1999; Bateman, 2005; Kotter, 2007; 
Walker et al., 2007). At Salten, the plant managers employed since the initial implementation 
process have mostly supported the implementation of EBS. Further, the current plant 
manager has been crystal clear about the importance of EBS from the very beginning of his 
employment, using an ‘iron fist’ when implementing EBS at the plant. Many of the plant’s 
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employees list the strong, ‘hands-on’ involvement of the current plant manager as an 
important source of motivation. This is also highlighted by the EBS center as having been 
vital for Salten’s success. Further, the HR team functions as a ‘council’ for EBS activity at 
the plant, helping the EBS coach lead the day-to-day implementation process. This is in line 
with Kotter’s (2007) recommendations, assembling a group with shared commitment and 
enough power to lead the change effort, working as a team outside the normal hierarchy.  
At Iceland, as the discussion of absorptive capacity revealed, one influencing factor of the 
initial implementation process was the organizational inertia or resistance to change which 
existed within the plant. An important reason for this inertia was the lack of support from the 
plant’s top- and middle management, which again influenced the lower organizational levels, 
creating a negative attitude towards EBS.  However, the employment of the current plant 
manager at Iceland changed the plant’s attitude towards EBS. In fact, the current plant 
manager’s initiative to take ownership of the plant’s EBS implementation, making the plant 
itself more in charge of the process, is highlighted by the employees themselves as a major 
breakthrough. This is also stated by the EBS center as one of the most important reasons for 
the plant’s positive development of the EBS implementation in recent years. However, when 
comparing the support at Iceland with that of Salten, the top management at Iceland still has 
an improvement potential in applying a stronger pressure on the process, driving the plant’s 
implementation of EBS forward.  
Empirical evidence suggests that support from top management has perhaps been one of the 
stronger influencing factors of both plants’ implementation process. Further, the resulting 
impact of a strong support of the top management at Salten, the lack of initial top 
management support at Iceland, and the subsequent strong support from the current plant 
manager at Iceland confirms Proposition 2b: A high level of top- and middle management 
support will have a positive influence on the XPS implementation. 
The use of managerial mechanisms to sustain change initiatives 
Clear targets and a common understanding of direction are both factors stated to be 
important for sustainment of change initiatives (Upton, 1996). Even more important is the 
communication of the targets and direction, throughout the organization (Upton, 1996). At 
both plants, the Rolling Top Five at each organizational level provides guidelines for the 
most important areas of improvement, intended to establish a common understanding of 
direction for the year to come. However, at Iceland the plant manager readily admits that the 
communication of the plant’s goals related to EBS holds a large improvement potential. This 
is supported by employees at the lower levels, where evidence suggests that goals related to 
production are much better communicated than goals related to EBS. At Salten, the 
interviewees from the managerial levels speak of how the organization has managed to create 
what they call the plant’s ‘common thread’. This ‘thread’ is achieved through linking the 
improvement projects performed at each organizational level to the plant’s Rolling Top Five. 
However, after having spoken to some of the plant’s operators, it seems that only the 
employees who participate in the designated improvement teams, actually know what the 
current Rolling Top Five is. This suggests a gap in EBS-related knowledge among the 
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employees at the lower levels; between those participating in improvement work and those 
who avoid this type of activity. However, in terms of the overall purpose of implementing 
EBS, Salten’s plant manager points out that an increasing number of employees now 
understand that using EBS to improve firm performance, also affects their job-security in the 
longer term. According to the plant manager, this has resulted in a calmer attitude among the 
employees in times of market instability. This is in line with Walker et al (2007), which claim 
that when workers see the personal benefits from implementing a change initiative, this has a 
positive influence on their attitude towards change. The findings within the two plants imply 
that both plants have well-established targets, but that the ‘common understanding of 
direction’ is perhaps not so common.  Especially, the operators who avoid joining EBS 
activities in the first place, seem the most unaware as to the plants’ areas of priority. 
According to Kotter (2007) employees need to know why change is important, and to 
understand that useful change is in fact possible. Consequently, this lack of understanding as 
to how activities at the operating level affect the overall level of the plant’s performance, may 
contribute to explaining why the motivation towards EBS is lower across the operating level 
at both plants compared to the managerial levels.  
Another factor reducing the resistance to change is planning for, and creating, short-term 
wins (Kotter, 2007). At Salten, one form of resistance to change existent within the plant is 
the resistance towards the change messenger, which, in the context of the plant’s day-to-day 
EBS implementation, is the local EBS coach. However, empirical evidence suggests that the 
visible results of the recent Kaizen actions, facilitated by the local EBS coach, has had a 
positive influence on the negative attitudes towards his role. This is in line with Kotter’s 
(2007) argument of short-term wins decreasing resistance to change. Further, as the results of 
improvement projects have been noticed across the plant, joining improvement teams has 
become more credible among the operators. The fact that these improvements are quantified 
in monetary value is also pointed out as a large source of motivation for participation, as this 
becomes something members of the team can point to having achieved. At Iceland, the 
empirical findings imply that the lack of motivation at the early stages of the implementation 
process was partly due to the lack of results connected to EBS. Further, evidence suggests 
that there is still not a strong focus on creating this type of short-term wins. Few of the 
employees interviewed could point a finger at the results of the improvement projects they 
had performed. Also, they didn’t know whether the results of these projects had been 
communicated upwards to the management levels. Consequently, empirical evidence reveals 
that planning for, and creating short-term wins has had a positive influence on the resistance 
to change at Salten, supporting with Kotter (2007). At Iceland however, evidence did not 
suggest a large focus on creating short-term wins. Consequently, an improvement potential 
lies in better visualizing and communicating the existing short-term wins achieved within the 
plant.  
In the change management literature, the level of employee involvement is found to have a 
positive and significant effect on resistance to change (Beer & Nohria, 2001; Brown & 
Cregan, 2008). The findings within the investigated plants imply that the way employee 
involvement is carried out differs between the two plants (see Appendix C). At Salten, the 
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involvement of employees is carried out through the improvement teams, where the 
participation is on a volunteer basis. The improvement projects are carried out on the basis of 
suggestions by employees, but have to relate to the areas of priority described through the 
Rolling Top Five of the plant. An observation made by the plant manager is that employees 
who participate in these projects also have a higher level of motivation for working with 
EBS. He explains this as having much to do with the fact that these employees can link their 
individual contribution to the results of the improvement project in question, supporting the 
cited theory as to the positive effect of employee involvement on the resistance to change. 
However, as the involvement is on a volunteer basis, evidence shows that those most resistant 
to EBS are also those who fail to volunteer. In this sense, the positive influence of employee 
involvement tends only to reach those who are already motivated. According to the operators 
themselves, the majority of the employees are neither very motivated nor strong opponents of 
EBS. The challenge of the plant therefore lies in reaching this ‘middle segment’ of the 
employees. At Iceland however, the improvement projects carried out are not systemized to 
the same degree as at Salten, making the degree of actual involvement in decision-making 
harder to judge. However, the local EBS coach points to involvement of employees as an area 
with improvement potential within the plant. 
The discussion reveals that both plants have an improvement potential in communicating 
targets and creating a common understanding of direction. Evidence suggests that this has 
constituted a drawback for both plants’ EBS implementation. At Salten, the achievement of 
short-term wins such as Kaizen actions has decreased resistance towards the local EBS coach, 
making his work with implementing EBS at the plant easier. Further, evidence suggests that 
employee involvement has had a positive effect on the resistance towards EBS at this plant. 
However, due to the limited use of managerial mechanisms to sustain change initiatives at 
Iceland, sufficient empirical evidence could not be collected concerning the effect of short-
term wins and employee involvement at the plant. Consequently, Proposition 2c: The use of 
managerial mechanisms to sustain change initiatives will have a positive influence on the 
XPS implementation, lacks sufficient evidence from both plants to be supported. 
6.1.3 Institutional theory 
In order to address Proposition 3a, this section will first discuss the institutional profile of the 
investigated subsidiaries, before the observed level of dependency, trust and identification is 
treated.  Finally, the combination of institutional and relational pressures is discussed, in 
order to assess the support for proposition 3a. 
The institutional profile of the host country 
The institutional profile of the host country is defined as a set of regulatory, normative and 
cognitive institutions (Kostova & Roth, 2002). From the empirical findings it became evident 
that Iceland has a different regulatory institution, such as different laws and regulations, than 
the country of the parent company, Norway. Also the cognitive structure and cultural norms 
differ from that of Norway. This can be related to the history of the country; even if Iceland 
has been producing silicon for more than thirty years, it is a young industrialized community. 
Many of the people recruited to the industry were former fishermen and farmers, used to 
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working independently (Øyvind Sørli, Wayne Faaland). According to Øyvind Sørli, this has 
contributed to a limited precision culture at the plant. Also employees at Elkem Iceland admit 
that the Icelanders are less structured than the Norwegians. Wayne Faaland states that 
Icelanders are very ‘proud to solve their own problems’, and addresses this as due to an 
‘island culture’.  
The institutional context influences the ability of the recipient unit employees to understand 
the practice, the way they interpret the practice and its value, and their motivation to adopt it. 
Positive judgments and motivations are more likely when the institutional profile is favorable 
for the particular practice (Kostova & Roth, 2002).  The institutional profile of the host 
country, Iceland, contains elements which are not favorable for the implementation of EBS 
practices. First, the lack of precision culture may be a barrier to the use of standards. Second, 
the proud attitude may have decreased their willingness to request the EBS center’s help. 
Third, different laws and regulations complicate the compliance with mandates regarding 
EBS coming from the headquarters in Norway. It is therefore reasonable to assume that an 
unfavorable institutional context has had a negative influence on EBS implementation at 
Elkem Iceland.  
However, it is not said that the institutional profile of Norway is ideal for these types of 
practices either, as EBS is based on the Toyota Production System (TPS), which has its 
offspring in Japan. However, since EBS is developed in Norway, it is reasonable to believe 
that the institutional environment has shaped the system, making it a better fit with the 
institutional profile of Norway. 
Dependency on headquarters 
Dependency on the headquarters is defined as the belief held by subsidiary managers that the 
subsidiary is dependent on the headquarters for essential resources (Kostova & Roth, 2002). 
Both of the investigated plants are mere production units, financed by the parent company. 
Therefore, the dependency on headquarters is high. According to the literature (Kostova & 
Roth, 2002), subsidiaries that perceive themselves to be dependent on the parent will tend to 
comply with mandates coming from the parent. In the case of the investigated plants, there 
was a strong pressure from the headquarters to implement EBS. Therefore, the dependence 
on headquarters secured the first implementation of EBS at the plants. However, a high 
dependence on headquarters is assumed to have different effects on implementation and 
internalization, which will be discussed at the end of the section. 
The level of trust towards the parent company 
Trusting the parent will shape the perception that the transferred practices are efficient and 
valuable for the subsidiary (Kostova & Roth, 2002). Since Elkem gained the full ownership 
of Elkem Iceland in 2003, the plant has had several expatriate managers from Norway. In the 
following years, unfortunate strategic decisions hurt the overall performance of the plant. 
These changes were initiated by the headquarters, and later accepted and carried through by 
the expatriate managers. Even if these decisions were made with the plant’s best interest in 
mind, evidence suggests that it affected the perception of the headquarters’ judgment. 
Therefore, Elkem Iceland has had a lower level of trust with the parent company as a result of 
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this. Elkem Salten, on the other hand, has had a stable development without any major 
strategic mistakes. The empirical findings give therefore no reason to believe that the history 
of the plant should have caused an impaired level of trust towards the parent company.  
The level of identification with the parent company 
Identification is defined as the degree to which the subsidiary employees feel that they are 
part of the parent company, and partly define their self-identities from this organizational 
membership. A subsidiary that identifies with the parent company is likely to share the values 
and beliefs of the parent, and therefore better understand the meaning and value of the 
transferred practice (Kostova & Roth, 2002).The empirical findings suggest that the 
employees of Elkem Iceland define their self-identities from the organizational membership 
in the plant, and not from the corporate membership. Therefore the identity with the 
headquarters can be said to be low. 
One reason for the low identity with the parent company indicated by the employees, is the 
fact that Elkem has not always been the sole owner of the plant. The entry mode used by 
Elkem differs between the two investigated plants. While Elkem Salten is a Greenfield 
subsidiary, built and owned by Elkem since 1973, Elkem Iceland has had a joint ownership 
until Elkem gained the full ownership in 2003. Before Elkem gained full ownership of Elkem 
Iceland, former ‘Icelandic Alloys’, the plant was partly a state owned company. Even if 
Elkem has been the sole owner for almost a decade, some of the former company culture is 
still to be found. This was confirmed by several of the employees at the plant. They pointed 
out that just the simple act of changing the name from ‘Icelandic Alloys’ to ‘Elkem Iceland’ 
has helped to undermine the former company culture. However, the previous name of the 
plant still appears in some artifacts, such as on the visiting name tags (see Appendix C). It is 
reasonable to assume that the former joint ownership has led to a lower identity at Elkem 
Iceland with the parent company, compared to at Elkem Salten. 
Further, the empirical findings suggest that the employees of Elkem Iceland do not have 
much knowledge of Elkem as a company. As pointed out by several of the interviewees, 
many employees don’t know what the different Elkem plants are producing, for instance. 
This limited knowledge of the company as a whole was also confirmed in the conducted 
employee survey at the plant (see Appendix C). Maybe more importantly, not many 
employees seem to know what Elkem stands for and what are the company values. As 
suggested by the theory (Kostova & Roth, 2002), there is a linkage between identity with the 
parent company and the sharing of values and beliefs. The fact that the employees of Elkem 
Iceland have a limited insight into company values, have led to a lower identity with the 
parent company. This causal relationship was also directly stated by some of the 
interviewees.  
Also, from the empirical findings it became evident that cultural and linguistic differences 
have influenced the level of identification of Elkem Iceland with the parent company. Many 
of the employees at the plant indicated that they see Elkem as a Norwegian company instead 
of an international company. The reasoning behind this is the perceived lack of understanding 
of other cultures by the headquarters. As specified by the plant manager, the headquarters do 
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not always take into consideration the fact that Iceland has different laws and regulations. 
Also, even if English is the official language in Elkem, official meetings are often said to be 
Norwegian biased. In addition, many documents are only distributed in Norwegian. This 
means that foreign plants, such as Iceland, have to wait until documents are translated before 
they can arrange courses. Also the difference in language act as a barrier when divisional 
EBS coaches work directly with operators at Iceland, because the operators become passive 
when they have to communicate in a language which is not their mother tongue. The 
difference in culture itself might make it more difficult for Elkem Iceland to identify with the 
headquarters. When, in addition, the headquarters is perceived to have a low understanding of 
other cultures, this was shown to have a direct negative influence on the relationship. 
The combination of institutional and relational pressures 
The combination of institutional and relational pressures will shape the level of 
implementation and internalization of the practice (Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Roth, 2002). 
In the case of Elkem Iceland, an unfavorable institutional profile is combined with a high 
level of dependence, and a low level of trust and identity with the parent company. The 
legitimacy pressure to adopt the practices arises from within the organization itself, and 
because the plant is dependent on the headquarters, it has to comply with mandates coming 
from it. Thus, EBS had to be implemented at the plant. At the same time, the cognitive and 
normative profiles of Iceland made it difficult for the plant’s employees to understand the real 
value of the practice. This led to a high level of implementation and a low level of 
internalization in the early stages of implementing EBS, conceptualized in the theory as 
ceremonial adoption (Kostova & Roth, 2002). As shown by the empirical findings, the 
employees at Elkem Iceland used the EBS tools in the beginning just because they were told 
so. However, they did not understand why they had to use them (Wayne Faaland). According 
to the divisional EBS coach, Wayne Faaland, this led to short periods of progress followed by 
major set-backs. 
Also, the low level of trust and identity with the parent company appears to have caused a 
‘not invented here syndrome’ at the plant. When the first EBS practices were tried 
implemented at the plant, they were viewed as ‘something coming from the outside’. As the 
current plant manager indicated, the practices were referred to as ‘Elkem bullshit’. This can 
be interpreted as something different than a general resistance to change, as the operators 
emphasized the fact that the practices were something coming from the outside. The finding 
that both trust and identity with the parent company had an influence on practice 
implementation is consistent with previous work on the transfer of practices across units 
(Szulanski, 1996; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998).  
Institutional theory can thus explain the difficulties with implementing EBS at Elkem Iceland 
in the early stages of the implementation process. However, the findings could not be 
replicated in the other case unit. Consequently, Proposition 3a: The combination of an 
unfavorable institutional profile, and a relational context characterized by a high level of 
dependency and a low level of trust and identity with the parent company, will have a 
negative influence on the XPS implementation, cannot be supported. 
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However, some of the discussed influencing factors have changed over the time passed. The 
employees at the plant state that they now have a higher understanding of the value of  EBS, 
indicating a higher level of internalization. Also, the relationship between the plant 
management and the headquarters is believed to be better after the new plant manager was 
employed. 
6.2 Factors influencing the sharing of XPS related knowledge  
Research question 1.2 that this section addresses, is more exploratory, seeking to identify 
what factors have influenced the EBS knowledge sharing in Elkem. This section will first 
discuss the identified factors which can be explained by the investigated theories, namely 
corporate socialization theory and agency theory, and address the propositions related to 
each theory. Next, identified factors which have influenced the EBS knowledge sharing, but 
which cannot be related to the investigated theories, will be explored. 
6.2.1 Identified factors explained by corporate socialization theory 
The existence of inter-unit links 
In order for organizational units to obtain new knowledge through interacting with one 
another, inter-unit links and networks are essential (Tsai, 2001). The empirical findings 
revealed that the EBS coaches at the two investigated plants have limited knowledge about 
each other. Thus, there is no interpersonal link between the people responsible for EBS 
implementation at the two plants. From the findings it became clear that this has hindered 
them in contacting each other for discussing EBS related matters. Both of the local EBS 
coaches indicated that it would have been easier to share knowledge with other EBS coaches, 
for instance through an online forum, if they knew the receiving part personally. Therefore, 
the empirical findings indicate that the lack of inter-unit links has had a negative effect on 
EBS related knowledge sharing. However, the positive effect of the existence of such 
interpersonal ties could not be proved based on the empirical findings. Consequently, 
Proposition 4a: The existence of inter-unit links will have a positive influence on the XPS 
sharing between MNC subsidiaries, lacks sufficient evidence to be supported. 
The use of corporate socialization mechanisms 
Corporate socialization mechanisms refer to those organizational mechanisms that facilitate 
the development of interpersonal ties in the MNC, which again can be expected to enhance 
the transfer of knowledge between units. Examples of such mechanisms can be (1) training 
involving participants from different units,(2) inter-unit trips, and (3) inter-unit  forums or 
committees (Björkman et al., 2004). 
Many corporate socialization mechanisms are to be found in Elkem. The most obvious 
mechanisms related to training are maybe the EBS University, which has had more than 800 
participants from different units over the last decade. One of the objectives with the EBS 
University is to share EBS experiences between the plants. However, the university is often 
the participants’ first introduction to EBS, which means that the participants don’t necessarily 
have that many experiences to share. Therefore, the EBS University does not have a direct 
positive influence on knowledge sharing between plants. However, many of the interviewees 
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stated that the EBS University is a good arena to build personal networks with employees 
from other Elkem subsidiaries. According to the corporate socialization theory, these 
networks can enhance the knowledge sharing over time (Björkman et al., 20014). 
Many inter-unit trips are facilitated related to the team work across units. The participants of 
these teams stated that they always learn something new when they visit other plants. Also, 
the plants receiving employees from other units benefit from these visits, as visitors from 
other plants often see solutions to problems that they have struggled with for years. However, 
the gained knowledge from these inter-unit trips is production knowledge, and not EBS 
knowledge. Therefore, the facilitation of inter-unit trips for operators does not have a direct 
positive effect on EBS knowledge sharing. However, the EBS center tried for a period to 
bring local EBS coaches with them when performing audits at other plants. Unfortunately, 
this was a short lived trend, as the economic crisis put an end to it. Due to the short period of 
time this was tested, it is difficult to say how this would have influenced EBS knowledge 
sharing between the plants. But the fact that operators from the production gain useful 
production knowledge from visiting other plants, gives an indication that EBS coaches would 
have gained valuable EBS knowledge from the same procedure. 
Other used mechanisms are the inter-unit forums, such as the safety forum held twice a year 
between the foundry division and the silicon division. The plant manager at Elkem Iceland 
points out that they sometimes discuss EBS indirectly at those meetings, and that he 
compares what the other plants are doing with his own plant’s EBS work. Therefore, even if 
these forums are not directed at sharing EBS knowledge, they facilitate EBS knowledge 
sharing to some extent.  
Based on the above discussion, it is obvious that the use of corporate socialization 
mechanisms in Elkem has led to the creation of interpersonal links in the company, and also 
more sharing of knowledge. However, because the inter-unit trips and forums are not directly 
directed at EBS, the shared knowledge is mostly production knowledge and not EBS 
knowledge. This indicates that the use of corporate socialization mechanisms has a positive 
influence on knowledge sharing between subsidiaries, but that the different mechanisms must 
be directed towards the specific knowledge that the MNC wants to transfer. Thus, the 
findings of this study give a strong indication that Proposition 4b: The use of corporate 
socialization mechanisms will have a positive influence on the XPS sharing between MNC 
subsidiaries, holds true, but the proposition cannot be supported due to the limited empirical 
evidence. 
The use of IT 
IT systems have been described in the literature (Bolsani & Scarso, 1996) as tools with high 
potential in knowledge management, especially in terms of efficiency and scope of 
knowledge access. The employees at the EBS center have started to use the Elkem intranet as 
a channel for sharing EBS knowledge. Evidence suggests that as of today, the EBS site is 
more of a database where relevant literature and information on EBS is distributed to a 
limited number of people. However, the EBS center is also planning to develop a virtual 
forum where EBS coaches can meet and exchange EBS experiences. The empirical findings, 
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however, revealed several doubts about using the intranet as an EBS sharing mechanism. The 
first concern is about leakage of proprietary knowledge from the EBS database. If many 
employees in Elkem were to have access to this database, they could easily download the 
documents and distribute them to competitors. Also, it was indicated that there is not a 
culture for using IT in Elkem. As pointed out, many employees don’t even open their e-mails. 
Regarding the EBS virtual forum, it was pointed out that it needed a both-way design to be 
useful. In this way, the EBS coaches can communicate directly with EBS coaches at other 
plants. However, the interviewed EBS coaches stated that they don’t know any other EBS 
coaches personally, and that this would make the communication difficult. This finding is in 
line with the theory, which emphasizes that IT usage should be combined with corporate 
socialization mechanisms (Brynjolfsson & Saunders, 2010).  
The use of IT, or in this case the use of the Elkem intranet, seems to have a potential for 
increasing the EBS knowledge sharing between plants. However, in line with the finding of 
Ciabuschi (2011), the empirical findings indicate that IT based systems should be used with 
caution. Also, since the online virtual meeting forum for EBS coaches is not yet developed, 
the empirical data only reveals the employees’ mixed perceptions about the value of such a 
forum. Therefore, Proposition 4c: The use of IT will have a positive influence on the XPS 
sharing between MNC subsidiaries, cannot be supported. 
6.2.2 Identified factors explained by agency theory 
Motivational disposition at the sending unit 
Another influencing factor of knowledge sharing between plants is the motivational 
disposition at the sending unit. Research based on agency theory indicates that MNC units 
may be reluctant to share knowledge with other plants in fear of losing a position of 
superiority (Björkman et al., 2004). The empirical findings of this study reveal that there is a 
competition between plants in Elkem. In times of recession, plants are in a position where 
they risk to be temporarily shut down, or have to run at a low capacity. According to the 
leader of the EBS center, the decision of what plants to partly or fully shut down is to some 
degree based on a comparison between the different plants’ performance.  Therefore, it might 
not be in the plants’ self-interest to share knowledge with other plants, because this may lead 
to an improved performance at the receiving unit.  
Further, empirical evidence indicates that the plants in periods have been ’put up against each 
other’. In such periods the plants have been reluctant to share information with other 
subsidiaries, because they are considered competitors. Therefore, the competitive nature of 
the relationship between the plants can be said to have decreased the plants’ motivation to 
share knowledge. In line with agency theory, the findings of the case study suggest that a low 
motivation of the sending unit indeed has a negative impact on knowledge sharing between 
MNC subsidiaries. Hence, Proposition 5a: A low motivation of the sending unit to share 
knowledge will have a negative influence on the XPS sharing between MNC subsidiaries, can 
be supported. 
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Perceived importance of knowledge sharing by headquarters 
According to agency theory, a high perceived importance attached to knowledge sharing by 
the headquarters will increase the outflow of knowledge from a subsidiary (Björkman et al., 
2004). Even though some plants are reluctant to share knowledge in fear of losing a position 
of superiority, there are also good reasons to share. As the plant manager at Elkem Salten 
indicated, the plant has gained some goodwill from the headquarters because of its openness 
related to the EBS work. This goodwill manifested itself when the headquarters distributed 
resources to the HR project, for instance. This form of recognition has led to a higher 
perceived importance of knowledge sharing at the plant, thereby increased the outflow of 
knowledge. As the plant manager indicated, the continued strategy to ‘open up the plant’ is 
partly based on the gained goodwill from the headquarters. However, Elkem Iceland has not 
shared their EBS experiences or ‘opened up the plant’ to the same extent as Salten. One 
possible explanation for this was given by Iceland’s HR manager, suggesting that if a plant is 
not proud of its own accomplishments, it might be unwilling to share its experiences with 
others.  
According to the agency theory, several incentive based control mechanisms (i.e. network 
based president bonuses) can be used by the headquarters in order to increase the perceived 
importance of knowledge sharing, and thereby the knowledge outflow from subsidiaries 
(Björkman et al., 2004; Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000). Elkem has so far not initiated any such 
mechanisms.  
The fact that the headquarters don’t give any clear signals that EBS knowledge sharing is 
important and highly appreciated, might be a contributing reason as to why the sharing 
between plants is so limited. However, the example of Elkem Salten shows that the plant’s 
high perceived importance of knowledge sharing gave it an incentive to share. Therefore, the 
empirical findings give a strong indication that Proposition 5b: A high perceived importance 
attached to knowledge sharing by headquarters will have a positive influence on the XPS 
sharing between MNC subsidiaries, holds true. However, since the finding is only based on 
the experience of Elkem Salten, the proposition cannot be supported.   
6.2.3 Identified factors not explained by theory 
Different XPS organization at the plants  
The lack of personal ties between the EBS coaches discussed previously, can be attributed to 
the absence of forums where they can meet in person, and also the fact that EBS is differently 
organized at the various plants. The empirical findings revealed that no forum exist, where 
the people responsible for EBS at the different plants can meet. Several of the interviewees at 
the investigated plants requested such a forum. However, since the EBS is organized 
differently at the plants, it would be difficult to decide who to include in such a forum. At 
Elkem Iceland, much of the responsibility for developing EBS at the plant is given to the 
local EBS coach. Even though she can ask her colleagues for advice, there is no formal 
support group around her role. At Elkem Salten, however, the EBS coach is part of a HR 
team which works together on EBS related issues. Also, the EBS coach has developed a 
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separate EBS team to support and help him with the implementation. Other plants don’t even 
have a local EBS coach, but have other roles responsible for the EBS implementation.  
The empirical findings indicate that the lack of standardized EBS organization makes it 
difficult for EBS coaches to know who to approach at other plants. It also makes it difficult to 
create a meeting forum for all people responsible for the EBS implementation. Therefore the 
different organization of EBS at the plants has a negative influence on the EBS knowledge 
sharing between subsidiaries.  
A knowledge center acting as an intermediary  
The empirical findings suggest that today it is mainly the EBS center that transfers ideas and 
EBS experiences between the plants. This is done by presenting real life EBS experiences 
from various plants at different courses, such as the EBS University. Also, the divisional EBS 
coaches can bring along ideas from other units when they visit or perform audits at the plants. 
The EBS center consists of five people and is responsible for the total EBS activity within 
Elkem. This results in a tight schedule for the members of the center, who have to divide their 
time among the  plants. Although the facilitation of knowledge-sharing that the EBS center 
performs today is valued by employees at both plants, empirical evidence suggests that there 
is a demand among the plants for more EBS knowledge sharing. Consequently, the EBS 
center may constitute a bottleneck in terms of the efficiency of EBS-related sharing, as the 
plants are dependent on the time and availability of the divisional EBS coaches in order to 
share knowledge. Another argument is that the plants may be too dependent on the EBS 
center for information. This will hinder them in actively seeking information from other 
plants. 
6.3 The generalizability of the study’s propositions 
Through the preceding discussion of the study’s theoretical propositions, a set of factors 
believed to influence the implementation and sharing of XPS have been investigated. Of the 
in total 13 propositions, 4 are supported by the empirical findings.  
- Proposition 1a: A high level of prior related knowledge will have a positive influence 
on the XPS implementation.  
- Proposition 1d: Organizational inertia will have a negative influence on the XPS 
implementation. 
- Proposition 2b: A high level of top- and middle management support will have a 
positive influence on the XPS implementation. 
- Proposition 5a: A low motivation of the sending unit to share knowledge will have a 
negative influence on the XPS sharing between MNC subsidiaries. 
As explained in Section 3.4, the theoretical propositions could only be confirmed under 
strictly defined circumstances; the findings from both plants needed to confirm the proposed 
relationship. This result in two main groups of propositions that are not supported by the 
empirical findings based on the predefined rules: 
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1. Propositions that find strong support at one of the plants, but lack sufficient evidence 
at the other. 
2. Propositions that concern factors which appeared to be in limited use in the case 
company. 
Even if the propositions in Group 1 (Proposition 1b, 1c, 2a, 2c, 3a, 5b) are not supported, the 
empirical findings give strong indications that they have the initially proposed influence on 
either XPS implementation or sharing. For instance, the use of cross-functional 
communication proved to have a positive influence on EBS implementation at Elkem Salten, 
while being in limited use at Elkem Iceland. Thus, based on the listed criteria, this factor 
lacks sufficient evidence to be supported. However, the finding is valuable, as it contributes 
to explaining the variation in EBS implementation at the investigated plants.  
The propositions in Group 2 (Proposition 41, 4b, 4c) lack sufficient evidence because of the 
limited use or existence of these factors in the case company. For instance, the use of 
corporate socialization mechanisms was proposed to have a positive influence on the sharing 
of XPS related knowledge between units. However, the empirical findings reveal that the use 
of corporate socialization mechanisms directed at EBS is very limited in Elkem. Thus, the 
proposition cannot be supported according to the given criteria. However, the finding is still 
important, because it reveals an essential improvement point in the case company. Therefore, 
many of the propositions in Group 2 are addressed in the managerial implications of this 
study. 
The theoretical propositions were based on existing theory on procedural knowledge transfer 
in MNCs. Because the five propositions which found support in this study were grounded in 
existing theory, and were supported based on a replication between two cases, they can be 
assumed to be generalizable to other MNCs. Although not fully supported, the other 
propositions cannot be rejected based on the lack of support from one comparative case 
study. 
As described introductorily in Chapter 2, the five theoretical perspectives used in the study, 
cover three different levels of analysis: subsidiary level, corporate level and national level. 
The investigated factors can thus be categorized according to these levels, as displayed in 
Figure 8 on the next page. The figure includes all the factors initially identified through 
reviewing the literature. However, the factors that have been confirmed through the supported 
propositions are marked in the figure with a note. 
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Figure 8: Factors influencing either the implementation or sharing of XPS-related knowledge.  
 
6.4 Discussion of main findings: Why has the level of XPS implementation varied 
between the plants? 
When discussing the study’s propositions in Section 6.2, support of a proposition was given if 
the findings from both plants confirmed the proposed relationship. This criterion gives rise to 
a generalizability of the supported propositions to other MNCs. However, when exploring the 
variation between the investigated subsidiaries, the strong presence of one factor in one 
subsidiary compared to the lack of presence of the same factor in the second subsidiary may 
be directly attributable for the variation in XPS implementation. Thus, the explanation for the 
variation in XPS implementation may be given by factors which did not receive support on 
the basis of the given criterion. Consequently, when exploring the main research question of 
this study, the generalizability of the identified factors will not be given a strong emphasis. 
Rather, the main focus will be on addressing those  factors identified in Figure 8 which best 
can  explain the variation in XPS implementation between the plants of the case company.   
The identified factors in Figure 8 have so far been treated separately and in accordance with 
the identified theories. However, simply adding up the separate factors is likely to create a 
simplified picture, when in reality the factors intertwine and influence each other. Thus, the 
National level
Corporate level
Subsidiary level
Institutional factors
Implementation:
IF1: Institutional profile 
of host country
Relational  factors
Implementation:
RFI1: Dependency on HQ
RFI2: Level of trust with HQ
RFI3: Level of identity with HQ
Sharing:
RFS1: Use of Corporate Socialization mechanisms
RFS2: Use of IT
RFS3: Existence of Inter-personal ties
RFS4: Motivational disposition of the sending unit (supported)
RFS5: Perceived importance of knowledge sharing
Organizational factors
Implementation:
OF1: Organizational inertia (supported)
OF2: Prior related knowledge (supported)
OF3: Use of gatekeeper 
OF4: Effort of knowledge acquisition (supported)
OF5: Lack of internal communication
OF6: Use of HRM practices
OF7: Support from top – and middle management (supported)
OF8: Prior change history
OF9: Lack of communication of targets and direction  
OF10: Planning for and creating short-term wins
OF11: Employee involvement 
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following discussion addresses the factors holistically, seeking to provide a full picture of the 
variation in the plants’ EBS implementation. Also, a discussion of how the limited sharing 
between the plants has contributed to the different levels of XPS implementation will be 
given. 
Multiple factors leading to Organizational inertia  
At Iceland, a strong influencing factor on the plant’s EBS implementation has been the initial 
organizational inertia, or resistance to change within the plant. Interestingly, several of the 
other factors identified seem to be directly attributable for this organizational inertia. First, 
the lack of top management support is perhaps the strongest influencing factor, as the 
production workers were left to implement EBS tools without any conviction as to why the 
plant should prioritize this type of activity. Second, the combination of a high level of 
dependence on the parent company (and resulting pressure to implement EBS), with a low 
level of trust and identity resulted in a case of ceremonial adoption: tools and methodology 
was seemingly implemented, but with a lack of conviction as to the value of such a system. 
Finally, empirical evidence points to the unfavorable institutional profile of Iceland as 
another contributing factor. The country’s adaptation from agriculture and fishing towards a 
more industrialized society has provided some transitional challenges. Bureaucracy and a rule 
of red tape are new elements that the Icelanders find hard to abide to. Consequently, the 
combination of the absence of support from top management, ceremonial adoption among the 
operators, in addition to an unfavorable institutional profile, seem to be directly attributable 
for the high level of organizational inertia hindering the initial EBS implementation. At 
Elkem Salten, there was also an initial resistance to change in the early stages of the EBS 
implementation. However, the organizational inertia at Salten did not have as strong a 
negative effect on the implementation as at Elkem Iceland. 
Prior related knowledge and support from the plant managers 
The employment of the current plant managers at the investigated plants has proven to have 
had a significant positive influence on the plants’ EBS implementation. At Iceland, the 
current plant manager is of Icelandic nationality and can thereby, as opposed to previous 
expatriate managers, better relate to the institutional profile shaping the plant. Second, the 
plant manager had prior related knowledge as to the value of TPS-based methodology, and 
was thereby easily convinced as to the value of EBS. Further, the plant manager took early 
ownership and gave strong support to the implementation process, which evidence shows has 
helped convince the plant’s employees as to the value of EBS. However, the current plant 
manager at Salten has given equally strong support to implementing EBS, but has also shown 
a strong personal involvement in the process, and thereby constituting an important driving 
force related to the plant’s EBS implementation. An important reason for this drive seems to 
be the manager’s prior related knowledge. More specifically, the combination of prior related 
knowledge of TPS-based methodology and previous direct experience of implementing EBS 
has proven valuable for the plant’s EBS implementation. Consequently, Salten has had a 
more focused approach to the implementation process, and has thereby achieved a more 
advanced level of EBS implementation 
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The plants’ effort of knowledge acquisition and the level of internal communication 
Another contrast found between the plants is the effort of knowledge acquisition. Again, the 
difference related to this factor seems to be explainable through several of the other identified 
factors in research question 1.1. First, at Elkem Iceland the prior change history of disrupting 
strategic changes and expatriate Norwegian plant managers seems to have impaired the 
relationship of the plant towards the headquarters. This is reflected in the plant 
management’s focus on managing the EBS implementation as independently as possible. 
Second, the different language between the plant’s employees and the EBS center creates 
difficulties when divisional EBS coaches perform practical training with the operators. This 
might also explain the limited effort of knowledge acquisition of Elkem Iceland. 
Consequently, the prior change history causing an impaired relationship with headquarters, as 
well as language barriers decreasing the value of the received training, has led to a low 
intensity of effort in acquiring knowledge in terms of the amount of help requested from the 
EBS center in later years.  
In comparison, the strong effort of knowledge acquisition displayed by Salten’s plant 
management is an important reason for the success of Salten in recent years. A consequence 
resulting from this effort and the close contact with the EBS center is the systemization of the 
cross-functional communication related to EBS. A cross-functional HR team, an EBS team 
supporting the local EBS coach, and regular meetings of the improvement teams all 
contribute to a higher awareness concerning the status of the plant’s EBS work. Further, 
quantifying savings due to improvement work and the compensation given to employees who 
participate, has given the employees extra motivation for this type of work. Also, the 
achievement of short-term wins, such as the result of Kaizen projects, helps combat 
resistance among the workers and increase motivation towards EBS at Salten. In contrast, a 
lack of cross-functional communication related to EBS is an important existing barrier to the 
EBS implementation at Iceland. Information-sharing between departments is not systemized, 
and there are few regular cross-departmental meetings to assure the follow-up of the EBS 
work at the plant.  
Multiple factors leading to limited inter-unit XPS related knowledge sharing 
From the previous discussion it becomes clear that the sharing of EBS related knowledge is 
very limited between the plants in Elkem. Several influencing factors are identified, both 
factors addressed in the theoretical propositions, and factors not covered by the investigated 
theory. 
Of the identified influencing factors, some appear to cause the existence of other factors.  
Maybe the most important underlying factor is the lack of standardization in how EBS is 
organized at the different plants. This factor is not covered by the investigated theory, but 
appears to have undesirable consequences. First, it makes it difficult for EBS coaches to 
know who to contact at other plants if they want to discuss an EBS related matter. Second, 
the lack of standardization makes it difficult to know who to include from the different plants 
in a potential forum for EBS sharing. Thus, it complicates the use of corporate socialization 
mechanisms.  
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The limited use of corporate socialization mechanisms related to EBS, is in itself a major 
barrier to the EBS knowledge sharing between subsidiaries. As revealed by the empirical 
findings, most corporate socialization mechanisms used in Elkem today are not directed at 
EBS, and thus facilitate the sharing of other types of knowledge. The lack of a forum where 
people responsible for EBS can meet and exchange knowledge creates a situation where there 
are no personal ties between EBS coaches. 
An interesting question is why the use of corporate socialization mechanism directed at EBS 
is so limited. The empirical findings revealed that today the EBS center acts as an 
intermediary in the sharing process between subsidiaries. This could be the underlying cause 
to the limited use of corporate socialization mechanisms; if the parent company views this as 
a sufficient measure for facilitating EBS knowledge sharing between plants, there is no need 
for them to initiate other mechanisms. Also, the plants become dependent on the EBS center 
for information, which prevent them from actively seeking information themselves at other 
plants. Therefore, the empirical findings suggest that the EBS center becomes a bottleneck in 
the EBS sharing process.  
The limited use of corporate socialization mechanisms also give a signal that sharing of EBS 
related knowledge is not a high priority in the company. Thus, it leads to a lower perceived 
importance attached to knowledge sharing by headquarters. The perceived importance of 
knowledge sharing is important for the outflow of knowledge from subsidiaries, especially in 
times of recession, as the findings revealed that the plants are reluctant to share knowledge in 
such periods. 
Consequently, five factors related to the implementation of XPS and four factor related to the 
inter-unit sharing of XPS can be identified as central for explaining the variation in XPS 
implementation between the investigated subsidiaries. These factors are listed in table 6. 
 
RQ1.1: Implementation of XPS 
• Organizational inertia 
• Top management support 
• Prior related knowledge 
• Effort of knowledge acquisition 
• Cross-functional communication 
RQ 1.2: Sharing of XPS 
• Standardization of XPS implementation 
• Use of corporate socialization mechanisms 
• XPS knowledge center acting as an 
intermediary 
• Perceived importance of knowledge sharing 
 
 
Table 6: Central factors causing the variation in XPS implementation between the investigated 
subsidiaries 
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Limited sharing contributes to the variation in XPS implementation 
As stated introductorily in the study, inter-unit sharing is believed to explain some of the 
variation in the XPS implementation success. The empirical findings of this case study 
suggest that this assumption can indeed be verified. One illustrative example is the HR 
project carried out at Salten. The HR project at Salten has led to an increased cross-functional 
communication and overall systemization of the EBS work carried out at the plant. These are 
factors identified through research question 1.1 as a significant difference between the 
investigated plants, and an important area of improvement for Iceland. Considering that some 
of the ideas that have been implemented at Salten, are directly copied from Elkem Solar in 
Kristiansand, it is reasonable to assume that if the ideas from this project had been 
implemented at Iceland, many of the same positive effects would be gained.  
As of today, the EBS center is responsible for transferring such ideas between plants. 
Consequently and as previously discussed, the plants themselves become less active in 
seeking information from other plants. Further, the EBS center, consisting of five coaches, 
has limited resources in facilitating this type of sharing at all thirteen plants. Also, 
implementing projects such as the HR project, demands resources from the headquarters. 
However, as of today, evidence suggests that the sharing of EBS related knowledge is not 
given a high priority.  This results in only occasional sharing, further limited by a low budget 
allocation from the headquarters. 
Consequently, evidence suggests that if there existed a higher degree of knowledge sharing 
related to XPS between the different units, ideas emerging at one subsidiary could soon be 
spread out in the network and copied at other units. This would enhance the overall XPS 
implementation in the company, and also lead to a lower variation in the level of XPS 
implementation at the different subsidiaries, thus supporting the link between inter-unit XPS 
related knowledge sharing and the variation in XPS implementation.  
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6.5 Proposing a model  
The preceding section identified a number of factors which, commingled, provides the 
explanation for the variation in XPS implementation between the investigated subsidiaries. 
Based on this discussion, nine factors are identified as essential for explaining the variation in 
XPS implementation between the investigated subsidiaries. These factors (four factors related 
to implementation identified through RQ 1.1 and four factors related to inter-unit sharing 
identified through RQ 1.2) are shown in Figure 9. Further, the identified underlying factors, 
as well as the relationship between these factors, are given in stippled boxes to visualize the 
holistic explanation of the variation in XPS implementation. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: A holistic model explaining the subsidiaries' variation in XPS implementation. 
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6.6 Managerial Implications 
On a general level, this study identifies multiple factors which may affect the XPS 
implementation and the sharing of XPS related knowledge in a multi-plant manufacturing 
network. Many of these factors may be influenced by managers of the parent company, of 
which the six given suggestions are directed at. Each suggestion is discussed in further detail 
bellow. 
1) Ensure that local managers have the ability to lead change processes  
2) Establish a cross-functional team to support the XPS implementation within each 
plant 
3) Standardize positions with XPS-related responsibility across the plants 
4) Promote a common corporate identity through promoting shared values and a 
common language 
5) Create physical and virtual forums for inter-unit knowledge sharing 
6) Communicate perceived importance of knowledge-sharing towards subsidiaries 
The ability to produce lasting changes in the organization is found to be highly dependent on 
the local manager’s ability to lead change processes. First of all, a strong influencing factor 
identified in this study is the display of top management support. The level of XPS 
implementation was found to be highly dependent on the support from local management. In 
order to avoid organizational inertia, it is important for the local management to take 
ownership of the implementation process. Further, the local manager is proven to be the 
single most important driving force of the long-term implementation process. Second, the 
prior related knowledge of the local plant manager proved to be of influence. The case study 
shows that prior related knowledge of XPS makes it easier for the local manager to recognize 
the value of such a system. Further, if the plant manager has prior experience with XPS, this 
may constitute a great advantage when driving the implementation process forward. 
Consequently, headquarters should consider mechanisms for internal sharing of practical 
experience as a supplement to training and courses containing theoretical knowledge.  
The findings also indicate that in order for the plants to internalize XPS, the structure of 
communication within the plant is an important influencing factor. In order to encourage 
cross-functional, internal communication, the establishment of interdisciplinary teams should 
be promoted. Especially, establishing a standardized, cross-functional team to support the 
XPS implementation should be prioritized, linking the HR function with XPS.  
Furthermore, a barrier identified in this study towards inter-unit knowledge sharing, is the 
lack of knowledge as to who holds title to the XPS-related responsibility within the different 
plants. Consequently, not only standardizing a cross-functional XPS team, but standardizing 
all important XPS related positions will facilitate XPS related knowledge sharing between 
the equivalent positions across the different plants. 
This study also addresses challenges caused by the institutional profile related to the location 
of the plants within different countries. If the headquarters fail to accommodate a plant’s 
institutional profile, this may lead to a distant relationship between the headquarters and the 
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plant in question. Further, a distant relationship may lead to a stronger resistance towards 
change, which if left unattended, can arise to the ‘not invented here’ syndrome. As the 
implementation of XPS may be viewed by some plants as a system imposed by the 
headquarters, this form of resistance can become a strong barrier to the implementation of 
XPS.  In order to prevent this type of situation, it is therefore important for corporate 
managers to focus on creating a common company identity through promoting shared values 
and promoting XPS as a common language. 
Further, in order to promote inter-unit sharing of XPS-related knowledge, physical and virtual 
forums should be established where XPS representatives can engage in sharing of knowledge 
and practical experiences. This will help relieve prospective intermediaries (such as a 
knowledge center) of this task, increasing the efficiency of the sharing of ideas and 
experiences.  
Also, the perceived importance attached to knowledge sharing by headquarters was found to 
influence the level of XPS related sharing. Consequently, in order for the XPS representatives 
to engage in knowledge sharing and use the suggested forums, it is important that corporate 
managers communicate the importance of knowledge-sharing towards the plants, and draw 
attention to this as an area of priority. 
6.7. Theoretical implications 
This study uses three theoretical perspectives in order to investigate the implementation of 
XPS in MNC subsidiaries, and two additional perspectives to investigate the sharing of XPS 
related knowledge between MNC subsidiaries. This provides an opportunity to compare and 
discuss the contribution and applicability of each theory. 
As indicated in Section 6.4, the explanation for the difference in level of XPS implementation 
at the investigated plants appears to be a complex interaction of different factors revealed 
through the theoretical perspectives. Many of the applied theories have an explanatory power 
by themselves, but a more complete understanding of the investigated phenomena can be 
reached by using the perspectives in combination.  
This section will first discuss the contribution and limitations of each of the applied theories. 
Next, the pattern of interaction between the different theoretical perspectives will be 
investigated. Finally, a model explaining the application of, and interaction between, each 
applied theory will be proposed.  
6.7.1 Contribution and limitations of the applied theories 
Absorptive capacity theory 
Absorptive capacity theory has proven to be useful in identifying major challenges and 
success factors at the investigated plants. As discussed, organizational inertia was a huge 
barrier to implementation at Elkem Iceland in the early stages of implementation. Absorptive 
capacity theory designates organizational inertia as a barrier to implementation, but does not 
give an explanation as to why the resistance to change was so high in Iceland.  
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A main element of the absorptive capacity of a unit is the intensity of effort in knowledge 
acquisition. This has proven to be a major success factor at Elkem Salten, as the plant 
manager has been very eager to request the EBS center’s help. This has resulted in a high 
frequency of visits from the EBS center, helping the plant with the EBS implementation. 
While the absorptive capacity theory states that intensity of effort in knowledge acquisition 
reflects the unit’s absorptive capacity, it does not seek to find what drives the motivation for 
knowledge acquisition.   
Change management 
Change management can partly explain why organizational inertia was present at Iceland, as 
the top management showed significant resistance towards the implementation of EBS, and 
thereby a lack of support of the implementation process. 
More importantly, change management is also a key perspective in explaining how 
organizational inertia was overcome. The negative trend at Elkem Iceland was not turned 
until a new, committed plant manager was employed. Based on the findings from both plants, 
the support from top management seems to be one of the most essential success factors for 
EBS implementation.  
Also, change management give an explanation to why there is still a ‘gray mass’ of 
employees at both plants that are not motivated for EBS. The lack of communication of goals 
and results related to EBS was found to be an essential barrier to reaching an adequate 
understanding of, and motivation for, EBS at the plants. 
Institutional theory 
Institutional theory has proven to be very useful in explaining why subsidiaries react in 
certain ways in a situation where the parent company is transferring, or actually imposing, 
organizational practices on the subsidiary. The strong resistance to change at Elkem Salten 
can be explained by the existence of a ‘not invented here’ syndrome. Because the plant had a 
low level of identity with the parent company, the practices were viewed as something 
coming from the outside, increasing the resistance to adopt the practices.  
The institutional theory can also explain the many set-backs in the implementation process at 
Elkem Iceland. The combination of an unfavorable institutional profile of the host country, a 
high dependency on the parent company, and a low level of trust and identity with the parent 
caused the plant to implement the practices without understanding the meaning behind them.  
Of the investigated theories, institutional theory is the only one which looks at the combined 
effect of influencing factors. This gives a high explanatory power of how new practices are 
implemented at subsidiaries. However, the theory says nothing as to how the relationship 
towards the parent company can be improved, for instance.  
Corporate socialization theory 
Corporate socialization theory provides many suggestions as to how companies can facilitate 
the sharing of knowledge between subsidiaries. The empirical findings suggest that the use of 
corporate socialization mechanisms in Elkem has indeed led to the creation of interpersonal 
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links in the company, and also more sharing of knowledge. However, because the committees 
and inter-unit trips are not directly directed at EBS, the shared knowledge is mere production 
knowledge and not EBS knowledge. 
From the findings of the study it became evident that the lack of interpersonal ties between 
the EBS coaches and the absence of forums directed at EBS sharing were major barriers to 
the sharing of EBS knowledge between the plants. This is in line with the corporate 
socialization theory, which states that these are important influencing factors for knowledge 
sharing. However, the theory does not explain why some subsidiaries are reluctant to share 
knowledge in the first place.  
Agency theory 
Agency theory is useful for explaining the underlying causes as to why the sharing of 
knowledge between the plants has been so limited. As suggested by the theory, subsidiaries 
may be reluctant to share knowledge in fear of losing a position of superiority. This has been 
shown to be the case in the history of Elkem, where the plants have been in danger of being 
partly shut down in times of recession. Therefore, it has not been in the plants’ self-interest to 
share knowledge with other plants, even though this would benefit the company as a whole.  
The relationship between the subsidiaries and the parent company can indeed be categorized 
as a principal-agent relationship. The theory gives clear directions as to how the behavior of 
the agent (subsidiary) can be controlled or monitored. However, the use of behavioral control 
mechanisms has been found to be very limited in Elkem. This is in spite of the finding that 
perceived importance of knowledge sharing has a significant influence on the knowledge 
outflow from Elkem Salten. 
6.7.2 Pattern of interaction between the employed theoretical perspectives 
The empirical findings of this study prove that both absorptive capacity, change management, 
and institutional theory can explain important aspects of XPS implementation in MNC 
subsidiaries. Also, corporate socialization and agency theory were partly able to explain the 
limited sharing of EBS related knowledge.  However, it appears that none of the perspectives 
are capable of explaining any of the two investigated phenomena alone; a more holistic 
understanding appears to be reached when using the perspectives in combination. 
Interaction between perspectives explaining the implementation of XPS 
It is possible to see a pattern in how the different theoretical perspectives have interacted with 
each other in order to produce a holistic explanation. Both change management and 
institutional theory seem to contribute to a greater understanding of the absorptive capacity of 
a subsidiary. The main elements of absorptive capacity are ability and motivation for 
absorbing new knowledge. Change management is directed at managing change processes, 
where an important part is managing the resistance to change within the organization. The 
resistance to change can be directly connected to the motivation for absorbing new 
knowledge; if there is a resistance to change within the organization, the employees will have 
a low motivation for absorbing new knowledge. Thus, change management gives directions 
as to how the motivational aspect of the absorptive capacity can be increased. Institutional 
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theory explains the underlying causes to this resistance to change, or the low motivation for 
absorbing new knowledge. Both the absorptive capacity theory and change management 
investigate aspects of the implementation process on a subsidiary level. The institutional 
theory, however, explain the implementation of practices by drawing on factors from both the 
corporate level (relational context) and the national level (institutional context).  
Interaction between perspectives explaining the sharing of XPS 
From the empirical findings it became evident that both the corporate socialization theory and 
agency theory can give useful explanations as to why the sharing between plants in Elkem is 
so limited, and also how the sharing can be increased. However, while the corporate 
socialization theory explain the limited sharing by the lack of lateral mechanisms or lack of 
personal ties between units, the agency theory is based on the assumption that units are 
reluctant to share knowledge with other units. Thus, corporate socialization theory suggests 
that the development of interpersonal networks and the existence of forums will 
automatically lead to more knowledge sharing. Agency theory, on the other hand, indicates 
that for subsidiaries to share knowledge they have to be monitored or somewhat controlled by 
the headquarters. Both of the theories investigate factors influencing the knowledge sharing 
on a corporate level. Based on the above findings, a model is proposed. The model shows 
how the different theories interact, what phenomenon they explore (XPS implementation or 
XPS sharing), and on what level they explain the topic of investigation 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Interaction between the applied theoretical perspectives. 
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6.8 Contribution to the theory on XPS implementation in MNCs 
This study can provide two main contributions to the theoretical field of XPS implementation 
in multinational companies.  
1) The study’s propositions build on existing theory on ‘procedural knowledge transfer 
in MNCs’. Four of the thirteen developed propositions were supported in the study, 
and are thus believed to be generalizable to MNCs other than the case company. This 
also gives a strong indication that there is indeed a link between the theoretical fields 
of procedural knowledge transfer and XPS implementation and sharing in MNCs. The 
set of propositions is based on an extensive review of the literature on this related 
field, and is therefore considered to be a useful framework for future research on XPS 
implementation and sharing in MNCs. 
 
2) The propositions are based on five theoretical perspectives. The findings of this study 
reveal that none of these perspectives are able to explain implementation or sharing of 
XPS in multinational companies by themselves. However, this study proposes a 
theoretical model which explains how the different theoretical perspectives interact.  
6.9 Limitations of the study and directions for future research 
The main limitation of this study is the fact that it is based on a single comparative case study 
of two subsidiaries within the same MNC. Even though a replication between the two cases 
justified that four of the propositions could be generalized, a stronger generalizability could 
be claimed if more cases were included in the study. Future research should therefore use the 
same set of propositions in order to strengthen the findings, and in order to confirm the 
propositions not supported according to the criteria used in this study 
Another limitation is that the study is based on the assumption that an increased sharing of 
XPS related knowledge between units will level out the variation in XPS implementation 
between MNC subsidiaries. The case study’s findings indicate that there is a connection 
between limited XPS related knowledge sharing and a high variation in XPS implementation 
between subsidiaries. However, the causal link between increased sharing and a lower 
variation in XPS implementation was not empirically tested in this study, and the topic has 
not received much attention in previous research. Future research should therefore investigate 
the causal link between XPS related knowledge sharing and variation in level of XPS 
implementation between MNC subsidiaries.  
The factors which were included in the theoretical propositions, proved not to be the only 
factors influencing the sharing of XPS related knowledge in the investigated case company. 
Thus, the set of propositions does not cover all potential influencing factors. The main 
empirical finding, which was not covered by the investigated theory, is the fact that the EBS 
center constitutes a bottleneck in the sharing of EBS related knowledge between the plants. 
Other MNCs with company-specific production systems tend to have the same organization 
as Elkem, with a knowledge center acting as an intermediary in the sharing between 
subsidiaries (Netland, 2011). An interesting topic for future research would therefore be to 
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investigate the role of such a knowledge center, related to XPS knowledge sharing between 
subsidiaries. The question of inquiry could be to what extent the knowledge center should 
interfere in the sharing of XPS related knowledge, and to what extent the knowledge sharing 
should go directly between the subsidiaries. 
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7. Conclusion 
This thesis addresses the topic of XPS implementation in multinational companies. The thesis 
has been conducted in the form of a case study of the multinational materials producer 
Elkem, a pioneer within XPS in Norway. The aim of this study has been to identify the 
underlying factors causing a variation in XPS implementation between the two investigated 
subsidiaries. The research approach when investigating this issue has been to first explore 
what factors that have influenced the XPS implementation in the investigated subsidiaries. 
Second, influencing factors on the XPS knowledge sharing between the investigated 
subsidiaries have subsequently been explored. Three main findings can be drawn from this 
study: 
1) A link can be drawn between factors identified in the literature as influencing the transfer 
of procedural knowledge in MNCs, and factors influencing the implementation and 
sharing of XPS. Factors within the five theoretical perspectives of absorptive capacity 
theory, change management, institutional theory, corporate socialization theory and 
agency theory find support in this case study. These factors are categorized according to 
three levels of analysis: subsidiary, corporate and national level. The total number of 
influencing factors at each level is summarized in Figure 8. Further, both organizational 
factors and external factors can be said to have an influence on the success of XPS 
implementation in the investigated MNC subsidiaries, thus supporting the contingency 
perspective. 
 
2) From the basis of identified factors influencing the implementation and sharing of XPS, 
nine factors are identified as having had a strong influence on the variation in XPS 
implementation between the investigated subsidiaries. Five of these factors have been 
essential for explaining why the level of XPS implementation varies between the plants. 
The remaining four factors have been identified as the most influencing factors on the 
XPS knowledge sharing between the subsidiaries. All nine factors are summarized below. 
Further, the case study’s findings give strong indications of a link between the level of 
inter-unit XPS related knowledge sharing, and the variation in XPS implementation 
between MNC subsidiaries. 
  
Implementation of XPS 
  
• Organizational inertia 
• Top management support 
• Prior related knowledge 
• Effort of knowledge acquisition 
• Cross-functional communication 
Sharing of XPS 
• Standardization of XPS implementation 
• XPS knowledge center acting as an intermediary 
• Use of corporate socialization mechanisms 
• Perceived importance of knowledge sharing 
 
3) Moreover, we find that no set of factors within a single theory can explain the difference 
in XPS implementation alone. Rather, a holistic perspective must be applied, as the 
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factors within the different fields of theory intertwine and influence each other. Therefore, 
a holistic model (Figure 9) describing the variation in the XPS implementation of the 
investigated subsidiaries is proposed. Further, as a result of this finding, a theoretical 
model is proposed (Figure 10), explaining how the different theoretical perspectives 
interact, what phenomenon they explore (XPS implementation or XPS sharing), and on 
what level they explain the phenomenon. 
  List of References 
 
 
93 
 
List of References 
Adler, P. S. and R. E. Cole (1993). "Designed for learning: a tale of two auto plants." Sloan 
Management Review 34: 85-94. 
Agócs, C. (1997). "Institutionalized resistance to organizational change: denial, inaction and 
repression." Journal of Business Ethics 16(9): 917-931. 
Alvær, I. & Westgaard, S. (2011). “Transfer of Procedural Knowledge within MNCs: A literature 
Review”, Unpublished project report, NTNU, IØT, Trondheim 
Ambos, T. C. and B. Ambos (2009). "The impact of distance on knowledge transfer effectiveness in 
multinational corporations." Journal of International Management 15(1): 1-14. 
Bateman, N. (2005). "Sustainability: the elusive element of process improvement." International 
Journal of Operations & Production Management 25(3/4): 261-276. 
Beer, M & Nohria, N. (2001). “Cracking the code of change”. Harvard Business Review, HBR’s 
Must-Read on Change, 13-24. 
Bell, E. and A. Bryman (2007). "The Ethics of Management Research: An Exploratory Content 
Analysis." British Journal of Management 18(1): 63-63. 
Björkman, I., W. Barner-Rasmussen, et al. (2004). "Managing Knowledge Transfer in MNCs: The 
Impact of Headquarters Control Mechanisms." Journal of International Business Studies 35(5): 443-
455. 
Bolisani, E. and E. Scarso (1996). "International manufacturing strategies: Experiences from the 
clothing industry." International Journal of Operations & Production Management 16(11): 71-&. 
Brown, M. and C. Cregan (2008). "Organizational change cynicism: The role of employee 
involvement." Human Resource Management 47(4): 667. 
Bryman, A. & Bell, E., 2007. Business Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Brynjolffson, E., & Saunders, B. (2010). Wired for innovation. How information technology is 
reshaping the economy. Cambridge, MIT. 
Burnes, B. (2004). "Emergent change and planned change competitors or allies: The case of XYZ 
construction." International Journal of Operations & Production Management 24(9). 
Cho, N., G. zheng Li, et al. (2007). "An empirical study on the effect of individual factors on 
knowledge sharing by knowledge type”. Journal of Global Business and Technology 3(2): 1. 
Ciabuschi, F., H. Dellestrand, et al. "Exploring the Effects of Vertical and Lateral Mechanisms in 
International Knowledge Transfer Projects." Management International Review 51(2): 129-155. 
Cohen, W. M. and D. A. Levinthal (1990). "Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning 
and Innovation." Administrative Science Quarterly 35(1): 128-152. 
Daghfous, A. (2004). "Absorptive Capacity and the Implementation of Knowledge-Intensive Best 
Practices." S.A.M. Advanced Management Journal 69(2): 21-27. 
  List of References 
 
 
94 
 
Davenport, T. and L. Prusak (1998). "Learn how valuable knowledge is acquired, created, bought and 
bartered." Australian Library Journal 47(3): 268-272. 
De Wit, B. & Meyer, R., 2005. Strategy: Process, Content, Context- An International Perspective. 4th 
ed. Hampshire: Thomson Learning. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). "Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review." The Academy of 
Management Review 14(1): 57-74. 
Ferdows, K. (2006). "Transfer of Changing Production Know-How." Production and Operations 
Management 15(1): 1-9. 
Foss, N. J. and T. Pedersen (2002). "Transferring knowledge in MNCs: The role of sources of 
subsidiary knowledge and organizational context." Journal of International Management 8(1): 49-67. 
Fujimoto, T., 1999. The Evolution of a Manufacturing System at Toyota. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
Gupta, A. K. and V. Govindarajan (2000). "Knowledge Flows within Multinational Corporations." 
Strategic Management Journal 21(4): 473-496. 
Harber, D., D. A. Samson, et al. (1990). "Just-in-Time: The Issue of Implementation." International 
Journal of Operations & Production Management 10(1). 
Holweg, M. (2007). "The genealogy of lean production." Journal of Operations Management 25(2): 
420. 
Jensen, R. and G. Szulanski (2004). "Stickiness and the Adaptation of Organizational Practices in 
Cross-Border Knowledge Transfers." Journal of International Business Studies 35(6): 508-523. 
Kaye, M. and R. Anderson (1999). "Continuous improvement: the ten essential criteria." The 
International Journal of Quality & Reliability Management 16(5): 485-506. 
Kim, L., 2001. Absorptive Capacity, Co-operation, and Knowledge Creation: Samsung’s leapfrogging 
in Semiconducters, in I. Nonaka and T. Nishiguchi (eds.) Knowledge Emergence –Social, Technical 
and Evolutionary Dimensions of Knowledge Creation, Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press:, pp: 270-286 
Kogut, B. and U. Zander (1993). "Knowledge of the firm and the evolutionary theory of the 
multinational corporation." Journal of International Business Studies 24(4): 625-625. 
Kostova, T. (1999). "Transnational transfer of strategic organizational practices: A contextual 
perspective." Academy of Management. The Academy of Management Review 24(2): 308-324. 
Kostova, T. and K. Roth (2002). "Adoption of an Organizational Practice by Subsidiaries of 
Multinational Corporations: Institutional and Relational Effects." The Academy of Management 
Journal 45(1): 215-233. 
Kotter, J. P. (2007). Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail. Harvard Business Review. 
Boston, United States, Boston. 85: 96-103. 
Lee, B. H. and H. J. Jo (2007). "The mutation of the Toyota Production System: adapting the TPS at 
Hyundai Motor Company." International Journal of Production Research 45(16): 3665-3679. 
  List of References 
 
 
95 
 
Liker, J. K., C. J. Haddad, et al. (1999). "Perspectives on Technology and Work Organization." 
Annual Review of Sociology 25: 575-596. 
Luecke, R., 2003. Managing Change and Transition. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press 
Mehta, V. and H. Shah (2005). "Characteristics of a Work Organization from a Lean Perspective." 
Engineering Management Journal 17(2): 14-21. 
Meyer, J. W. and B. Rowan (1977). "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and 
Ceremony." American Journal of Sociology 83(2): 340-363. 
Minbaeva, D., T. Pedersen, et al. (2003). "MNC Knowledge Transfer, Subsidiary Absorptive 
Capacity, and HRM." Journal of International Business Studies 34(6): 586-599. 
Minbaeva, D. B. (2005). "HRM practices and MNC knowledge transfer." Personnel Review 34(1): 
125-144. 
Moran, J. W. and B. K. Brightman (2001). "Leading organizational change." Career Development 
International 6(2): 111-119. 
Netland, T. (2011) Company-specific production systems: Trends in theory and industry. Presented at 
The Norwegian work-shop on Company-specific Production Systems: Company-specific production 
systems (XPS) and their role in future international manufacturing, 31.5.2011, NTNU Gløshaugen, 
Trondheim 
Netland, 2012: “Exploring the phenomenon of company-specific production systems: one-best-way or 
own-best-way?”, International Journal of Production Research, DOI:10.1080/00207543.2012.676686 
Ohno, T., 1988. Toyota production system: beond large-scale production. New York: Productivity 
Press 
Schaffer, R. H. and H. A. Thomson (1992). Successful Change Programs Begin with Results. Harvard 
Business Review. Boston, United States, Boston. 70: 80-80. 
Szulanski, G. (1996). "Exploring Internal Stickiness: Impediments to the Transfer of Best Practice 
Within the Firm." Strategic Management Journal 17: 27-43. 
Szulanski, G., R. J. Jensen, et al. (2003). "Adaptation of Know-how for Cross-border Transfer." 
Management International Review 43(3): 131-150. 
The Economist, 2012. From Bitter to Sweet. [online] Place: The Economist. Available at: 
http://www.economist.com/node/21552631?fsrc=rss [02.03.2012] 
Tsai, W. and S. Ghoshal (1998). "Social Capital and Value Creation: The Role of Intrafirm 
Networks." The Academy of Management Journal 41(4): 464-476. 
Tsai, W. P. (2001). "Knowledge transfer in intraorganizational networks: Effects of network position 
and absorptive capacity on business unit innovation and performance." Academy of Management 
Journal 44(5): 996-1004 
Upton, D. (1996). "Mechanisms for building and sustaining operations improvement." European 
Management Journal 14(3): 215-215. 
  List of References 
 
 
96 
 
Walker, H. J., A. A. Armenakis, et al. (2007). "Factors influencing organizational change efforts." 
Journal of Organizational Change Management 20(6): 761-773. 
White, R. E., J. N. Pearson, et al. (1999). "JIT manufacturing: A survey of implementations in small 
and large U.S. manufacturers." Management Science 45(1): 1-15. 
Williams, K., C. Haslam, et al. (1992). "Ford versus 'Fordism': the beginning of mass production?" 
Work, Employment and Society 6(4): 517-555. 
Williams, K., Haslam, C., et al. Cars Providence, RI: Berghahn Books 
Womack, J. P. and D. T. Jones (1994). From lean production to the lean enterprise. Harvard Business 
Review. Boston, United States, Boston. 72: 93-93. 
Womack, J. P., D. T. Jones, et al. (1990). The machine that changed the world: based on the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 5-million dollar 5-year study on the future of the automobile / 
James P. Womack, Daniel T. Jones, Daniel Roos, Rawson Associates. 
Yin, R.K., 2009. Case study research: design and methods. 4th ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications. 
Zahra, S. A. and G. George (2002). "Absorptive Capacity: A Review, Reconceptualization, and 
Extension." The Academy of Management Review 27(2): 185-203. 
 
 
 
 
  Table of Appendix 
 
 
97 
 
Table of Appendix 
APPENDIX A: MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CASE COMPANY ..................................... 97 
APPENDIX B: CASE STUDY PROTOCOL ................................................................................................... 104 
APPENDIX C: FINDINGS FROM DOCUMENTATION ............................................................................. 113 
APPENDIX D: RESULTS ON EBS AUDITS OF THE INVESTIGATED PLANTS 2012 ........................ 117 
APPENDIX E: PERFORMANCE INDICATORS AFTER EBS WAS INTRODUCED IN ELKEM ...... 118 
APPENDIX F: OVERVIEW OF THE CITED EBS TOOLS AND METHODOLOGIES……………... 106
   Appendix A: Managerial Implications for Elkem 
 
 
98 
 
Appendix A: Managerial implications for the case company   
The implications discussed in this section are directed towards three ‘levels’ within the case 
company: the local plant managers, the EBS center, and managers of the parent company. 
Some of the suggestions in this chapter have been commented on during interviews, or 
coincide with suggestions proposed by the interviewees themselves. Thus, selected citations 
from the empirical findings will be repeated to display the employees’ own opinions related 
to these suggestions.    
Implications for the local plant management of the investigated plants  
The case discussion pointed to areas of improvement for Elkem Iceland in order to advance 
the level of the plant’s EBS implementation compared to Elkem Salten. However, some of 
these areas hold an improvement potential for both plants. Consequently, we propose two 
areas for improvement for Elkem Iceland, of which the last area also concerns Elkem Salten. 
Within each area we propose a set of actions to help reach the target.  
The two proposed improvement areas are:  
a) Formalize the structure of communication 
b) Increase motivation for EBS among the operators  
A: Formalize the structure of communication 
The discussion points to the lack of a formalized communication structure at Elkem Iceland 
as an important area of improvement. In order to formalize internal communication, a number 
of measures which has proven successful at Salten can be applied. 
Firstly, a cross-departmental HR team should be established. This will assemble positions 
(e.g. the EHS manager and the HR manager) that relate to EBS, which at Salten has proven to 
strengthen the communication between managerial functions.  
“(…) it is a great strength, a great strength. In a way…you become more powerful in 
decision-making processes too. I mean, of all those that can make decisions here, it’s almost 
just the plant manager who isn’t part of the HR team. And now, quite often, decisions that 
have to be made are handed over to the HR team” [Terje Aanesen, HR Manager, Salten] 
This is also a measure that Iceland’s local EBS coach is positive towards.   
”(…) how I see EBS is that it comes into HR, quality and EHS, so this proves we should of 
course contact each other more or, you know, help each other out more than we do today, 
definitely.” [Unnur Sigurjónsdóttir, Local EBS coach] 
Second, the plant should establish an EBS team consisting of a small panel of team leaders 
and operators in addition to the local EBS coach. This team will function as a support group 
for the local EBS coach, providing feedback and suggestions from the operating levels 
concerning EBS-related activity. Further, establishing an improvement room will help 
visualize the on-going improvement projects, and create a common meeting place for the 
improvement teams. In this way, members of the plant management may also be continually 
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updated. According to the local EBS coach at Salten, the successful implementation of such a 
room at both Elkem Solar and at Salten should result in the transfer of this idea to other 
plants: 
 “I have high hopes, or I would expect that those who sit with the power here in Elkem can 
copy this to the other plants. And I don’t know if they have done that, but they absolutely 
should.” [Rune Skau, EBS coach] 
Finally, a formal EBS-related meeting schedule should be set up, where the HR team, the 
EBS team, as well as the improvement teams have regular, designated meetings at the 
improvement room.  
B: Increase motivation for EBS among operators (Capturing the ‘grey mass’) 
An important area of improvement concerning both plants is increasing the motivation and 
employee involvement at the operating levels. As pointed to in the case discussion, the focus 
should be on capturing the ‘middle segment’ or ‘gray mass’ which is the proportion of 
workers that are neither very motivated nor very resistant towards internalizing EBS.  
In order to increase both involvement and motivation, the communication of targets and 
promotion of a common understanding of direction holds improvement potential at both 
plants. At Iceland, this concerns communication of on-going projects and their following 
results towards all employees. At Salten, this mainly concerns those employees that are not a 
member of improvement teams. At Iceland, establishing an improvement room with all the 
on-going A3s will help visualize the on-going projects. Further, quantifying the savings of the 
improvement projects and creating a visual follow-up sheet resembling that used at Salten, 
will help communicate the results of improvement projects. This was also found to increase 
motivation at Salten. 
“I feel that those who participate in the improvement projects are motivated. When they see 
the results; that a group can, with the job they do, save for instance 1.5 million or 3 million. 
Then you see that people become motivated and think their work is fun.” [Rune Skau, EBS 
coach] 
However, in order to increase motivation and involvement among the employees out on the 
shifts, there needs to be an increase in EBS-related communication. A possible solution to 
this is targeting the meetings held in production, such as the morning meetings and the shift 
meetings. This is something both plants, independent of each other, have thought of. 
 “We want to structure the shift meetings and give them a clear and visible content, where 
EBS, especially the improvements, has an active part in each meeting.” [Rune Skau, EBS 
coach] 
“My issue with morning meetings should be that there is more of a discussion. The numbers 
are up there, there’s no sense in reading them. But I rather have more discussions on 
improvements that aren’t there. I think this is where we could get a lot more information out 
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to the teams and not just reporting their last production numbers.” [Wayne Faaland, EBS 
center] 
Another measure proven to be effective in increasing motivation and combating resistance to 
change is the creation of short-term, visible results such as the Kaizen actions performed at 
Salten. This is something Iceland should learn from, targeting departments where motivation 
for EBS is known to be low. This may also lead to an increase in involvement: 
“I think that these days it gives a bit credit to join the improvement teams. Eventually, when 
the results are becoming visible, people see that this is quite fun to work with. When we ran 
the Kaizen project in the workshop, those who participated could later on say that “We 
contributed to this result”. And that is for them a good feeling, at least that’s my 
impression”. [Rune Skau, EBS coach Salten] 
Another measure to increase employee involvement in improvement projects is to use 
compensation mechanisms. At Salten, the small increase in pay for those hours dedicated to 
improvement work serves as a carrot, but the modest amount helps to avoid that this 
compensation becomes the main motivation for involvement.  
Finally, something that operators at both plants wanted more of, that will help increase 
motivation and involvement, is more targeted training. This means training employees in 
how to use tools and methodology on the plant, in common everyday situations. In fact, one 
of the main barriers to EBS internalization mentioned by operators at Iceland, was the 
difficulty in applying the tools and methodology learned through courses in their everyday 
situations. 
Implications for the EBS center  
The main implications for the EBS center concern helping the plants to become more 
independent in exchanging EBS-related knowledge, and thereby increasing the amount of 
EBS-related knowledge sharing within Elkem. In order to achieve this target, three 
suggestions are made: 
• Develop intranet for virtual knowledge sharing  
• Bring local EBS coaches when performing audits at other plants 
• Create forums for physical knowledge sharing 
In order to help promote sharing of EBS-related experiences, the EBS center should develop 
the new version of the company intranet to also constitute a virtual meeting place for local 
EBS coaches. However, this virtual forum will have to be designed to be as functional as 
possible in order for the local EBS coaches to use of their time to utilize it. The 
communication must be both-way, and the establishment of closer ties between the local EBS 
coaches is a prerequisite. The EBS center should therefore continue the practice of bringing 
along local EBS coaches when performing EBS audits at other plants. Empirical evidence 
suggests that this type of trips was considered very valuable by the local EBS coaches.  
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Another recommendation is to establish ‘physical’ forums for EBS-related knowledge 
sharing. Today, there are forums for the specialist fields, management meetings, division and 
plant manager meetings, and meetings for process engineers. Also, regular EHS forums exist 
within the foundry division. Consequently, establishing an EBS forum should be the next 
priority. However, the form and purpose of such a forum is of utmost importance in order to 
make contributed time and resources well-spent. This issue is well-said by Løkaas, one of the 
divisional EBS coaches: 
“It is a bit difficult to formalize such a process. “Let’s meet, let’s share experiences, what 
experiences shall we share today?” It becomes a bit forced.” [Magne Løkaas, EBS center] 
The forum should primarily be aimed at gathering the local EBS coaches, but could also 
include members of the HR team at each plant. The meetings would have to be on an annual 
or twice-annual basis, and have specific topics with concrete problems related to the EBS 
implementation at each plant. Several of the employees at both plants expressed opinions as 
to the content of such a forum: 
Because, again, EBS is not like so many, it’s a philosophy, a culture. To sit down and discuss 
culture, it’s very nice, I would probably enjoy it quite a lot. But would I benefit from it, apart 
from meeting the guys discussing something else? I don’t think so. And because it’s not that 
specific, discussing different tools, specific tools, maybe if we have some kind of a problem, 
some kind of improvement potential. But not to discuss EBS in general, I don’t believe in 
that.“ [Einar Thorsteinsson, Plant Manager Iceland] 
“I wish that we could have a forum in Elkem where the people involved in improvement work 
could meet once or twice a year to exchange experiences. (…) I feel the need for an 
environment where the improvement people from the different plants meet. We don’t have 
enough knowledge about each other.” Rune Skau, EBS coach] 
“If we were able to make it into something concrete, that the meeting had an agenda, an 
intention. And that some learning objectives or points of improvement were developed. And if 
we don’t achieve that, there is no point in continuing. But if we see some improvement as a 
result of such meetings, new ideas and thoughts and so on, it would absolutely justify it.” 
[Terje Aanesen, HR Manager] 
The empirical evidence revealed that the divisional EBS coach within foundry, Wayne 
Faaland, is working on developing this type of forum, following the same structure as the 
monthly EHS meetings within foundry. This should however be implemented within all of 
Elkem’s divisions. The experience with the EHS forum implies that a similar EBS forum will 
contribute to increasing the use of EBS at the plants.  
“We started this up in January and it was surprising to hear the feedback from the safety 
managers saying that “That was a good idea” and “We haven’t thought about that”. And 
then again, it’s not that difficult. It’s just that sometimes you get too hung up in what you’re 
doing and you can’t open your eyes for new ideas. So just bringing in five new ideas for fall 
protection or 5S and stuff like that, we learn a lot from that. And I know that people already 
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asked the safety managers to send them more information and they said that they’ll 
implement some of these things.” [Wayne Faaland, EBS center] 
The want for increased knowledge sharing is strong within the investigated plants. A 
selection of citations expressing this need is therefore left to conclude this section. 
 “I think this is something that we should use more in Elkem (…) to share competence 
between the plants. [Unnur Sigurjónsdóttir, Local EBS coach] 
 “I want to be able to go out and see other plants, see how they are doing it, because it’s 
really a shame if there are good ideas out there, especially in the same corporation, it’s sad if 
it is not shared.” [Hannes Ingolfsson, Team leader] 
“I think it would have been nice to meet people and discuss. I think that would have been a 
good idea. Of course, we have Oddgeir and Magne who are here from time to time to help us, 
and we can discuss matters with them. But without doubt, gathering people from different 
plants to discuss would not be a bad idea.” [Trond Steensen, Team leader] 
” (…) we see that in many cases we struggle with the same problems. And maybe someone 
else has found a solution, and why on earth should we keep struggling if we can just copy 
it?” [Trond Steensen, Team Leader] 
Implications for managers of the parent company 
The last section concerns implications for the managers of the parent company, more 
specifically the headquarters of Elkem. The main focus of the headquarters related to EBS, 
should be to provide directions and resources for the plants to standardize positions across the 
plants. This will help facilitate knowledge-sharing within the plants, and increase efficiency 
of the EBS implementation process. Further, the findings at Iceland show that there is a need 
to create a stronger corporate culture, and to promote Elkem as a multinational and 
multicultural company.  
The main suggestions to the headquarters of Elkem can therefore be summed up as: 
• Standardize positions related to EBS across the plants 
• Create a stronger corporate culture 
Evidence suggests that an important barrier towards EBS-related knowledge sharing between 
Elkem plants is the lack of standardized positions across the plants. In order to better connect 
the positions and build stronger ties between the plants, positions such as that of the local 
EBS coach and the previously mentioned HR team should be standardized across the plants. 
Also, connecting positions such as team leaders at different plants will secure the exchange of 
relevant knowledge.  
One important barrier to EBS implementation at Elkem Iceland was the low identity with the 
parent company, as the empirical findings suggest that this increased the resistance to 
implement EBS. The low identity seems especially attributable to two factors; the fact that 
the headquarters are perceived to have a low understanding of the existence of other cultures, 
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and the plant’s limited knowledge of company values. In fact, the employees at Elkem 
Iceland view Elkem mainly as a Norwegian company, and not an international company. The 
findings suggest that this is partly due to the abundance of documents distributed only in 
Norwegian, and also the usage of the Norwegian language in international meetings. Elkem 
should therefore translate all important documents to English, and consistently use the 
official language, English, in international meetings. 
In order to create a stronger corporate culture, it is important that employees at all Elkem 
plants know and can relate to the company values. Therefore, the values of Elkem should be 
better communicated to the plants. This seems to be particularly important in the case of 
foreign subsidiaries, as the findings suggest that cultural differences make it harder for them 
to identify with the parent company. 
Implications for Aim Action  
Local plant 
management 
Formalize the structure of 
communication 
Standardize the HR function 
Establish EBS team  
Establish improvement room 
Establish regular meetings 
Increase motivation for EBS among the 
operators 
Increase communication of targets and 
promote a common understanding of 
direction 
Plan for and create short-term wins 
Use a compensation system to increase 
employee participation  
Increase targeted training 
EBS center Facilitate inter-unit sharing of 
knowledge and experiences related to 
EBS 
Develop intranet for virtual knowledge 
sharing 
Bring local EBS coaches when 
performing audits at other plants 
Create forums for physical knowledge 
sharing 
Headquarters of 
Elkem 
Promote stronger ties between  
(i) the EBS-related positions at the 
plants 
(ii) the headquarter and foreign-based 
subsidiaries 
Standardize positions related to EBS 
across the plants 
Create a stronger corporate culture 
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Appendix B: Case study protocol 
The purpose of this case study protocol is to guide the investigators in carrying out the data collection. 
First, a short introduction of the study is given, followed by a theoretical framework including the 
main research that the case study’s theoretical propositions build on. Next, a general overview of the 
data collection procedure is provided, before an outline of the case study report is given. Finally, the 
interview guide is described, including the questions for the conducted focused interviews. 
Short introduction of the study 
This case study is written as the concluding part of a master’s degree in Industrial Economics and 
Technology Management at NTNU. The study is conducted in collaboration with the materials 
producer Elkem, in particular the center of Elkem Business System (EBS), and with guidance from the 
institute. 
The aim of the study is to achieve a greater understanding of why the level of success with 
implementing XPS varies between subsidiaries within the same MNC. By taking a contingency 
perspective, this study investigates what factors influence the level of XPS implementation in MNCs. 
Also, the study identifies what factors influencing the XPS related knowledge sharing between 
subsidiaries, as inter-unit sharing is believed to explain some of the variation in XPS implementation 
success. 
In order to investigate the question of inquiry, a comparative case study is conducted between two 
subsidiaries of Elkem. While one of the investigated plants appears to have achieved a high level of 
success with implementing EBS, the other has struggled with the implementation. The following 
research questions are proposed: 
RQ1: Why has the implementation of XPS varied between the investigated subsidiaries? 
 RQ1.1: What factors influence the XPS implementation in MNC subsidiaries? 
 RQ1.2: What influences XPS knowledge sharing between MNC subsidiaries? 
Based on the case study’s findings, both managerial and theoretical implications will be discussed. 
The next page will present a theoretical framework, which describes the main research that this case 
study is based on.
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Theoretical 
perspective 
Potential Influencing 
factor(s) 
Reasoning Authors 
Absorptive 
Capacity  
Prior related knowledge, 
Intensity of effort,  
Cross functional 
communication, 
Use of HR practices, 
Use of gatekeepers, 
Organizational inertia, 
Absorptive capacity of the receiving unit is identified as one of the most 
referred determinants of knowledge transfer (e.g. Lee & Wu, 2010; 
Szulanski, 1996, Gupta & Govindarajan, 2000). Subsidiaries differ in their 
absorptive capacity, and this affects the level of internal knowledge transfer.  
Cohen & Levinthal (1990); Kim 
(2001); 
Minbaeva et al. 
(2003);Daghfous (2004); 
Minbaeva (2005) 
 
Change 
Management 
Prior change history, Top- 
and middle management 
support, Creating clear 
targets and a common 
understanding of direction, 
Planning for and creating 
short-term wins, Employee 
involvement 
The implementation of XPS in subsidiaries can be a dramatic change in the 
organization, as it is often followed by changes in the organizational 
structure, replacement of managers, or adjustments to new routines. Also, an 
important ingredient in most company specific production systems is 
continuous improvement. This can be interpreted as small incremental 
changes that are conducted on an on-going basis.  
Womack et al (1990); Schaffer 
& Thomson (1992); Kaye & 
Anderson (1999); Upton 
(1996); Beer & Nohria 
(2001);Bateman (2005); Kotter 
(2007)Walker et al., (2007); 
Brown & Cregan (2008) 
 
 
Institutional 
theory 
Institutional profile of host 
country, Relational context 
between subsidiary and 
parent company 
The characteristics of a subsidiary’s host country have been found to have an 
influence on knowledge implementation. Also, the relationship between the 
subsidiary and the headquarters is another important aspect of knowledge 
implementation identified through the literature review. Subsidiaries that 
identify with the parent company will easier understand the importance and 
value of new practices, and therefore implement them more easily.  
Kostova & Roth, 2002; 
Szulanski, 1996 
Corporate 
Socialization  
Use of corporate 
socialization mechanisms, 
Use of IT, Existence of inter-
unit links 
Many studies in the conducted literature review emphasized the existence of 
close interpersonal networks in the organization as being an important factor 
for knowledge sharing (e.g. Ciabuschi et al., 2011; Minbaeva, 2007; Tsai, 
2001). The importance of such networks for knowledge sharing is explained 
by corporate socialization theory. 
Bolsani & Scarso, 1996; Tsai, 
2001; 
Björkman et al., 2004 
 
Agency 
theory 
Motivational disposition at 
the sending unit, Perceived 
importance of knowledge 
sharing  
The motivation of the sender to share knowledge was emphasized in the 
reviewed literature. Agency theory can therefore be used to explain the 
subsidiaries’ reluctance to share knowledge with other units in the MNC. 
 
Szulanski, 1996; Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 2000; Szulanski 
et al., 2003; Björkman et al., 
2004;  
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Field Procedures 
The following section describes the sites to be visited, including contact persons, the data collection 
plan, the prior preparations for the researchers,  and the interview schedule including employees to be 
interviewed. 
 
 
Data Collection Plan 
1) Approximately one week to visit each plant 
2) Conduct 8 focused with employees from different levels in the plant. 
3) Direct observation of production facilities and procedures 
4) Collect other documentation that will increase the understanding of the visited plant 
 
Preparations for the researchers 
1) Establish contact persons for each site and date for site visits 
2) Schedule interviews with site personnel to be held during site visits 
3) Get an understanding of the theoretical framework to be used, Elkem Business System, and 
the Elkem plants in Iceland and Salten 
4) Develop interview questions  
5) Arrange for available equipment to be available for the interviews  
 
 
 
 
Site to be visited Contact person 
Elkem Iceland 
Grundartangi 
Skilmannahreppur 
IS-301 Akranes, Iceland 
 
Tel: + 354 43 20 200 
E-mail: elkem@elkem.is 
Plant Manager: Einar Thorsteinsson 
Unnur Sigurjónsdóttir 
 
 
 
 
Tel: +354 86 06 163 
E-mail: unnur.sigurjonsdottir@elkem.com 
Position: Local EBS coach 
Site to be visited Contact person 
Elkem Salten  
NO-8226 Straumen, Norway 
 
Tel + 47 75 69 81 00 
 
Plant Manager: Arve Ulriksen 
Rune Skau 
 
 
Tel: +47 90 03 15 68 
E-mail: rune.skau@elkem.no 
Position: Local EBS coach 
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Agenda for case study investigation 
 
Plant: Elkem Iceland 
Date: 27. February - 01. March 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Monday Activity Who* Where
13:30 14:00 Arriving at plant Silje, Ingrid, Wayne
14:00 14:15
Presentation of agenda by students-
Background for the study, main objectives Key personnel Hekla
14:15 15:00 Guided tour at the plant- Direct observations Unnur
All main processes 
and facilities
Tuesday
07:00 08:00 Morning meeting- direct observations 
Unnur Sigurjonsdottir          
(EBS-coach) Main Entrance
08:30 10:30 Interview
Einar Thorsteinsson            
(Plant Manager) Víti
11:00 12:00 LUNCH
12:00 13:30 Interview
Unnur Sigurjonsdottir          
(EBS-coach) Víti
13:30 15:00 Individual work with materials - Víti
Wednesday
08:15 09:15 Interview
Thordur Magnusson           
(Production Manager) Hekla
09:30 10:15 Interview
Sigrun Palsdottir              
(HR- Manager) Hekla
11:00 12:00 LUNCH
12:00 13:00 Interview
Wayne Faaland               
(EBS coach) Hekla
13:30 14:30 Interview
Jon Atli Kjartansson           
(Team leader) Hekla
Thursday
08:15 09:15 Interview
Hannes Ingolfsson             
(Team leader) Laki
09:30 10:30 Interview Operator (maintenance) Laki
10:30 11:30 Interview Operator (production) Laki
11:00 12:00 LUNCH
12:00 12:30 Gathering of documents and other information
Unnur Sigurjonsdottir          
(EBS-coach) Laki
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Plant: Elkem Salten 
Date: 13.March - 15. March 2012 
 
 
 
Outline of the Case study report 
1. Introduction 
2. Theoretical background 
3. Methodology 
4. Case presentation 
a. Presentation of Elkem 
b. Elkem Business System 
c. The Elkem plant in Iceland 
d. The Elkem plant at Salten 
5. Empirical findings 
6. Discussion of empirical findings 
7. Conclusion  
Tuesday Activity Who* Where
12.00 12.30 Arriving at plant Silje and Ingrid
Meeting room 
Canteen
12.30 12.45
Presentation of agenda by students-
Background for the study, main objectives Key personnel 
Meeting room 
Canteen
13.15 14.45 Guided tour at the plant- Direct observations Rune Skau (EBS coach)
All main processes 
and facilities
Wednesday
08.30 09.30 Interview Arve Ulriksen (Plant Manager)
Meeting room 
Canteen
10.00 11.00 Interview
Lars Jonny Lundeng           
(Production Manager)
Meeting room 
Canteen
11:00 12:00 LUNCH
12:00 13.00 Interview Trond Steensen (Team leader)
Meeting room 
Canteen
13:30 14.30 Interview Terje Aanensen (HR manager)
Meeting room 
Canteen
Thursday
08.30 09.30 Interview Rune Skau (EBS coach)
Meeting room 
Canteen
10.00 11.00 Interview Hans E. Vollan (Operator)
Meeting room 
Canteen
11:00 12:00 LUNCH
12:00 13:00 Interview Ulf Pedersen (Team leader)
Meeting room 
Canteen
13.30 14.30 Interview Stig Sivertsen (Operator) 
Meeting room 
Canteen
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Interview guide 
The interviews will be open-ended and assume a conversational manner, but will follow a set of 
questions derived from this case study protocol. All the interviews will be recorded on tape, and later 
transcribed. 
Introduction to the interview 
‐ Background for the study, and what we are investigating.  
‐ The interview will be recorded on tape, but the interviewee has the option to read and accept 
the transcription before we use it in the master thesis. 
 
Plant Manager - PLM 
Local EBS-coach –EBSC 
Production Manager- PRM 
HR-Manager- HRM 
Team leader- TL 
Operator - O 
 
Absorptive capacity  
 
 
 
(PLM, EBSC, PRM, HRM, TL, O) 
Ability 
a) What is your educational background? Have you ever studied or worked abroad? 
b) For how many years have you had your current position in the plant? 
c) Can you relate the work you do with EBS to any former work experience? In this case, what 
type of experience (e.g. problem solving activities)? 
d) What type of formal EBS training have you received? Would you like to have more training? 
e) Which of the EBS tools do you use in your daily work with EBS?  
f) Are you in charge of performing any EBS training at the plant? If yes, who do you train? How 
do you feel your training is received? 
Motivation 
a) What is your personal opinion on EBS? What do you think are the most important benefits 
and disadvantages from implementing EBS at this plant?  
b) What factors do you think complicate the work with EBS in this plant? 
c) What is your own motivation for working with EBS at this plant? 
d) How would you assess your own EBS effort? How about compared to other employees at the 
plant?  
e) Do you feel that you take part in the decisions on how EBS is to be carried out in this plant? 
f) How are the goals and results related to EBS communicated and visualized in this plant? Are 
both short- and long-term goals communicated and visualized? 
The following questions are concerned with the absorptive capacity of the interviewee. What we 
want to know is whether the interviewee has a good ability, and a high motivation to receive 
knowledge. 
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g) Do you think that there is still much to gain from continuing the work with EBS in this plant? 
h) What is your impression of the overall motivation among the plant workers for carrying out 
EBS work? Are there any differences based on e.g. position or among the different operating 
teams? 
i) Do you notice any variations in the plant’s EBS-effort? E.g. depending on time of year, 
before and after visits from the divisional coach, financial situation of the plant etc. 
 
Perceived cultural distance 
 
 
 
(PLM, EBSC, PRM, HRM, TL, O) 
a) Do you think that there are any cultural differences between Norway and Iceland? In that 
case: 
‐ What are the most significant cultural differences?  
‐ Have cultural differences led to any complications with understanding or implementing 
EBS? How, why? 
Relational distance 
 
 
 
(PLM, EBSC, PRM, HRM, TL, O) 
a) Do you think of your plant as being part of a corporate family? Is there a common “Elkem 
culture” across the different plants? 
(PLM) 
b) To what extent is the plant dependent on the parent company for essential resources such as 
capital, technology and expertise? 
a) Is the EBS implementation an important criterion when the plant’s overall performance is 
evaluated?  
b) Do you receive any rewards based on the success with implementing EBS? 
c) Is there any type of information you prefer not to share with the EBS-center? What about the 
headquarter?  
d) Would you feel comfortable with the headquarter having access to the EBS audits of this 
plant? Why, why not? 
HR-management 
The following questions are concerned with the cultural differences between the sender and receiver 
of knowledge. What we want to know is if cultural differences, or the institutional profile of the host 
country, act as a barrier to knowledge transfer between the sending and receiving unit.   
The following questions are concerned with the relational context between the sending and 
receiving unit. The level of dependency, trust, and identification between the units determines the 
relational context. 
The following questions are concerned with the role of human resource management in relation to 
EBS implementation. What we want to know is what kind of HR practices are performed at the 
plant. 
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(HRM) 
a) How are local staffing procedures performed? Describe the process potential candidates go 
through 
b) What types of training-activities aimed at increasing the workers EBS-knowledge are initiated 
by the HR-department at the plant? 
c) On what basis are promotions given? 
d) In which ways are superior work-performances recognized? 
e) Are any flexible working practices such as flexi-time, job rotation or part-time work practiced 
at this plant? Why, why not?                                              
 
The use of corporate socialization mechanisms 
 
 
 
(PRM, TL, O) 
a) Who decides what are the most critical processes to be improved at the plant (the rolling top 
five)? 
b) How do you decide what cases the A3 methodology should be applied for, and who is 
developing the A3 sheet? 
EBS recently got its own site on the intranet system of Elkem where you can share information on 
EBS and read about others experiences: 
c) What type of information do you think would be useful to share on this site? 
(PLM, EBSC) 
d) Have you ever been visiting other plants to observe how they have implemented EBS? 
e) When you attended the EBS University, did you exchange information and experiences with 
employees from other plants? Who do you think benefited the most from this information 
exchange?  
f) Have you received any useful information from employees on how the EBS implementation 
can be improved at this plant?   
EBS recently got its own site on the intranet system of Elkem where you can share information on 
EBS and read about others experiences: 
g) What type of information do you think would be useful to share on this site? 
Perceived measures 
 
 
The following questions are concerned with the use of corporate socialization mechanisms. What we 
want to know is whether the company facilitates inter‐unit trips and visits, training involving people 
from multiple units, and joint problem solving between employees.  
The purpose of the following questions is to find a perceived measure of the senders’ ability and 
motivation to share knowledge.   
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(PLM, EBSC, PRM, HRM, TL, O) 
a) What is your opinion on how the EBS training sessions you have received have been carried 
out? 
• How capable would you say the instructor was of performing the EBS training? 
• Has the instructor of this training session managed to make the EBS material easy 
to understand and use in your daily work?  
• Do you feel that the instructor has been committed to the task of sharing EBS 
with you? 
b) Who do you go to for help if you have any problems with the EBS implementation? 
Ending of interview 
‐ Ask for the e-mail address and if we could send some questions if any uncertainties show 
up at a later point in time. 
‐ Thank the interviewee for his/her time and for sharing useful information with us. 
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Appendix C: Findings from Documentation 
Records of EBS activity at the plants 
  Elkem Iceland Elkem Salten 
a) Participation in training activities                                      
 EBS University 25 %   22 %  
EBS Academy 30 %  0 %  
EBS team leader school 0 %   16 %  
b) Extent of improvement work 
 Improvement teams Analysis teams: 1 
Critical process teams: 6 
Improvement teams: - 
Analysis teams: 1 
Critical process teams: 3 
Improvement teams: 10 
Number of improvement projects 
completed in 2011 
‐  17 
Total savings due to completed 
improvement projects in 2011 
‐  10,25 MNOK 
c) Other 
 Number of EBS Universities 
hosted by the plant 
2 4 
Number of visits paid by the EBS 
center in 2011 
4 13 
A: Training activities 
Three types of formal EBS-related training activities are carried out across the plants: EBS 
University, EBS Academy, and EBS team leader school. A closer description of each activity 
is given in section 4.2. The participation in each activity is given as the percentage of the 
plant’s current employees who have attended the given activity of the total number of 
employees currently working at the plant. 
The results show that the participation at EBS University is quite even between the plants. 
However, while the EBS Academy has been held at Iceland and not at Salten, the EBS team 
leader school has been conducted at Salten and not at Iceland. When asked about the team 
leader school, the local EBS coach explains that the plan is to arrange such a school. 
However, the problem lies in translating the training material to Icelandic, a common 
obstacle to all types of EBS-related training where the training material is in English or 
Norwegian. 
B: Improvement work 
At plant level, there are three different types of EBS-related teams: analysis teams, critical 
process teams and improvement teams. The analysis team meets quarterly and run advanced 
statistical analysis based on long term historical data. The critical process teams solve process 
problems on furnaces through a systematic approach, while the improvement teams run 
improvement projects according to the plant’s Rolling Top Five list. 
Both of the studied plants have one analysis team, while Iceland has six critical process 
teams, compared to Salten’s three critical process teams. In terms of improvement teams, 
Salten has ten formal teams, while Iceland does not have a preset number of teams. In fact, 
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the way improvement work is carried out at the plants varies a lot between Iceland and 
Salten.  
As a result of a HR project initiated at Salten in 2011, the plant has formalized the structure 
of the improvement work carried out. Every improvement team reports once a month. This is 
done at a regular meeting held every Friday between 08:00 and 09:00, where two or three 
improvement teams report status according to the A3. The HR-manager is responsible for 
leading the meeting, which is carried out according to specific pre- defined rules: 
• No one is allowed to sit during the meeting 
• A3 must be in A3-format 
• All information must be updated in front of the meeting 
• The department sponsor and team leader must at the minimum be present 
 
The team leader presents the status according to the A3 and follow-up points are noted down 
and followed up at the next debriefing. A yearly plan is made so that every team knows when 
to show up. Other participants in the meeting are the local EBS coach, the financial manager 
and the plant manager  
  
Further, the savings made through the improvement projects are quantified in monetary 
values. A follow-up sheet is used to document the status of the improvement projects. 
At Iceland however, there is not a set specific number of improvement teams at the plant 
which report to the top management. Rather, the improvement work has more of an 
independent structure, carried out within each department. Consequently, the number of 
projects carried out each year and the savings due to completed projects are not quantified.  
“Unfortunately, we can´t say how many projects were started or how much was saved, since 
we do not keep track of that, e.g. We do not keep track of which ones are related to 
improvements work the teams have worked on.” [Unnur Sigurjónsdóttir, Local EBS coach] 
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C: Other 
Salten has hosted twice as many EBS Universities as Iceland (four EBS Universities at Salten 
versus two at Iceland). Also, there is a large difference in number of visits paid by the 
divisional EBS coaches of the EBS center during 2011. At Iceland, the number of visits paid 
by the divisional EBS coach Wayne Faaland was estimated by the local EBS coach to four 
visits. At Salten, two of the divisional EBS coaches visited the plant, Magne Løkås and 
Oddgeir Samseth. Løkås had a length of stay at the plant equal to four weeks, dispersed 
across ten visits. Samseth had a length of stay equal to one week, dispersed across three 
visits. 
Elkem Iceland: Results of employee survey 
In October 2011, an employee survey was conducted at Elkem Iceland. The survey was 
distributed to all employees currently working at the plant, which resulted in a response rate 
of 96 %. The form of the survey is a set of statements of which employees were asked to tick 
off the box that best reflected his or her level of agreement. On the basis of the responses, the 
result of each question is scored on a scale from 1 to 5, reflecting the five response 
alternatives given (strongly disagree, tend to disagree, neither nor, agree and strongly 
agree). 
The result of the survey shows that there are three areas in particular which show the lowest 
score. These are: 
Question Strongly 
disagree 
(1) 
Tend to 
disagree
(2) 
Neither 
nor 
(3) 
Agree
 
(4) 
Strongly 
agree 
(5) 
Average 
Score 
24: I have a good knowledge of 
the work of other groups within 
the company 
5 % 12 % 25 % 44 % 15 % 3,53 
29: Elkem staff works as a 
whole 
7 % 13 % 26 % 46 % 8 % 3,35 
45: I receive adequate 
information about important 
events and changes within the 
company 
9 % 12 % 27 % 39 % 12 % 3,34 
Results from direct observation at the plants 
At each plant, a guided tour of the plant was carried out. During each tour, pictures were 
taken of interesting observations, which did not concern restricted intellectual property of the 
company.  
During February and March 2011 a Kaizen action was carried out at Salten. The target for 
this Kaizen action was the plant’s hydraulics room. The state of the hydraulics room was 
worn-down and the layout was disorganized, with a cluttering of broken and new equipment 
making the room difficult to clean.The state of the room January 2011: 
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A committee of employees was set down to carry out the Kaizen action. A target state of the 
room was defined, followed by a set of tasks defined to reach the target state. These tasks 
included cleaning out the room, sorting the equipment, and painting the walls. Further, a 
standard was established, defining the function of the room, as well as which equipment is to 
be found. During the guided tour at the plant, the investigators were shown the room. The 
pictures below were taken by the investigators, showing that the results of the Kaizen action 
performed in the Hydraulics room were still maintained one year after the action. The state of 
the room March 2012: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another interesting direct observation was the appearance of the visitor’s cards issued to 
allow access into the main areas of the plants. At Iceland, this card displayed the former name 
of the plant, giving little indication that this was an Elkem plant. In comparison, the visitor’s 
card at Salten showed the Elkem logo.  
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Appendix E: Performance indicators after EBS was introduced in Elkem 
These figures show how the income from operations and the injury rate has developed in the years 
after EBS was introduced in Elkem. 
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Appendix F: Overview of the cited EBS tools and methodology 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Explanation 
Rolling Top Five A management tool to decide the top five prioritized improvement areas at each level in the 
plant.  
5S 5S is a systematic method for creating and maintaining a common standard for order and  
structure in a workgroup or workplace. The five S stand for: Sort, Structure, Shine, 
Standardize, Sustain 
 
A3 A3 is a tool used to solve problems and tackle challenges. It is a systematic method for 
progressing from problems/challenges to implementation and measurement of results.  
The A3 contains: 
• BC (Business Case): What problems have we identified or what challenges do we 
face?  
• Current condition: How do things work today? Why is there a problem or a 
challenge? Analysis of causes.  
• Target condition: How is the solution that solves the business case? What should 
the new process look like?  
• Action plan: How do we implement the Target Condition? What actions are 
required, who should do it and when? 
• Measurement/control: How do we confirm that our solution actually produced 
the desired results?  
 
Standardized 
work (standard 
practice) 
Precise procedures describing how to conduct a work task reducing variations and defining 
the basis for improvements. 
 
Kaizen Continuous improvement to create more value with less waste, either focusing on the whole 
value chain or on an individual process. 
 
